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Abstract 
This monograph reopens a central and contentious question about Machiavelli's 
thought: how does he understand the relation between morality and politics? In the 
twentieth century, three of the most influential answers were those of Benedetto Croce, 
Leo Strauss and Isaiah Berlin. In 1925, Croce argued that Machiavelli values morality 
and thus discovered the "autonomy of politics" with bitterness. In 1958, Strauss argued 
that Machiavelli is both "an evil man" and "a teacher of evil." And in 1972, Berlin argued 
that Machiavelli's political philosophy is moral-but based on a "pagan morality." 
My dissertation reexamines the question of Machiavelli through a close reading 
that analyzes his political vision in both its historical and intellectual context. I argue that 
Machiavelli esteems the moral virtues but insists that to be a successful ruler one must 
know how to act against them, when necessary. Throughout his writings, he takes for 
granted that the state's security is a necessity without which virtue, honour and greatness 
are themselves not possible; thus he argues that the necessity of security overrides moral 
considerations when the two come into conflict. Further, since expansion increases 
security, expansion itself is necessary. This is a far-reaching argument. First, it means that 
the struggle for power is inherent in affairs of state, not only due to avarice and ambition 
but also due to the desire for security itself; second, since expansion is necessary for 
security, the argument that rulers may violate moral norms for the end of security extends 
to expansion. At the same time, MachiaveHi' s realist mode of analysis also puts limits on 
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ambition, avarice and expansion, though they derive largely from a prudent understanding 
of necessity, the limits of power and the indignation aroused by injustice. 
When it comes to the art of the state, for Machiavelli, the true way is to be in 
accord with necessity. Necessity resolves the conflict between politics and morality and 
subordinates the orthodox notion of the true way-whether associated with Christianity, 
the middle way or both-to the true way revealed by necessity. 
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The View from the Palazzo 
. Justice, it has been said, is more wondrous than the evening and morning star. Yet, 
like the glow of Venus at dusk and dawn, justice is not only beautiful but elusive and 
fleeting. And as Mars often forsakes the beauty of Venus to stir up wars, human beings 
often forsake justice; the reasons for this seemingly senseless betrayal are manifold. 
Firstly, there is no universally acknowledged standard of justice; different individuals, 
societies and epochs may hold conceptions of justice that are themselves in conflict. 
Secondly, even when people share a concept of justice, there is often disagreement about 
the particulars of justice, such as, who has been wronged and how to correct it. Thirdly, 
the actions of individuals and groups often fall short of their own ideals of justice. The 
first problem is epistemological: in order to use power justly, one must know what is just 
and unjust or, to put it in moral terms, what is good and evil. In the domestic context, the 
second and third problem may be addressed by a well-ordered political community: 
disputes may be settled by impartial, authoritative courts, while violence and fraud may 
be constrained by the force of law. A further restraint at both the domestic and 
international level is that moral standards themselves act as a form of power insofar as 
they restrain those who accept them as standards. Yet even in our age of the United 
Nations it still remains the case that there is no supranational body with the competence 
to make, adjudicate· and enforce international laws (though a patchwork of organizations 
has emerged to try to fill that gap: United Nations' resolutions, the International Criminal 
Court, coalitions of the willing and so on). Thus, the appeal to justice-whether 
1 
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originating from the United Nations, governments, groups or the street-is often not 
enough to restrain the use of violence by one group against another. That being the case, 
realists-those who assume that material power, not justice, is the principal force in 
international relations-may off er some insight on the prudent conduct of foreign affairs. 
Since E. H. Carr's assessment that Machiavelli "is the first important realist" is 
widely shared, Machiavelli is a fitting place to begin to study the relation between 
morality and politics. 1 As a man of the late Renaissance, his thinking is influenced by the 
ancients, medieval thought and Italian humanism, but what makes him stand out from that 
background is his frank descriptions of internal and external affairs as well as his bold 
and original prescriptions for how to deal with them. 2 Although many of his principles 
were controversial in his own time, and have been ever since, there may be wisdom in his 
underlying premise that "men cannot secure themselves except with power" (D 1.1.4).3 
His counsels are based on pessimism about human nature and the belief that neither 
human desires nor the human condition change over time-though he recognizes that 
human values change due to what he calls educazione ("education" or "upbringing"). 
1 The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 62. 
2 Throughout my thesis I try to stay close to Machiavelli's language in order to enter into 
his thought as well as to avoid imposing a later vocabulary on him. Likewise, I generally 
use male pronouns since, as Hanna Pitkin notes, "Machiavelli and his intended audience 
were males" (Fortune is a Woman, p. 175 n. 4). There were, however, esteemed female 
rulers at his time, such as Isabella of Spain and Caterina Sforza. 
3 Quotations from The Prince, Discourses and Florentine Histories are from the 
translations by Harvey Mansfield et al. References to the Discourses cite book, chapter 
and paragraph. References to the Art of War, translated by Christopher Lynch, cite book 
and section. I provide the Italian only when particular words, or the wording itself, are 
especially important. All quotations from II principe are from the edition edited by Jean-
J acques Marchand. The Italian from Machiavelli's other works, except where noted, is 
from Tutte le opere edited by Mario Casella. 
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Like no other, Machiavelli faces the problem of power directly: power is necessary for 
security but may be abused out of ambition or avarice; fear and the love of liberty lead 
states to rob others of their liberty; what should be done is often forsaken for what is 
useful. Machiavelli takes us to the heart of a problem still without remedy. 
The Heart of the Enigma 
While Machiavelli's works may still have something to teach us today, they also 
present puzzling questions. One of the most contentious and persistent is how he 
understands the relationship between politics and morality. In all his works, his concern 
for the common good is palpable, and he uses the common moral vocabulary of his time. 
Yet he often analyzes events and offers counsels with little or no discussion of their 
justice or injustice. I will, as is almost customary, point to some of the most egregious 
examples in a cursory fashion. He teaches that to maintain a new principality, one must 
eliminate the bloodline of the previous prince (P 3). He explains what Louis XII-a 
"barbarian" power-should have done to maintain his acquisitions in Italy (P 3, 26). He 
demonstrates how one can use "crime" to gain power "for whoever would find it 
necessary" (P 8). In both The Prince and the Discourses, he gives it as a general rule that 
"men should either be caressed or eliminated" (P 3, D 2.23.4). In the Discourses, he 
advises not only princes and republics but also tyrants. As he dispassionately writes, 
"tyrants" can secure themselves against leading citizens either "by getting rid of them" or 
by having them share in enough honours that they will be content (1.16.5). In Discourses 
1.26.1, he elaborates on how to make a successful tyranny and says men who desire to rule 
3 
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must be willing to commit acts "altogether wicked." In the next discourse, he gives as an 
example the murder of the pope and the cardinals, saying that such "honorably wicked" 
acts have something great or generous in them. He teaches that an uncorrupt republic 
should offend citizens whom it ought to reward and have suspicion of those in whom it 
ought to have confidence in order to check their ambition for power (1.29.3). He notes that 
if a victorious captain shows insolence toward his lord, the latter will deserve "some 
excuse" for seeking either to have him killed or to take away his reputation (1.29.1); the 
following chapter advises a victorious captain either to leave the army after a victory or to 
use the army to punish the prince for the ingratitude he would have shown his victorious 
captain (1.30.1). In Discourse 1.40, he examines with seeming indifference how a people 
may maintain freedom and how a ruler may seize a tyranny. In Discourses 3.16.2, he 
argues that a republic should always be ordered to make war so that the most worthy 
citizens do not foment imprudent wars merely to see themselves given the positions of 
command that they deserve (D 3.16.2 ). 
Machiavelli's reason for offering such counsels can be puzzling: are they merely 
analyses or also prescriptions? Those who see some merit in his argument that a good end 
may excuse immoral means often cede some justification to his more well-known 
precepts-for example, that cruelty should be used well (P 8), that promises to other 
rulers may be broken (P 18), that a ruler should appear good even when forced to act 
against morality (P 18). Others have concluded that all such counsels are simply evil. 
Reginald Pole, in his Apologia ad Caro/um Quintum, written in 1539, writes: 
Among other works, he composed The Prince (for this is the title he has given to 
one of his books), in which he portrays for us such a prince, that, if Satan were to 
4 
reign in the flesh and were to have a son, to whom he were to bequeath his 
sovereignty after his death, he would give him no other instructions than those 
found in this book. 4 
Over four hundred years later, Strauss declared himself to be "inclined to the old-
fashioned and simple opinion according to which Machiavelli was a teacher of evil. "5 
However, if Machiavelli were simply a teacher of evil, his writings would not also have 
garnered centuries of praise-unless he has duped everyone except his condemners. 
Certainly, his writings have put those who see some virtue in them on the defence. In 
order to better situate my own reading, I will delineate the more sympathetic 
interpretations of the past five centuries. 6 
In light of all the hostile attacks on Machiavelli, it is noteworthy that the first 
printing of The Prince, Discourses and Florentine Histories was sanctioned, in 1531, by 
Pope Clement VII.7 However, at that time The Prince already had its detractors, leading 
the Florentine printer Bernardo Giunta to dedicate the work to a churchman in .the Papal 
Curia, writing: "may your lordship defend it from those persons who, because of its 
subject, go about lacerating it so harshly, all day long, not knowing that those who teach 
herbs and medicines equally teach poisons too, only so that we may defend ourselves 
4 In Kraye, Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Political Texts, vol. 2, p. 275 
(hereafter cited as Cambridge Translations). On the date of the text see Donaldson, 
Machiavelli and Mystery of State, p. 6. Donaldson notes that although Pole's Apologia 
was not pub~ished until the middle of the eighteenth century "his views had some 
circulation during his lifetime" (p. 88). 
5 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 9. 
6 For reviews of Machiavelli's reception see Burd, ed., II principe; Meinecke, 
Machiavellism; Baron, In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism, vol. 2; Cochrane, 
"Machiavelli: 1940-1960"; Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli. 
7 Burd, ed., II principe, p. 2. 
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from them because we know them. "8 Giunta does not challenge the notion that The 
Prince teaches poison but defends Machiavelli's intention for doing so. The reason some 
Florentines were lacerating The Prince is accounted for Giovanni Busini (1501-74). 
Although Busini is generally hostile toward Machiavelli, and he is writing twenty-two 
years after his death, Roberto Ridolfi still accounts it a faithful picture of how many 
Florentines felt about Machiavelli in 1527 (the last year of his life): 
The populace hated him on account of The Prince: to the rich it appeared that his 
Prince was a document to teach the duke to take from them all of their property, 
to the poor it was to take all of their liberty. To the Savonarolans, it seemed he 
was a heretic; the good thought he was dishonest; the wicked thought he was more 
wicked, or more effective, than they were; so that everyone hated him. 9 
Busini's "everyone" is, however, clearly an exaggeration, for in addition to Giunta's 
defense of The Prince, another early justification was that Machiavelli intended it as an 
act of fraud. Reginald Pole relates that while in Florence around 1538, he discussed The 
Prince with some Florentines who excused the work by saying that Machiavelli had told 
them his intention was to write things pleasing to a tyrant and thus expedite his "swift 
downfall."10 While Pole is presumably a reliable witness that such an interpretation was 
8 The prefatory letter is translated in Connell, ed., The Prince, pp. 151-52. Two editions 
were published in 1532, one by Antonio Blado in Rome and one by Bernardo di Giunta in 
Florence. On these two editions see Burd, ed., JI principe, pp. 2, 35-36; Connell, ed., The 
Prince, pp. 147-52. 
9 In The Prince, ed. Connell, p. 160. Burd quotes the Italian: "e l' universale per conto del 
suo Principe ; ai ricchi pareva che quel Principe fosse stato un documento da insegnare al 
Duca tor loro tutta la roba, e a' poveri tutta liberta. Ai Piagnoni pareva che e' fosse 
eretico, ai buoni disonesto, ai tristi piu tristo, o valente di lorn : talche ognuno l' odiava" 
(Burd, ed., JI principe, p. 40). For Ridolfi's judgement see Life of Niccolo Machiavelli, p. 
248 (hereafter cited as Life of Machiavelli). Viroli shares Ridolfi' s view, Machiavelli, p. 
114. For more on the letter see Connell, ed., The Prince, pp. 159-60. 
10 Apology, in Kraye, Cambridge Translations, vol. 2, p. 285. In the Apology, Pole says 
this conversation took place "last winter." Since he composed the work in 1539, Pole is 
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in circulation at that time-about ten years after Machiavelli's death-it seems unlikely 
that Machiavelli himself was the source of it since he refers to its analyses positively in 
his later writings. Nonetheless, Pole's comment again shows that Machiavelli's 
. sympathizers felt The Prince required some justification. The argument that it contains 
intentionally bad counsels is later found in Giovanni Toscano (1578), Andre Rossant 
(1589) and Thomas Fitzherbert (1606). 11 On the other hand, Alberico Gentili, an Oxford 
jurist and law professor, expands on the expose interpretation in his De legationibus libri 
tres (1585): 
It was not his purpose to instruct the tyrant, but by revealing his secret counsels, to 
strip him bare, and expose him to the suffering nations. Do we not know that there 
have been many princes such as he describes? That is the reason why princes of 
that type object to the survival and publication of his works. The purpose of this 
shrewdest of men was to instruct the nations under pretext of instructing the 
prince.12 
Since the Roman Church placed Machiavelli's writings on the Index librorum 
prohibitorum in 1557, Gentili's stab at tyrannical princes who wish to repress the work in 
order to conceal their secret counsels seems aimed at the papacy. Francis Bacon also se~s 
the work's merit in its expose of wicked princes. In his Advancement of Learning (1605), 
he writes: 
presumably referring to the winter of 1538-39. In another anecdote from an even later 
source-Riccardo Riccardi (1558-1612)-it is alleged that Machiavelli presented The 
Prince to Lorenzo de' Medici but that he showed more enthusiasm over a gift of hunting 
dogs; Machiavelli is then said to have told some friends that "if [the Medici] ·observed his 
methods [in The Prince]; they would see that conspiracies resulted from it, as ifhe meant 
to say that his book would get him his revenge" (see Connell, ed., The Prince, p. 142). 
11 Toscano, Pep/us ltaliae (Paris, 1578); Rossant, Les meurs, humeurs et comportemens 
de Henry de Valois (Paris, 1589); Fitzherbert, First Part of a Treatise Concerning Policy 
and Religion (Douai, 1606) (Donaldson, Machiavelli and Mystery of State, pp. 88-89). 
12 Quoted in Donaldson, Machiavelli and Mystery of State, p. 10 n. 15, p. 89. See also 
Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 115. 
7 
we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and not 
what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the 
columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; 
his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and 
sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue 
lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are 
wicked to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. 13 
By discussing political life as it is, Machiavelli's writings forewarn honest men about 
"deceits and evil arts."14 Bacon is not, however, wholly sympathetic to Machiavelli, 
criticizing him for teaching "that it belongeth to the education and discipline of princes to 
know how to play the part of the lion in violence and the fox in guile."15 
Spinoza in his Political Treatise (1677) and Rousseau in The Social Contract 
(1762) both see Machiavelli as a lover of liberty and interpret The Prince as a warning to 
the people about the nature of princes. Spinoza comes to this conclusion by reckoning 
that such a "wise statesman" and "advocate of freedom" must have had "some good 
purpose in mind."16 Rousseau takes the differences between The Prince on the one hand 
and the Discourses and Florentine Histories on the other as evidence that The Prince only 
pretends to give lessons to kings while really warning the people about the king's aim of 
keeping them weak. 17 
In the nineteenth century, the relationship between The Prince and Machiavelli's 
other works began to be re-evaluated. Burd attributes this in part to the fact that 
13 The Advancement of Learning (1605), p. 254. 
14 Ibid., p. 254. 
15 Ibid., p. 188. 
16 Political Treatise, ch. 5, paragraph 7. 
17 The Social Contract, bk. 3, ch. 6 and the note added by Rousseau to the 1782 edition. 
Since Machiavelli advises the prince to arm his subjects, Rousseau's interpretation is 
clearly too narrow. 
8 
Machiavelli's now famous letter of December 10~ 1513, to Francesco Vettori was 
published for the first time in 1810.18 In the letter Machiavelli explains: "[I] have 
composed a little work De Principatibus, where I delve as deeply as I can into reflections 
. on this subject." He also says he plans to dedicate the work to Giuliano de' Medici as he 
desires employment with the "Medici lords."19 As Burd points out, the letter helps 
establish that The Prince was written in good faith, not as an expose, fraud or satire.20 
Thomas Macaulay, basing his argument on a close reading of The Prince, makes the same 
point in his essay entitled Machiavelli (1827). As Macaulay points out, The Prince 
contains many passages which preclude the view that it was intended either as a satire of 
ambitious princes or as a calculated fraud against the Medici.21 He then proposes that all 
of Machiavelli's works exhibit "the same obliquity of moral principle" alongside 
"elevation of sentiment" and "zeal for the public good." The solution to this "enigma," he 
finds not in Machiavelli himself but "in the state of moral feeling among the Italians of 
those times." The view that the immorality in Machiavelli's writings reflects his times 
more than his own character was also maintained by Herder, Hegel, Fichte, Ranke and 
Burd.22 
18 Burd, ed., II principe, p. 14 n. 1. 
19 Quotations from the translation in Mansfield, ed., The Prince, pp. 110-11. 
20 Burd, ed., II principe, p. 20. 
21 This reference and the following may be found in Critical and Historical Essays, vol. 
2, pp. 2-4. 
22 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, pp. 154-55; Burd, ed., II principe, pp. 14-15, 24, 
28. 
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In Machiavelli's own view, are his writings a reflection of the times or tracts for 
all times? The former view is partly substantiated by Machiavelli's contempt for the 
corruption and weakness of his own period. As he writes in Florentine Histories: 
if in describing the things that happened in this devastated world one does not tell 
about either the strength of soldiers, or the virtue of the captain, or the love of the 
citizen for his fatherland, it will be seen with what deceits, with what guile and 
arts the princes, soldiers, and heads of republics conducted themselves so as to 
maintain the reputation they have not deserved. (5.1) 
Nonetheless, while Machiavelli was naturally affected by his times, his thought cannot be 
reduced to a mirror for his times. Machiavelli draws on the ancients because, in his view, 
affairs of state do not change. The principles he draws from the ancients and from his 
experience are intended as remedies for his own times, but as principles he recognizes 
them to be true for the past, present and future. To take one example of this conviction 
from among many: 
Prudent men are accustomed to say, and not by chance or without merit, that 
whoever wishes to see what has to be considers what has been; for all worldly 
things in every time have their own counterpart in ancient times. That arises 
because these are the work of men, who have and always had the same passions, 
and they must of necessity result in the same effect. (D 3.43.1) 
At the same time, Machiavelli knows that the lessons of the past cannot be applied 
regardless of particulars. For example, in Prince 20, he points out that he must speak in a 
"broad mode" since one must consider "the particulars of those states where any such 
decision has to be made." 
The seed of the argument that Machiavelli took a "scientific" approach to politics 
is already evident in Burd' s 1891 "Introduction" to fl principe: "Machiavelli in The 
Prince has eliminated sentiment and morality, though the interest to him was not merely 
10 
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scientific, but practical also. "23 That interpretation bloomed in the 1940s as writers such 
as Leonardo Olschki and Ernst Cassirer characterized Machiavelli as a proto-political 
scientist, coldly examining the laws of politics free from moral judgments.24 In 
Machiavelli's "entirely detached" an~lysis in Prince 3 of the mistakes that led Louis XII 
to lose his acquisitions in Italy, Cassirer sees Machiavelli looking at politics as if it "were 
a game of chess~"25 However, Chabod and Strauss have both argued that Machiavelli's 
analysis of Louis' mistakes prescribes the policies that would be necessary to piece 
together a strong Italian state. 26 Thus, what sometimes seem to be detached analyses may 
perhaps be veiled prescriptions. A further problem with the political scientist 
interpretation is that Machiavelli indeed makes normative judgments and shows partisan 
passions, something pointed out by several commentators.27 Despite these weaknesses 
with the thesis that Machiavelli treats politics scientifically, the fact remains that he does 
often adopt a shockingly amoral tone. This leads back to the question about his own view 
of morality-does putting morality to the side mean that he devalues it? 
In the twentieth century, three of the most influential answers were those of 
Benedetto Croce, Leo Strauss and Isaiah Berlin.28 As already mentioned, Strauss aligns 
23 Burd, ed., JI principe, p. 16. 
24 Olschki, Machiavelli the Scientist (1945); Cassirer, The Myth of the State (1946). For a 
review of this literature see Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," pp. 119-21. 
25 Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 143. 
26 See Chabod, Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 75 and n. 2; Strauss, Thoughts on 
Machiavelli, pp. 66-67. 
27 See, for example, Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, pp. 11, 233; Anglo, Machiavelli: A 
Dissection, p. 272; Wood, "Machiavelli's Humanism of Action," p. 34; Mansfield, 
Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 21; Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 7. 
28 In a review of Machiavelli scholarship published between 1940 and 1960, Eric 
Cochrane states that Croce's thesis is one of the most widely discussed and has achieved 
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his interpretation with the opinion that Machiavelli "was an evil man" and "a teacher of 
evil. "29 In other words, he aligns his interpretation with the view of religious writers such 
as Reginald Pole and Innocent Gentillet. An interpretation of Strauss' Thoughts on 
Machiavelli and 'why he chose such unlikely allies would take us too far afield as we 
would first have to question the very sincerity of his claim; after all, he himself admits 
that it.is a "simple opinion" and indicates that "the considerate ascent from it leads to the 
core of Machiavelli's thought."30 Thus, Strauss hints in his introduction that his exoteric 
position is qualified by an esoteric position. Further, although he condemns Machiavelli's 
teaching, he argues that "he does not bring to light a single political phenomenon of any 
fundamental importance which was not fully known to the classics."31 Strauss' position 
on Machiavelli has an interesting relation to Machiavelli's own claim to reveal the 
ancient esoteric teaching symbolized by Chiron since it seems they agree on that point. 
However, Strauss, the defender of the ancients, publicly discredits Machiavelli's teaching 
as "an evil teaching." In other words, his condemnation of Machiavelli's teaching seems 
aimed at relegating it to the esoteric position it had in ancient thought, even if in making 
such a claim he condemns himself to some "harmless ridicule. "32 
general acceptance in Italy ("Machiavelli: 1940-1960," p. 115.). Berlin refers to it as 
"[t]he most influential of all modem interpretations" (The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 
177). In John Geerken's 1976 literature review, "Machiavelli Studies since 1969," he 
supports Berlin's thesis and calls the essay "one of the most interesting of the 
quincentenary papers" (p. 365). Of the numerous commentators who write on Machiavelli 
in a Straussian vein, Harvey Mansfield wears the affiliation most openly. 
29 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 9. 
30 Ibid., p. 13, emphasis added. 
31 Ibid., p. 295. 
32 Ibid., p. 9. 
12 
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I will now turn to a brief summary of Croce's and Berlin's more straightforward 
interpretations. Croce first stated his influential interpretation that Machiavelli discovered 
"the autonomy of politics" in Elementi di politica (1925). As he writes: 
It is known that Machiavelli discovers the necessity and autonomy of 
politics, of politics which is beyond or, rather, below moral good and evil, which 
has its own laws against which it is useless to rebel, politics that cannot be 
exorcised and driven from the world with holy water. 33 
Since in Croce's view Machiavelli values morality, he argues that Machiavelli made his 
discovery with "sharp bittemess."34 Isaiah Berlin's essay The Originality of Machiavelli 
(1972) rejects Croce's interpretation. Berlin argues that in Machiavelli's writings, the 
reader finds conventional objective morality existing side by side with a social pagan 
morality. By pagan morality, he means taking the creation of "a strong, secure and 
vigorous society" as an ultimate value sought after for its own sake. 35 He argues that such 
an ultimate end is, by definition, a moral end and thus posits that pagan morality is an 
alternative to the type of morality that rests on an objective criterion (such as the word of 
God or eternal reason). 36 He then argues that although Christian morality and pagan 
morality exist side by side in Machiavelli's writings, he places little value in the former 
and instead embraces the latter: "he chose his side, and took little interest in the values 
that this choice ignored or flouted. The conflict between his scale of values and that of 
33 Politics and Morals, p. 59. 
34 Ibid., p. 60. Federico Chabod endorsed Croce's autonomy thesis in an essay also 
published in 1925 (see his Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 116). Croce reaffirmed his 
interpretation in an essay published in 1949 (see Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," p. 
115). 
35 The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 173; also see pp. 169, 177. 
36 Ibid., pp. 169, 177-78. 
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conventional morality clearly did not (pace Croce and the other defenders of the 
"anguished humanist" interpretation) seem to worry Machiavelli himself. "37 
Both interpretations are persuasive insofar as both account for a peculiar aspect of 
Machiavelli's thought: that he speaks as though morality has some sort of objective 
validity, yet often addresses affairs of state in isolation from that morality or even in 
contravention of it. In Croce's reading this is because Machiavelli recognizes politics and 
morality as autonomous spheres, in Berlin's because he has little interest in conventional 
morality. The question of whether Machiavelli is an "anguished humanist" is a matter of 
where one places the emphasis. On the one hand, Berlin is right that Machiavelli 
generally does not show any anguish in imparting his counsels; on the other, Croce is 
right that he does show much bitterness over men's malignity and corruption. 
My dissertation reexamines the question of Machiavelli through a close reading 
that focuses on the relation between morality and politics in his writings and that analyzes 
his political vision in terms of both its historical and intellectual context. My reading 
concurs with two of the essential elements of Croce's thesis: the argument that 
Machiavelli values morality and the argument that he emphasizes the role of necessity in 
politics (the third element, the question of his anguish, I just briefly addressed). Croce's 
framing however overgeneralizes the degree to which Machiavelli separates morality and 
politics. While he does indeed often analyze affairs of state according to cold reason, he 
does not envision a general break between morality and politics since the very context of 
affairs of state is praise and blame, the virtues, honour and glory. 
37 Ibid., p. 196. 
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I argue that Machiavelli esteems the moral virtues but insists that to be a 
successful ruler one must know how to act against them, when necessary. Throughout his 
writings, he takes for granted that the state's security is a necessity without which virtue, 
honour and greatness are themselves not possible; thus he argues that the necessity of 
security overrides moral considerations when the two come into conflict. Further, since 
expansion increases security, expansion itself is necessary. This is a far-reaching 
argument. First, it means that the struggle for power is inherent in affairs of state, not only 
due to avarice and ambition but also due to the desire for security itself; second, since 
expansion is necessary for security, the argument that rulers may violate moral norms for 
the sake of security extends to expansion. At the same time, however, Machiavelli's 
realist mode of analysis also puts limits on ambition, avarice and expansion, though they 
derive largely from a prudent understanding of necessity, the limits of power and the 
indignation aroused by injustice. When it comes to the art of the state, for Machiavelli, 
the true way is to be in accord with necessity. Necessity resolves the conflict between 
politics and morality and subordinates the orthodox notion of the true way-whether 
associated with Christianity, the middle way or both-to the true way revealed by 
necessity. 
My exploration of Machiavelli's political vision falls into seven chapters. The 
remaining part of the introductory chapter will argue for the merits of an exegetical 
approach to Machiavelli's texts, provide a brief introduction to the historical and 
intellectual context of his thought, and justify reading The Prince and Discourses 
together. 
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The underlying purpose in the second and third chapter is to show that despite 
Machiavelli's argument from necessity he does esteem honour and the moral virtues. 
Chapter 2, "Machiavelli's Princes and Principality," sets up the argument through a brief 
history of Cesare Borgia's rise and fall. As is well known, Machiavelli holds Cesare up as 
a model for imitation in The Prince. To understand why, it is important to paint a 
contemporary portrait of him which gets under the rumours that later historians recorded 
as history. Further, since Machiavelli and Cesare Borgia were contemporaries whose 
paths crossed on three separate occasions, the brief history of Cesare will also shed light 
on Machiavelli's political context and development as a thinker. The historical account of 
Cesare then provides the basis for analyzing his role in Prince 7 and that chapter's 
relation to chapter 6 on virtit and chapter 8 on crime. I argue against the view that 
Machiavelli's intention in the three chapters is to undermine the differences between 
virtit, fortune and crime, but rather that his aim is to hold them up as useful and important 
distinctions. Nonetheless, when it comes to the art of the state, Machiavelli himself argues 
for the necessity of what could be called, to adapt an expression from Sheldon Wolin, an 
economy of moral transgression. 38 
Chapter 3, "The Human Basis of Morality and Justice," shows that Machiavelli 
allows the violation of the moral virtues only for the sake of the security and well-being 
of the state; in other words, his argument does not extend to a critique of honour and the 
moral virtues in general. The chapter also focuses on the place of justice in his thought, 
for, although he minimizes it, he also points out the deleterious effects that disregarding 
38 For Wolin's ~rgument that Machiavelli's political theory is premised on "an economy 
of violence" see Politics and Vision, ch. 7, sec. 5. 
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justice can have for a ruler. Further in the Discourses he adopts a theory from Polybius 
that finds the origin of both morality and justice in human nature. Although Machiavelli 
honours the virtue of justice, when it comes to the art of the state, he censures the desire 
to acquire only when it leads to acquiring more than one can hold. While that is a merely 
practical limit, he still thinks justice has a role in restraining a power from betraying a 
friend, warns about the hatred generated by flagrant acts of injustice and points out the 
importance of treating the people where one's army is camped justly. Thus, while 
Machiavelli takes a pragmatic approach to affairs of state, his theory still puts limits on 
ambition, avarice and expansion, though they derive from a prudent understanding of 
necessity, the limits of power and a psychological understanding of the role of justice. 
Chapter 4, "Of Natural Things," develops an interpretation of what Machiavelli · 
considers to be in accord with nature. The first part analyzes his frequent deployment of 
the argument from "necessity" or, what he calls in Prince 3, "natural necessity." In his 
view, the argument from necessity resolves the conflict between the moral good and the 
political good since security and well-being are the sine qua non. The second part of ~he 
chapter analyzes his concern with the relation between a ruler's particular nature and his 
fortuna (or fortune). I argue that in his view a ruler has enough free will to harness the 
virtue of his state as a defense against fortuna and also to accommodate his own nature to 
the needs of the times, though not enough to change his nature altogether. The final part 
focuses on Machiavelli's statements about the true way and its relation to Christianity, the 
middle way, the Roman way and necessity. While Machiavelli refers in passing to 
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Christianity and to the middle way as "the true way," this section argues that he 
subordinates the orthodox true way to a more efficacious rival, the true way of necessity. 
Since the Roman republic followed necessity in its ascendency, its example teaches the 
true way. However, Machiavelli also shows that once Rome attained supremacy over its 
enemies and began to overextend, corruption set in. Thus, the corruption that began to eat 
away at Roman virtue reveals another necessity: all things have a natural limit that, once 
crossed, initiates their decline. 
Chapter 5, "Of Supernatural Things," treats the question of Machiavelli's religious 
beliefs and how they bear on his understanding of the relation between morality and 
politics. The chapter argues that Machiavelli never questions the existence of God but is 
ultimately most concerned with human things, that is, the freedom left to human agency 
in a world partly determined by suprahuman causes. When it comes to the question of 
divine punishment, he argues in Prince 8 that a ruler can have "some remedy" with God 
for cruelty if it s_~rves the common good. Thus I argue that Machiavelli believes in God 
but assumes that religion correctly interpreted is not' in conflict with natural necessity. 
Chapter 6, "Machiavelli and the Ancients," begins with a critique of Isaiah 
Berlin's argument that Machiavelli adopts a pagan morality. The chapter shows that 
Berlin misrepresents both Machiavelli's writings and ancient thought by too quickly 
explaining away the existence of the objective moral standards evident in both; that is, in 
both Machiavelli's thought and pagan thought there are moral concepts that transcend the 
good of the polis and act as measures by which political conduct may be morally judged. 
Further, Machiavelli knew it was not possible to simply leap over (what was already 
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coming to be known as) the Middle Ages in order to adopt a pagan morality; rather, his 
argument for the imitation of antiquity must be understood in the context of the Christian 
education and humanism of his time. To·that end, the final section of the chapter traces 
the origin of humanism, or the studia humanitatis, in ancient Rome and its rebirth in 
Renaissance Italy. It will be shown that where Machiavelli parts from his humanist peers 
is in his argument that the inhumane aspects of ancient politics should also be imitated. 
However, I argue that his call for the imitation of the ancients is nonetheless still 
tempered by the Stoic and Christian ideal of humanitas (or humanity). 
· The concluding chapter, "Machiavelli and the Quality of the Times," shows that 
most twentieth-century realists share Machiavelli's premise that for the sake of one good, 
the security of the state, rulers must be willing when necessary to act against another 
good, moral norms. The chapter then traces the development of the balance-of-power 
concept, a norm that appeared in Machiavelli's own time, became generally accepted by 
the end of the seventeenth century and was still generally accepted by twentieth-century 
realists. In light of the spread of the balance-of-power principle, the rise of more fixed 
territorial borders and technological advancements (allowing power to be increased 
internally rather than through expansion), Machiavelli's argument that expansion is 
necessary for the· sake of security has lost much of its explicit rationale. Nonetheless, his 
enthusiasm for the Roman model suggests that his argument for the necessity of 
expansion is also mixed up with what is simply his admiration for political grandeur. In 
the penultimate section of the conclusion, I suggest that Nietzsche's concern with cultural 
greatness is as, or more, pressing for our times than Machiavelli's concern with political 
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greatness. In particular, whereas one of Machiavelli's main concerns is how morality and 
religion affect the art of the state, one of Nietzsche's main concerns is how morality and 
religion have themselves become groundless. Thus I use Nietzsche's writings to show 
that a pressing problem pervades our times: morality and religion have themselves fallen 
into question. 
Although Machiavelli's writings presuppose the existence of both internal and 
external struggles for power, I believe that in our times Machiavelli's writings have more 
currency in terms of external affairs. One reason for this is that it remains true, as 
Machiavelli says in Prince 18, that in foreign affairs there is no court for princes to appeal 
to. Since there is no authoritative body with the competence to make and enforce 
international laws, foreign affairs tend to exemplify the problem of the relation between 
morality and politics in a more naked form than domestic politics. Secondly, although 
contemporary situations occasionally remind us that internal affairs can devolve into a 
revolutionary situation, they are generally less volatile now than at Machiavelli's time. 
Such an argument was already made by Fichte in 1807 in On Machiavelli as Author 
(Uber Macchiavelli als Schriftsteller); therein, he writes that Machiavelli's maxims still 
apply to external affairs but that, with the pacification of relations between princes and 
peoples, civil law has become sufficient for the direction of internal affairs. 39 Consistent 
with the pacification of internal affairs described by Fichte, Jerrold Seigel dates the origin 
of more stable internal affairs to the centralization of the European monarchies in the 





eighteenth century.4° For those reasons my study of the relation between politics and 
morality in Machiavelli's thought focuses more heavily on external affairs. 
Postcards to Machiavelli 
The host of interpretations that haunt Machiavelli's corpus bear witness to "the 
death of the author." According to this poststructuralist critique of traditional 
hermeneutics, a text lacks any authoritative presence that could assure it of an intended 
meaning. As Paul de Man puts it: "There is no escape from [deconstruction], for the text 
also establishes that deconstruction is not something we can decide to do or not to do at 
will. It is co-extensive with any use oflanguage.''41 From that point of view, texts remain 
irreducibly open to interpretation as well as the creativity of the reader. In Machiavelli's 
writings, the indeterminacy of language is heightened by his characteristic pithiness, 
shocking boldness and polemical style. 
While interpretation admittedly faces uncertainties and rests on some degree of 
reasoned speculation, my interest nonetheless Iies in the hermeneutic pursuit of trying to 
understand Machiavelli as he understood himself. One reason is sheer curiosity: what did 
Machiavelli really intend? A related reason is respect: due to his remarkable political 
experience and incisive intellect, I take for granted that trying to grasp Machiavelli's 
intention is the :rpost valuable way to approach his work (regardless of whether one agrees 
with him). If, in accordance with the postmodern contention, the standard of the author's 
40 
"Virtu in and since the Renaissance," pp. 483-84. For the same point, also see 
Meinecke, Machiavellism, p. 284. 
41 Quoted in Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 13 n. 54. 
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intention is abandoned, what is left? At best, creative interpretations, strategic 
appropriations or playful deconstructions. At worst, slapdash readings, ideologically-
motivated caricatures and purely subjective interpretations. While the latter are merely 
arbitrary, the first three also have shortcomings (particularly if they are not based on a 
more comprehensive engagement with the author'·s intention): going straight to a creative 
interpretation privileges one's own acuity over the author's; making strategic 
appropriations without grasping the whole of which they are a part can· bring along 
unrecognized implications, and undoing a text by deconstructing it may undermine 
precisely what is most challenging and thought-provoking about it. For those reasons, my 
aim lies in an interpretation of Machiavelli's understanding of the relation between 
morality and politics as he himself saw it. 
In The Prince, Machiavelli himself writes: "my intent is to write something useful 
to whoever understands it" (P 15). 42 This shows that he thought he had something useful 
to teach but recognized that not everyone would hear it. If we now approach texts as 
haunted graveyards of dead signifiers, then we lose the great pleasure which Machiavelli 
himself found in entering the courts of ancient men, speaking with them and hearing their 
replies.43 Yet those who enter Machiavelli's own Study to ask him questions cannot even 
. agree on· how to hear the tone of his replies. Is he forthright or artful, detached or 
passionate, benevolent or diabolical?44 My interpretation takes most of his replies to be 
42 
"l'intendo mio, scrivere.cosa utile a chi la intende" (p. 215). 
43 As Machiavelli says in his letter to Vettori of December 10, 1513. 
44 On the question of his sincerity, Burd writes that Machiavelli "has taken the greatest 
pains to avoid ambiguity, and to say exactly what he means"; however, he also says that 





forthright, though delivered with his famous wry smile. Some believe such an approach to 
be naive or lacking in sophistication. However, when Machiavelli is taken to speak 
frankly, he is most clear and salient. A reading that stays close to his explicit sayings also 
has the merit of sounding like Machiavelli. On the other hand, focusing on silences, 
imputed contradictions and alleged double meanings may easily drift into arbitrariness. 
While it is necessary to consider what is happening between the lines, the search for 
esoteric meanings can take on a parasitical relationship with the text. How could 
Machiavelli show his knowledge of affairs of state, if he writes in such a mode that one 
must guess at his meaning? And what would he need to obfuscate when he already 
denounces the wickedness and foreign policy of the Roman church, says Christianity has 
been falsely interpreted as a passive religion, writes that the greatness of killing the pope 
would overcome its infamy and condones fratricide for the sake of the common good? 
As J. H. Whitfield jests, it is unfortunate that all these disputes over Machiavelli's 
intention cannot be resolved by simply sending him a postcard. 45 However, despite the 
death of our author, my interest remains an interpretation of his intention; thus, I take as 
my aids the traditional humanist strategies of interpreting a text in light of the writer's life 
as well as his or her linguistic, intellectual and historical context. 
prindpe, pp. 12, 14). According to Whitfield, those who pride themselves on reading 
under the surface miss his "ingenuousness" (Whitfield, Discourses on Machiavelli, pp. 4-
5). Geerken writes: "Machiavelli was much too careful and deliberate a writer to indulge 
in anything which might lead to his reader's confusion and possible disagreement" 
("Machiavelli's Moses," p. 591). Ledeen says of The Prince: "few great books are as 
clearly and unambiguously written" (Machiavelli on Modern Leadership, p. ix). On the 
other hand, Mansfield writes: "Machiavelli is sincere and never tries to trick his 
readers .... Nothing would have amused our Niccolo more" (Quoted in Nederman, 
Lineages, p. 302). 
45 Discourses on Machiavelli, p. 4. 
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Honour and the Art of the State 
In the Discourses Machiavelli relates a saying of the people-"They have one 
mind in the piazza and another in the palazzo" (1.47.3)--and inverts its meaning. In the 
mouth of the people, it accuses popular citizens who rise to a magistracy of abandoning 
the ideals they had espoused in the piazza. In Machiavelli's mouth, it means· that in the 
piazza one does not see things as clearly as when in the palazzo. His writings invite us to 
see the view from the palazzo. Of course a diversity of opinions still compete within the 
palazzo itself, but those views are based, one hopes, on ~nformed knowledge and a 
responsibility for the outcome. 
Machiavelli entered the palazzo at a time when the love of pagan antiquity had 
taken deep root in Italian culture but while Christianity still held sway. In Florence, under 
the influence of the Dominican friar Savonarola, a popular government was established 
after the expulsion of the Medici in 1494. During this republican period, the chief 
magistracies were the Signoria, the Ten of War, the Council of Eighty and the Great 
Council (what is often referred to as the Ten of War in Eng~ish was called the Dieci di 
Liberia e Pace or the Dieci di Bafia). The Republic's official head was the Gonfalonier of 
Justice; he was the presiding magistrate of the Signoria, a body composed of the 
Gonfalonier and Eight Priors of Liberty. The Signoria was responsible for deciding on 
policy and formulating legislation. The Ten of War dealt with foreign affairs, diplomacy 
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and the conduct ofwar.46 The Eighty was a council ·of review and advice.47 The approval 
of the Great Council was· required· to pass new laws and taxes. Appointments to the paid 
and honorary offices were made through the vote of the Great Council and a process of 
allotment. 
Under the law passed on December 23, 1494, a Florentine would become a 
member of the Great Council if he, his father or his grandfather had been a candidate for 
any of the three most honourable offices: the Signoria, the Twelve Good Men or the 
Sixteen Gonfalonieri. As a result of the law, over three thousand Florentines attained 
membership in the Great Council and with it the right to hold both paid offices and 
unpaid honourary offices. Cerretani, a contemporary historian, celebrated that "almost the 
whole of Florence were members of the government. "48 However, if Florence had a 
population of approximately seventy thousand at the time, then in fact only about one of 
every four or five adult males held full citizenship rights.49 Nonetheless, this new republic 
was considered a popular or broad government (governo popolare or largo). According to 
contemporary usage, those in the Great Council were often referred to as the moltitudine 
(mass) or the popolo (people) and those excluded from it the plebe (plebs) or the vulgo 
(mob). The upper class of the ottimati (best) was made up of the wealthy (ricchi) and the 
46 My main sources for the constitutional arrangement of the Florentine Republic are 
Gilbert, "Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini," pp. 
189-93, as well as his Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 8-23, 29, 65. 
47 Pesman, "Machiavelli, Piero Soderini, and the Republic of 1494-1512," p. 49. 
48 Quoted jn Brown, Medicean and Savonarolan Florence, p. 165. 
49 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 20. 
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old ruling families (grandi). 50 The ottimati who shared Savonarola's vision supported the 
new constitution, but many of the ottimati were grieved by the amount of authority the 
Great Council granted to the people. In their view, the new constitution gave too much 
power to those who were, in Guicciardini's words, "men of lesser brain and quality," 
taking authority from themselves, "the wise and qualified citizens."51 Thus, many of the 
ottimati sought a reform which would limit the authority of the Great Council, returning 
more power to themselves, or to eliminate the Great Council altogether and establish a 
~arrow government (governo stretto) modeled on the Venetian constitution. 
In the spring of 1498, Savonarola's enemies gained the upper hand. On April 8, he 
was arrested; he was then tortured and found guilty of conspiring to tamper with the 
government and falsely claiming to speak with God.52 On May 23, in the piazza of 
Florence, he and two of his most devoted disciples were hanged in chains and burned. 
After his execution, many of his supporters were removed from office. According to the 
criteria for membership in the Great Council, citizenship did not reach as far as the 
Machiavelli family; however, NiccolO' s name was one of four put forward by the Council 
of Eighty to fill the administrative post of Secretary of the Second Chancellery.53 Four 
days later, on June 19, the Great Council elected him to the post. He was twenty-nine. On 
July 14, the Signoria appointed him to also serve as Secretary to the Ten of War. At that 
5° For a more detailed account of these terms see Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guiccirdini, 
pp. 24-25; also see Pesman, "Machiavelli, Piero Soderini, and the Republic of 1494-
1512," p. 49. 
51 History of Florence, ch. 25, p. 248, and ch. 23, p. 222. 
52 Watkins, Humanism and Liberty, p. 227. 
53 On Machiavelli's election see Rubinstein, "The Beginnings of Niccolo Machiavelli's 
Career in the Florentine Chancery," and Black, "Florentine Political Traditions and 
Machiavelli's Election to the Chancery." 
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time Florence had to contend not only with the other major Italian powers-the duchy of 
Milan, the Venetian republic, the Papal States and the kingdom of Naples-but also with 
Italy's powerful neighbours: the French, the Spanish, the Swiss and the Germans. The 
invasion of Charles VIII in 1494 had shaken all of Italy, and after the French returned in 
1499 and then jointly took the kingdom of Naples with the Spanish in 1501, some Italians 
began to look back on the first French invasion as the signal of a new age in Italian 
politics. The string of foreign conquests inaugurated by Charles' unstoppable descent into 
Naples made clear the decisive role of arms in affairs of state.54 In the first years of the 
sixteenth century, Bernardo Rucellai wrote his History of the French Invasion, claiming 
that Charles' invasion was "by far the greatest event of this age, which has had an impact 
on the entire human race. "55 
On August 26, 1502, the Florentines passed a law to transform the office of 
Gonfalonier into a position for life. On September 22, Piero Soderini was elected by the 
Great Council to the new office. 56 Machiavelli became a close aide of Soderini, but this 
meant that enemies of Soderini also became enemies of Machiavelli. In 1506, Alamanno 
Salviati-who had supported Soderini' s election but came to oppose him when he failed 
to use his authority to advance the interests of the ottimati--expressed his opinion about 
Machiavelli at a dinner party: "I never entrusted anything at all to that rascal [ribaldo] 
54 See Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 129ff. 
55 Quoted in Gilbert, ibid., p. 259. 
56 See Gilbert, ibid., p. 74; Pesman, "Machiavelli, Soderini, and the Republic of 1494-
1512," pp. 50-51. 
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since I have been one of the Ten."57 Cerretani in his Jstoriafiorentina refers to 
Machiavelli as Soderini's "mannerino" (lackey).58 In 1512, Machiavelli would pay the 
price for this close connection to Soderini. 
Since the main role of the Great Council was voting on legislation and electing 
officials, deliberation took place in the smaller magistracies and in consultative meetings 
(pratiche ). The surviving pratiche of the Ten of War are particularly informative about 
the types of concerns and arguments that arose in their deliberations.59 Some of the Ten's 
pratiche are recorded in Machiavelli's own hand. 60 In these meetings, participants would 
often try to justify a particular course of action by supporting it with a proverb, a well-
known historical precedent or a classical authority, the most privileged history being that 
of Rome and the most authoritative sources classical and Christian texts. The Florentines 
prided themselves on their skillful application of ragione, or reason. In their meetings it 
was commonly argued that they should take "the middle way" (via di mezo), "enjoy the 
benefit of time~' (godere el beneficio de/ tempo) and, when war broke out, remain neutral 
as long as possible.61 But they also knew that reason and force were not the only factors 
in political affairs; there was necessity, fortune and God. Necessity was seen to trump 
freedom of action: "necessity dictates" (la necessita constringue) and "necessity knows of 
57 See the letter from Biago Buonaccorsi to Niccolo Machiavelli of October 6, 1506 
(Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 141 ). On Salviati, see Butters, "Machiavelli and the 
Medici," p. 65. 
58 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 99. 
59 Gilbert first published his study of this material in "Florentine Political Assumptions in 
the Period of Savonarola and Soderini" (1957). He then gave a slightly briefer account in 
his book Machiavelli and Guicciardini (1965). I rely on both as noted. 
60 Gilbert, "Florentine Political Assumptions," p. 192 n. 17, p. 213. 
61 Quoted in Gilbert, "Florentine Political Assumptions," pp. 198, 201, and Machiavelli 
and Guicciardini, pp. 33-34. 
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no laws" (la necessita non ha legge).62 Fortune, a concept inherited from the ancients, 
sigiiifies the role of chance in human affairs, and, when seen as a goddess, her caprice 
was subordinated to God's Providence. 
Religious belief runs throughout the pratiche. For the Florentines, the very 
success of their city was a sure sign of God's favour. One meeting records a participant 
saying: "in many ways God has shown that He will not abandon this city. "63 Such care 
was manifested to them in the sudden death of their Milanese enemy Giangaleazzo 
Visconti in 1402 and in the decision of Charles VIII to withdraw his occupying forces 
from Florence in 1494.64 Since they saw signs of God's intervention in their affairs, 
debate would often turn around whether a particular threat should be dealt with by trying 
to win God's succor or by resorting to the same wayward practices used by other states. 65 
Most speakers tried to balance their religious convictions with worldly wisdom, though 
some held more one-sided views. One of the extremes was to argue that they should 
strictly follow Christian principles. The other w~s to argue that they had to follow the 
ways of the world; as one speaker put it, when another "tries to trip us, we must try to trip 
him."66 A debate which occurred in August of 1505 shows two of the key considerations 
around which debate turned: securta and honore. In this pratica, we see them weighed 
against each other: "Piero Popoleschi said that Messer Francesco Gualterotti' s counsel 
62 Quoted in Gilbert, "Florentine Political Assumptions," p. 206, and Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini, p. 41. 
63 Quoted in Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 44. 
64 Ibid., pp. 43-44. For Machiavelli's account of the first incident see FH 3.25. 
65 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 42-44, 71. 
66 Quoted in Gilbert, "Florentine Political Assumptions," p. 208, and Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini, pp. 43. 
29 
! . 
was secure, and Giovanni Vittorio Soderini' s honourable, but not so secure, and that one 
had to consider which of the two should be adopted. And, with the city in its current 
situation, it seemed to him that its first priority should be ensuring its own security."67 
This summary of the debate and the speaker's decision in favour of security shows it was 
not uncommon to argue that in normal circumstances the first place goes to honour but 
that when the very security of the state is at risk security takes precedence. 
Florence's republican institutions saw their demise in 1512. Piero Soderini, who 
had been elected Gonfaloniere for life in 1502, maintained a policy of friendship with 
France, both for the sake of protection and due to commercial interests. In 1510, Pope 
Julius II turned against France, and, by the end of 1511, Sp3:in, Venice and England had 
joined his Holy League. This put Florence in a dangerous position. However, on April 11, 
the French were victorious in the Battle of Ravenna, and Soderini' s policy seemed 
vindicated. Fortune then turned against Florence again: the French victory was pyrrhic 
and when the Swiss entered Italy on the side of the Pope the French withdrew from 
northern Italy. The Pope sent an envoy to demand that Florence now join the league, but 
Soderini still failed to change sides. As a result, the league agreed to depose Soderini and 
to restore the Medici as private citizens. With no French arms to defend Florence, 
Soderini' s hope rested in Florence's national militia, a militia which Machiavelli had 
67 Quoted in Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium," p. 1135. "Piero 
Popoleschi dixe che ii discorso di messer Francesco [Gualterotti] era securo, et quello di 
messer Giovanvictorio honorevole et non tan to securo, et che era da pensare quale de' 
dua fussi da pigliare. Et che trovandosi la citta in termini che l'e, Ii pare che in primis 
debba cercare la securta sua" (Consultee pratiche 1505-1512, ed. Fachard, p. 40). For 
three similar examples which prioritize, respectively, the profitable (utile), safety and 
security, see the same essay by Cox, p. 1135 (two of those examples may be found below 
in chapter 6 in the section on "Morality and Security"). 
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been instrumental in creating and organizing over the previous six years. On August 29, 
the Spanish forces allied with the Pope confronted the militia at Prato and as soon as the 
city's walls were breached the soldiers fled. The Spanish sacked the city, murdering and 
raping. The Spanish viceroy was now in a position to enforce the Pope's demands. 
Soderini fled to Siena on August 31, and the next day Giuliano de' Medici entered 
Florence. On September 16, the Medici seized power by using the presence of armed men 
stationed in the piazza to coerce the approval of a committee with absolute power. 68 The 
committee, dominated by partisans of the Medici, reformed the constitution to maintain 
the semblance of a republic while concentrating power in the Medici's hands. 
Machiavelli, who had worked closely with Soderini, was dismissed from office on 
November 7. The following February, his name was found on a list drawn up by two men 
plotting against the Medici. Although he was imprisoned and tortured, no evidence was 
found against him, and, with the payment of a fine, he would be freed. Fortune, however, 
freed him in another way. Following the death of Julius II in February, 1513, Cardinal 
Giovanni de' Medici became Pope Leo X on March 11. During Florence's celebration for 
the election of the first Florentine Pope, Machiavelli was freed as part of a general 
amnesty. 
After being released from prison, Machiavelli spent his idle time in the latter part 
of the year penning The Prince. Therein, he addresses the debates seen in the pratiche 
about whether policy should be conducted according to the counsels of Christianity or the 
ways of the world. Chapter 15 offers a decisive judgment: "it is so far from how one lives 
68 See Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 130; Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 132. 
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to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns 
his ruin rather than his preservation." In chapter 18, Machiavelli is even more explicit, 
arguing that rulers must "know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity." In 
Machiavelli's view, rulers should not place their hope in God but in prudence and when 
necessary in the same wayward practices used by other states. His poem The Ass (1517) 
confirms this: "To believe that without effort on your part God fights for you, while you 
are idle and on your knees, has ruined many kingdoms and many states. "69 For one who is 
secular or has a deist conception of God, the need for such an argument now seems 
archaic; however, at Machiavelli's time it was a necessary polemic against a conventional 
belief. 
Machiavelli's very use of the expression "to enter into evil" suggests that he 
himself believes in the moral categories of good and evil. Nonetheless, he is unflinching 
about the types of evil that a prince must be willing to enter into: "acting against faith, 
against charity, against humanity, against religion" (P 18). Since he takes the goodness of 
morality for granted, he is clear about the cost of his argument: he recognizes evil as evil 
but still condones it. Although The Prince argues that rulers must colour their immoral 
acts, Machiavelli himself does not colour his argument. Rather, the matter is so vital and 
misunderstood that he speaks as boldly as possible. In The Prince, Machiavelli challenges 
the orthodox view, proclaiming he will deal with "the effectual truth" rather than modes 
of government "that have never been seen or known to exist in truth" (P 15). His critique 
69 Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 764. These lines echo the sentiment of Cosimo de' Medici's 
saying "that states were not held with paternosters in hand" (recorded by Machiavelli in 
Florentine Histories 7.6). 
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of idealism may in part be directed at works like Plato's Republic, but it was also directed 
at his more recent predecessors.70 By focusing the issue on "ruin," Machiavelli makes the 
reader face the risk that comes from basing affairs of state on idealism: there are times 
when a ruler must either be willing to act against virtue in hope of safeguarding the state 
or ignore "what is done for what should be done" and thereby risk ruin (P 15). While his 
argument for the contravention of virtue is shocking and polemical, he is careful to justify 
it with the already accepted idea that necessity knows no law. 
Having taken this opportunity to introduce Machiavelli's historical and 
intellectual context, I must still justify my use of The Prince and Discourses as if they are 
cut from the same cloth, despite their different orientation. 
The Relation between The Prince and Discourses on Livy 
One persistent issue in the literature on Machiavelli is the chronological and 
theoretical relation between The Prince and the Discourses. The chronological problem 
arises because in The Prince Machiavelli refers to having reasoned on republics 
elsewhere-"! shall leave out reasoning on republics because I have reasoned on them at 
length another time" (Io lascero indrieto el ragionare delle republiche, perche altra volta 
ne ragionai a lungo) (P 2). What exactly he is referring to is uncertain since what we 
know about the composition of The Prince and Discourses does not quite square with it. 
In a letter he wrote to Vettori on December 10, 1513, he says he has "composed a little 
70 Gilbert writes: "I am inclined to agree with Villari that Machiavelli was thinking 
mainly of the humanist literature of the quattrocento" ("The Humanist Concept of the 
Prince," p. 472 n. 3). Anglo argues he was thinking not only of the ancients but also of 
medieval and Renaissance texts on princely rule (Machiavelli: A Dissection, p. 189.) 
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work De Principatibus" and that he is still "continually fattening and polishing it."71 
Using external evidence from his letters and internal evidence from The Prince, scholars 
generally agree that Machiavelli began the work in the summer of 1513 and fipished it in 
December 1513 or early 1514. However, as Claude Lefort points out, there is no reason 
he could not have begun working on a theoretical tract earlier and there is some evidence 
he did so. In particular, Lefort points to a letter from Machiavelli's chancery colleague 
Agostino Vespucci who, when he published Machiavelli's Decennale in 1506, told him 
he still expected to see "the more extended work that with no less secrecy he is hatching 
in his store."72 
When it comes to the composition of the Discourses, scholars disagree over the 
precise dates due to a lack of solid evidence. Since Machiavelli refers to having reasoned 
on republics at another time in The Prince, many scholars have assumed that he must 
have begun the Discourses in 1513. His dedication to the Discourses is taken as another 
clue about the time of composition as he therein acknowledges his obligation to Zanobi 
Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai for having "forced me to write what I would never 
have written for myself." It is assumed that they fed Machiavelli this encouragement 
while he was associated with the group of Florentine and foreign literati who met for 
discussion in the Rucellai family gardens, the Orti Oricellari. Filippo de' Nerli, one of the 
members of the group, later recalled the main interests of their discussions and how two 
of Machiavelli's most famous works grew out of them: 
71 Quotation from the translation in The Prince, ed. Mansfield, p. 110. 
72 Quoted in Machiavelli in the Afaking, pp. 84-85. 
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they cultivated themselves by means of classical works and the lessons of history, 
and on the basis of them and the request of his friends Machiavelli composed his 
book of discourses on Titus Livy and also the book of those treatises and 
discussions on the militia. 73 
Scholars debate when Machiavelli first joined these meetings, arguing as early as 1514 
and as late as 1518.74 Since Cosimo Rucellai died in 1519 and Machiavelli addresses him 
in his dedication, Cosimo's death provides the terminus non post quern. Machiavelli's 
references within the work itself provide evidence that he was working on it from around 
1516 to 1518.75 To indulge the view that he may have started the work in 1513, we can 
then date the time of composition to the period between 1513 and 1519. 
Although The Prince was finished before the Discourses, many scholars 
nonetheless assume that Machiavelli's allusion to having reasoned on republics must refer 
to some part of the Discourses. Federico Chabod has argued that after Machiavelli was 
released from prison, he began a work on the collective virtue of republican Rome but 
then-realizing the opportunity the present afforded for himself, the Medici and Italy-
put it aside to focus his thoughts on the individual virtue of a prince.76 Felix Gilbert 
concurs with Chabod's chronology but suggests that Machiavelli's reference in The 
73 Quoted in Gilbert, "The Composition and Structure of Machiavelli's Discorsi," p. 128 
(translation modified). Gilbert also provides the original: "si esercitavano costoro assai, 
mediante le lettere, nelle lezioni dell'istorie, e sopra di esse, ed a loro instanza compose ii 
Machiavello quell suo libro de' discorsi sopra Tito Livio, e anco il libro di que'trattati, e 
ragionamenti sopra la milizia" (ibid, p. 484 n. 50). 
74 Burd places Machiavelli's entrance into the group in 1518 (J/ principe, p. 151 ). Gilbert 
argues it was 1515 at the earliest ("Composition and Structure," p. 128). Ridolfi argues 
for 1516 as the earliest date (Life of Machiavelli, p. 300 n. 10). Sices suggests Machiavelli 
may have attended meetings as early as 1514 ("Introduction," p. xiv). 
75 See Gilbert, "Composition and Structure," pp. 117-18; Baron, Jn Search of Florentine 
Civic Humanism, pp. 132-34 n. 49. 
76 See Chabod, Machiavelli and the Renaissance, pp. 12, 30-41, 137. 
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Prince to a work on republics may have been to a draft of what later became the first 
eighteen chapters of the Discourses. 77 Hans Baron has more recently argued for a quite 
simple and probable solution: Machiavelli could have inserted the reference at a later 
date, in particular between late 1515 and early 1518.78 David Wootton argues for an 
altogether different explanation: his reference to having reasoned about republics another 
time was a humourous way of acknowledging the awkward business of his interrogation 
and torture after the Medici took control of Florence. 79 
According to Baron, the Discourses represents an evolution in Machiavelli's 
thought, growing out of his acquaintance with the circle that met at the Oricellari 
Gardens.80 He further argues that the orientation of the two works is "irreconcilable."81 
While Machiavelli's participation in the meetings at the Oricellari Gardens surely 
provided him with a wonderful opportunity to share in discussions on affairs of state and 
ancient literature, I will argue that in Machiavelli's own view The Prince and Discourses 
are complementary works. Further, if they are reconcilable, then the uncertainties about 
the chronological relation between them recede in importance. Four reasons vindicate the 
view, dominant since the nineteenth century, that they are reconcilable: the quality of 
Machiavelli's times, the similarity of the principles in the two works, the different ends 
77 Gilbert, "Composition and Structure," p. 127. 
78 Baron, In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism, p. 133. 
79 
"Introduction," p. xxv. It could be added that reasoning "a lungo" (at length) would be 
a grimly ironic way to describe his torture by strappado; also, he says he reasoned about 
republics at "altra vol ta" (another time), not in another work. 
80 Baron, Jn Search of Florentine Civic Humanism, pp. 143-47. 
81 Ibid., p. 143. 
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served by principalities and republics and the belief that states naturally cycle through 
different forms of government. 
The first reason-the quality of Machiavelli's times-rests upon an appreciation 
of his historical context. During the struggle between papacy and empire, Italian cities 
began to carve out independence for themselves by forming local governments of nobles 
and an elected governor. 82 By the end of the 11 OOs, such a communal form of self-
government was in place in Venice, Parma, Padua, Milan, Piacenza, Florence, Pisa, Siena 
and Arezzo. This new form of government soon came to be marred by power struggles 
between the rising merchant class and the ruling noble families. In most of the 
communes, an end to the often violent factional conflict was achieved by the more or less 
willing acceptance of princely rule. By the end of the 1200s, such a transition had taken 
place in Ferrara, Verona, Milan, Mantua, Treviso, Pisa, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna and 
Rimini.83 A few communes survived into the 1300s. Padua maintained its liberty until 
1328. In Siena, the popular party seized control from the nobility in 1287 and set up an 
oligarchy of merchants which ruled through a Board of Nine Governors until 1355.84 
Florence and Venice maintained their liberty throughout the 1300s, but in the 
quattrocento Cosimo de' Medici made himself, in Machiavelli's words, "prince of the 
republic" (D 1.33.3). In the same century, the Republic of Genoa found itselflocked in a 
struggle with Milan, variously losing and regaining its liberty. And in Milan, the short-
82 Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 2, p. 4. For a detailed history see Jones, The Italian 
City-State: From Commune to Signoria. 
83 On this early transition see Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 2, p. 118, and Skinner, 
Foundations Of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, pp. 23-26 (hereafter cited as 
Foundations). 
84 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, p. 24. 
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lived Ambrosian Republic which succeeded the death of Filippo Visconti in 144 7 fell into 
the hands of Francesco Sforza in 1450; as a result, Milan returned to a duchy. While 
northern Italy was going through this political and economic turmoil, southern Italy 
remained subject to foreign powers and feudal in character. Thus, by the middle of the 
fifteenth century, autocracy was the dominant mode of government in Italy. 
Responding to this new political landscape, many quattrocento humanists turned 
their attention to the mirror-for-princes genre.85 To cite a few examples, Francesco 
Patrizi, who had written The Institution of a Republic in the 1460s, wrote The Kingdom 
and the Education of the King in the 1470s.86 Bartolomeo Sacchi, showing the same 
flexibility, wrote On the Prince in 1470 and turned it into a republican treatise entitled On 
the Best Citizen in 1474.87 Giovanni Pontano, a Neapolitan humanist, wrote On The 
Prince in 1468. There was nothing unique in Machiavelli's turn to the mirror-for-princes 
genre; what was unique, as he himself proclaims in Prince 15, was his break with the 
traditional counsels given to princes. 
The letters Machiavelli wrote to Francesco Vettori after he was released from 
prison in March 1513 tell us much about his own motives for writing a handbook for 
princes. Vettori, a friend of Machiavelli since his time in the chancery, was in Rome in 
early 1513, acting as a Florentine ambassador to the Pope. The day after Machiavelli was 
released from prison, he wrote to Vettori: "If it is possible, remind Our Lordship about 
85 On the re-emergence of this tradition see Gilbert, "The Humanist Concept of the 
Prince," pp. 93-96; Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, pp. 113-18. 
86 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 90 n. 56; Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, pp. 
116-17' 182. 
87 See Kraye, ed., Cambridge Translations, vol. 2, p. 88. 
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me in order that, if it should be possible, either he or his family might start engaging my 
service in some way or other."88 On June 20, 1513, he wrote to Vettori: "the pope, aware 
of his brothers' and nephews' lack of territory, is unwilling to give any less account of 
himself than did his predecessors." Vettori's response of July 12 concurs with 
Machiavelli about Pope Leo's intention: "his aim is to maintain the respect for the Church 
as he found it, not to want its states to be diminished, unless what is diminished should be 
handed over to his own, namely, to Giuliano and Lorenzo, to whom he is thinking of 
giving states in any case." In Machiavelli's famous letter of December 10, 1513, he again 
expresses his desire "that these Medici lords begin to make use of me even if they should 
begin by making me roll a stone." With that end in view, he tells Vettori he has 
"composed a little work De Principatibus" and that he wishes to offer it to Giuliano de' 
Medici, the pope's brother, as it should be welcome "to a prince, and especially to a new 
prince."89 Although Machiavelli in fact later dedicated the work to Lorenzo de' Medici, 
the Pope's nephew, it is noteworthy that at the time he wrote the letter to Vettori, Leo X 
had given Giuliano de' Medici the same position that Pope Alexander had given Cesare 
Borgia: Captain-General of the Church.90 With the Medici holding power in both Rome 
and Florence, Machiavelli's desire for the vita activa, his drive to comprehend the art of 
the state, and the quality of the times (both the ubiquity of principalities and, due to their 
lack of unity, Italy's weakness), all conspired to suggest the utility of a tract on princes. 
88 All translations of Machiavelli's personal correspondences are from Machiavelli and 
His Friends, unless noted otherwise. 
89 Quotations from the translation in The Prince, ed. Mansfield, pp. 110-11. 
90 See Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 220. 
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A second reason The Prince and Discourses may be reconciled is that many of the 
principles found in the former recur in the latter. As Macaulay noted in 1827, the two 
works are based on "the same principles," the first discoursing on them in relation to "an 
ambitious man," the later in relation to "an ambitious people. "91 Further in the Discourses 
Machiavelli addresses his counsel not only to republics but also repeatedly to princes. 
That his works are based on the same principles is evident from the way Machiavelli 
himself refers to. his earlier works when discussing an issue he has already written on. If 
he were not concerned with discovering true principles-or ifhe came to reject his earlier 
views-he could not have referred to his other works in such an unqualified way. A brief 
consideration of this intertextuality shows how consistent his fundamental beliefs 
remained. In the Discourses, he makes four references to The Prince. Discourses 2.1.3 
refers to "our treatise of principalities." In Discourses 2.20.1, he refers to his discussion of 
mercenaries in "another work of mine," suggesting chapters 12 and 13 of The Prince. In 
Discourses 3.19.1, he says he has "broadly discoursed" on the motives of princes and how 
they can avoid hatred in "another treatise." Discourses 3.42.1 refers to chapter eighteen of 
The Prince and names "nostro trattato De Principe." In Florentine Histories, he writes it 
· would be proper "to reason ·On the qualities of conspiracies and their importance ... if I had 
not spoken of it in another place" (8.1). Such discussions can be found in Prince 19 and 
Discourses 3.6. Finally, as we have seen, he refers in Prince 2 to having reasoned on 
republics "at length another time." 
91 Critical and Historical Essays, vol. 2, p. 30. 
40 
. r ,. , . 
A related consideration is that the word ''principe" can mean not only "prince" but 
also "ruler" or "leader." For example, in the Discourses, Machiavelli refers to Camillus 
and other leading citizens ofrepublican Rome as "princes of the city" (1.12.1). Likewise, 
he writes that one of the advantages of being born in a republic is that men "can, through 
their virtue, become princes" (D 2.2.3). In Florentine Histories, he refers to the republican 
rulers of Florence as "the princes of the state" (i principi dello stato) (3.23), and he calls 
the leader of a republican party the "prince of the Party" (principe della Parle) (4.28).92 
Thus, it is not surprising that the principles found in both The Prince and the Discourses 
pertain to principi in both senses of the word: princes and rulers. 
Thirdly, The Prince and Discourses complement each other because principalities 
and republics serve different but complementary ends. As the Discourses explains, 
principalities are necessary to found, republics to maintain. Regarding the first, 
Machiavelli argues that "to order a republic anew or to reform it altogether outside its 
ancient orders" requires the authority of a single law giver (D 1.9 heading). Likewise, in a 
corrupt city, good laws can be enforced only if one individual uses "an extreme force" to 
ensure their observance (D 1.17.3). Then, if a state is to last long, it must pass to the care 
of the people (D 1.9.2, 1.17.3, 1.58.3). Rome, which for Machiavelli was the greatest 
republic history has known, serves as the greatest model of a state that began as a 
principality and developed into. a republic. 
92 That this looser usage is not particular to Machiavelli is seen in Savonarola's Treatise 
Against Divinatory Astrology where he calls Ptolemy "ii principe di questi astrologi" (the 
prince of these astrologers) (quoted in Parel, Machiavellian Cosmos, p. 20). 
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Fourthly, the two works serve a complementary purpose by addressing the 
classical view that states naturally cycle through different forms of government. In 
Discourses 1.2.3, Machiavelli adopts the version of that view.presented by Polybius in 
Histories, book 6. For a republican who accepts that theory, the only question can be how 
to prolong republican rule. Machiavelli himself notes that since there is not a remedy for 
every disorder that arises in a republic, it is impossible to create "a perpetual republic" (D 
3.17.1).93 Further, he argues that the form of goveniment depends upon the condition of 
the people: where there is no equality a republic cannot be made (D 1.55 heading). The 
existence of a feudal nobility in Naples, Rome, the Romagna and Lombardy make 
republican governance impossible in those places (D 1.55.4). Also, where citizens have 
become corrupt, a republic is "the worst" form of government (D 1.18.3). Since a suitable 
constitution depends upon the condition of the people, the princely form of government 
remained relevant in both theory and practice. It should also be noted that support for the 
rule of one could be found in such esteemed authorities as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and 
Dante. 
In light of these reasons, it should be apparent that for Machiavelli The Prince and 
the Discourses· were complementary works. Nonetheless, his own preference for 
republican governance is clear. He became secretary when Florence was a broad-based 
republic, and he served his city faithfully for fourteen years. In the second chapter of The 
Prince, he mentions that he has reasoned on republics elsewhere as if to alert the reader to 
93 Though compare Discourses 3.22.3 where he writes that "if a republic were so happy 
that it often had one who with his example might renew the laws, and not only restrain it 
from running to ruin but pull it back, it would be perpetual." 
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the fact that he has written on both topics. In the Discourses, he states: "governments of 
peoples are better than those of princes" (1.58.3). He also argues that the best constitution 
is a republic that has a kingly power, a senate and a popular government (1.2.57). Further, 
at least as early as the Ghiribizzi (a letter he wrote in 1506), Machiavelli identified one of 
the fundamental problems of princely rule: since men cannot change their disposition 
· their success or failure depends upon whether or not their way of proceeding is in accord 
with the times. He returns to this problem in Prince 25 but points to its remedy only in the 
Discourses: "a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality, 
for it can accommodate itself better than one prince can to the diversity of times through 
the diversity of the citizens that are in it" (3.9.2).94 A final point that can be made here is 
that those who wish to see Machiavelli as, above all, the republican author of the 
Discourses must confront the uncomfortable fact that one of his principal reasons for 
favouring republics is that they are better at acquiring empire.95 
In his famous letter to Vettori, Machiavelli confidently asserts: "through this study 
of mine, were it to be read, it would be evident that during these fifteen years I have been 
studying the art of the state I have neither slept nor fooled around. "96 Likewise, in The 
Prince's dedicatory letter, he attributes his knowledge of the art of the state to both his 
political experience and his classical studies: "I have found nothing in my belongings that 
I care so much for and esteem so greatly as the knowledge of the actions of great men, 
94 Homqvist reads Machiavelli's omission of this solution in The Prince as a rhetorical 
strategy with a republican intent, see his Machiavelli and Empire, pp. 251-53. 
95 D 1.58.3, D 2.2.1; for the private advantages of republicanism see D 2.2.3. Recent 
literature has emphasized the imperialism underlying Machiavelli's republicanism; see, in 
~articular, Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli and Hornqvist, Machiavelli and Empire. 
6 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 265. 
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learned by me from long experience with modem things and a continuous reading of 
ancient ones." The coherence of Machiavelli's opinions rests on the learning and 
experience he had already acquired when he wrote The Prince at age forty-four. Of 
course, he continued to read, discuss and judge; but he did so on the firm foundation of 
experience and study he had already acquired over a long period. Machiavelli himself 
again makes this same point in the Discourses's dedicatory letter: "in it I have expressed 
as much as I know and have learned through a long practice and a continual reading in 
worldly things." Since his texts grow from this firm foundation of experience and study, I 
draw from them freely in order to try to clarify his understanding of the art of the state 





Machiavelli's Princes and Principality 
In The Prince, Machiavelli offers Cesare Borgia, the Duke of Valence, as an 
example to be imitated-"! do not know what better teaching I could give to a new prince 
than the example of his actions" (P 7). While many shocking rumours about the Borgia 
family came into circulation during the papacy of Cesare's father, Pope Alexander VI, 
many later historians and writers presented the unsubstantiated rumours as facts and even 
invented new ones.97 As the Borgia legend grew, so did confusion over Machiavelli's 
choice of Ces'are as a model to be imitated. Rousseau's interpretation of The Prince in the 
Social Contract (1762) shows the influence of such defamation: "The mere choice of his 
execrable hero sufficiently manifests his secret intention" (3.6).98 To get under the hostile 
rumours and recover a more nuanced view of Cesare Borgia, we may turn to 
contemporaneous judgements and a brief history of his actions. One of the best sources 
for such con~emporaneous judgements is Machiavelli since their paths crossed three times 
while he was on diplomatic missions for Florence. Thus, to get a taste of Renaissance 
politics, to recover a more historical picture of the Duke and to see how Machiavelli's 
97 For example, Guicciardini's History of Italy (1540), Tomaso Tomasi's Vita de/ Duca 
Valentino (1655), Gregorio Leti's Vita di Cesare Borgia (1670), Victor Hugo's Lucrece 
Borgia (1833), Alexandre Dumas' Les Borgias (1840) and even Burckhardt's The 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860). On this genre of literature see Hillgarth, 
"The Image of Alexander VI and Cesare Borgia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries." 
98 This line comes from a note Rousseau added to the second addition of 1 782 in order to 
further support the contention he made in the first edition that The Prince is really a 
warning to the people about the nature of princes. Garrett Mattingly is a modem defender 
of the same view: "Only in a satire can one understand the choice of Cesare Borgia as the 
model prince" ("The Prince: Political Science or Political Satire?," p. 184). 
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experiences as Florentine secretary affected his later writings, this chapter begins by 
reviewing the major events of Cesare's life, with particular attention to those occasions on 
which Machiavelli met with him as an envoy of Florence. 
Cesare's father, Rodrigo Borgia, was crowned Pope Alexander VI in August of 
1492.99 That very month, Alexander made Cesare the Archbishop of Valencia and, in 
September of the following year, Cardinal of Santa Maria Nuova. Five years later, in 
August 1498, the College of Cardinals allowed Cesare, then twenty-three years of age, to 
remove his cardinal's hat. 100 As Machiavelli put it in his first Decennale (a poem written 
in 1504 summarizing the major events of the previous ten years): 
Si volse al figlio, che seguia la setta 
De' gran chercuti, e da quei lo rimosse 
Cambiandoli el cappello a la berretta. 
He turned to his son, who followed the sect 
Of the great clerics, and withdrew him from them, 
Changing the h~t to the beret. 101 
In the lead up to this change of hats, Pope Alexander and the new French King, Louis 
XII, had come to agreement on several matters. Alexander would grant Louis a divorce 
from his barren wife, a dispensation to marry the widow of Charles VIII and a cardinal's 
hat for his. closest councilor, Georges d' Amboise; in exchange, Louis would confer the 
99 My principal sources for this history are Burd, ed., 11 principe; Sabatini, The Life of 
Cesare Borgia; Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli; Hibbert, The Borgias and Their Enemies, as 
well as Machiavelli's own writings as noted throughout. All quotations from his legations 
are from The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, vol. 
3. 
100 Due to the existence of contradictory documents, Sabatini argues that Cesare's birth 
can only be fixed between 1474 and 1476. He thus uses 1475 as his birth-year (bk. 1, ch. 
2). 
101 Tutte le opere, ed. Casella, p. 803, lines 178-180; Machiavelli, Chief Works, vol. 3, p. 
1449 (translation modified). 
46 
I' 
duchy of Valence on Cesare, support his proposed marriage with Carlotta of Aragon and 
give him command over a body of French soldiers. 102 In October of 1498, Cesare left 
Italy with the papal dispensation, the cardinal's hat and the hope of securing his marriage 
with Carlotta. Once in France, he joined Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, a cardinal who 
had openly made himself an enemy of Alexander by seeking his deposition but now at 
least feigned to seek Alexander's friendship. 103 In December, Louis received his papal 
dispensation and d' Amboise his cardinal's hat. On January 18, 1499, Cardinal della 
Rovere wrote to Alexander praising Cesare's performance at the French court: 
I cannot refrain from informing Your Holiness that the most illustrious Duke is 
so endowed with prudence, ability and every virtue of mind and body,- that he has 
conquered everybody .... He has found so much favour with the King, and all the 
princes of this court that everyone holds him in esteem and honour of which fact I 
willingly and gladly give testimony. 104 
Even allowing for flattery, Rovere' s account of Cesare's conduct and reception 
presumably contains some accuracy. Adding further interest to his description, his use of 
the expression "every virtue of mind and body" shows "virtue" being used in its classical 
sense of "excellence." 
Cesare returned to Italy with Louis XII, riding in the king's train as he 
triumphantly claimed Milan for France on October 6, 1499. Baldassare Castiglione was 
102 Although Cesare was Cardinal of Santa Maria Nuova, he continued to use the title of 
his archbishopric and was thus known as Cardinal of Valencia, a city in Spain. After 
giving up the purple, he became the Duke of Valence (or Valentinois in French), a duchy 
in France. When he gave up his role as Cardinal of Valencia and became the Duke of 
Valence, his name in Italian happened to remain Valentino (see Sabatini, Life of Cesare 
Borgia, bk. 2, ch. 5). As Machiavelli notes, Cesare is "called Duke Valentino by the 
vulgar" (P 7), his more correct title being Duke of Valence (or Duke of Valentinois ). 
103 On his reasons for now seeking peace with Alexander see Sabatini, Life of Cesare 
Borgia, bk. 3, chs. 1-2. 
104 Quoted in Hibbert, The Borgias and Their Enemies, p. 133. 
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also present in the procession, and in a letter he wrote describing it he praises Cesare's 
"very gallant bearing."105 With the aid of his French arms, Cesare took Imo la in 
December and Forti in January. Louis was then pressed to recall his soldiers to defend 
Milan from an attack by its former ruler Ludovico Sforza. However, Sforza's mercenary 
army betrayed him, and he spent the rest of his life in prison. Having secured Milan, 
Louis returned his auxiliaries to Cesare, and the following October, he took Rimini and 
Pesaro without a shot being fired. To congratulate Cesare on this victory, the Duke of 
Ferrara sent Pandolfo Collenuccio to Pesaro; in his report to the Duke of Ferrara, 
Pandolfo wrote: "He is accounted valiant, joyous, and open-handed, and it is believed that 
he holds honest men in great esteem. Harsh in his vengeance, according to many, he is of 
great spirit and of ambition, athirst for eminence and fame." 106 In time, this reputation for 
qualities such as vengeance and cruelty would help to darken his more admirable 
qualities. 
On April 25, 1501, the prince ofFaenza, Astorre Manfredi, surrendered his city to 
Cesare after a prolonged assault. In June, Astorre and his half-brother were imprisoned in 
the dungeon of Castle Sant' Angelo in Rome; the following June their bodies were found 
in the Tiber. After Cesare took Faenza and Castle Bolognese, he sent Florence a request 
for free passage through Tuscany; then, without awaiting reply, he entered Florentine 
territory. 107 Meeting with a Florentine ambassador in Barberino (about fifteen miles from 
105 Letter of October 8, 1499, in Cartwright, Baldassare Castiglione: the Perfect Courtier, 
p. 20. 
106 Quoted in Sabatini, Life of Cesare Borgia, bk. 3, ch. 6. Hibbert also quotes from the 
report, The Borgias and Their Enemies, p. 170. 
107 For Machiavelli's analysis of this event see D 1.38.2. 
48 
! . 
Florence), he demanded that the city become his ally, sign a condotta paying him 36,000 
ducats a year for his military services and change their government to one he could trust. 
To give force to these demands he advanced to Campi, less than seven miles from the 
city's walls. The Signoria had little choice but to sign a treaty, agreeing to the alliance and 
payment demanded by the Duke. Cesare was committed to joining the King of France on. 
his Neapolitan campaign and had also received letters from both the King.and the Pope 
telling him not to persecute the Florentines; pressed thus, he moved on to besiege 
Piombino. The Florentines, relieved of the immediate threat, evaded the first payment 
requested by Cesare. 
On June 4 of the following year (1502), Arezzo rebelled from Florence with 
support from Vitellozzo Vitelli. He was a condottiere allied with Cesare and bent on 
avenging the execution of his brother by Florence in October of 1499; Florence 
nonetheless suspected that Cesare was the one ultimately behind the rebellion. Vitelli 
took Arezzo and within a few days possessed all the strongholds of the Valdichiana. Piero 
de' Medici, who was also part of the plot, ominously took up residence in Arezzo, hoping 
to return to power in Florence. With Vitelli holding the Valdichiana, Pisa still defending 
its freedom and Pistoia tom by civil conflict, Florence was at risk of losing half its 
empire. 108 Cesare capitalized on Florence's weaknesses by asking the city to send an 
envoy with whom he could discuss important matters. On June 22, the Signoria sent 
Francesco Soderini and Niccolo Machiavelli. While on their way to meet with Cesare, 
they heard that he had suddenly taken the state of Urbino from Duke Guidobaldo da 
108 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 63. 
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Montefeltre through deceit and force of arms, though without bloodshed. That day 
Machiavelli wrote to Florence: "Your lordships should take note of this stratagem and of 
this remarkable speed combined with extraordinary good fortune." 109 Machiavelli and 
Soderini arrived in Urbino on June 24 and, over the course of two evenings, discussed 
their differences with the Duke. Accusations and justifications went back and forth. The 
Duke wished Florence to make good on their treaty: 
This government of yours does not please me, and I cannot trust it; you must 
change it and give me a pledge that you will observe everything you promised; 
otherwise you will soon realize that I have no intention of going on like this, and 
if you do not want me as a friend, you will find me your enemy. 110 
The Florentines in tum asked the Duke, "What reason have we given you to have your 
generals and men to attack us?"111 The Duke responded by saying the responsibility for 
the attacks lay solely with Vitellozzo Vitelli, but he added "there can be no half measures 
between me and you: you must either be friends to me, or enemies."112 At the end of the 
letter informing the Ten of these exchanges, Machiavelli added his impression of the 
Duke: 
This prince is very splendid and magnificent, and in war he is so bold that there 
is no great enterprise that does not seem small to him, and to gain glory and 
territory he never rests or knows danger or weariness: he arrives at a place before 
anyone has heard that he has left the place he was in before: he wins the love of 
his soldiers, and has got hold of the best men in Italy. These things make him 
victorious and formidable, and are attended with invariable good fortune. 113 
109 Quoted in Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, pp. 48-49. 
110 Ibid., p. 49. The primary source is the legation to the Ten dated June 26, 1502. It is 
sir:ed by Soderini, but written by Machiavelli. 
11 Quoted in Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 116. 
112 Ibid., p. 116. 
113 Quoted.in Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 50. 
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The danger from the rebellion soon passed, as-Cesare, knowing he had to respect King 
Louis' protection of Florence, threatened to punish Vitelli if he did not retire from Arezzo 
and the Validichiana. That summer Leonardo Da Vinci accepted Cesare's offer to employ 
him as his architect and.general engineer. Leonardo retained the position for about a year 
and a half, producing some amazingly accurate maps, renovating fortresses and designing 
military technology. 114 
In October, Vitelli, some of the Duke's other condottieri and some of the rulers on 
the outskirts of Cesare's dominion met at the castle of Cardinal Orsini in Magi one to form 
a league against the Duke, fearing that his expanding state may engulf their cities one 
after the other: As Machiavelli tells us in The Prince, the result of their conspiracy was 
"rebellion in Urbino, tumults in Romagna, and infinite dangers for the duke" (P 8). The 
conspirators had also asked Florence to join them; instead, the Signoria sent Machiavelli 
to Cesare's court with instructions to offer Florence's friendship, but not to commit them 
to anything. Machiavelli arrived at Imo la on October 7, 1502. Upon this, their second 
meeting, the Duke was twenty-seven and Machiavelli thirty-three. Machiavelli remained 
with the duke's train until January 20, 1503. During this period the Duke accomplished 
two particularly notable acts, both of which Machiavelli praises in The Prince. After 
conciliating the condottiere who had conspired against him, Cesare moved to Cesena in 
preparation for the conquest of Sinigaglia with their aid. While in Cesena, he summoned 
his Governor-General, Ramiro de Lorqua, from Pesaro. When Ramiro arrived on 
December 22, the Duke had him arrested and published the charges against him: fraud, 
114 By early March 1504 he was back in Florence. See Masters, Machiavelli, Leonardo, 
and the Science of Power, pp. 14, 16, as well as his Fortune is a River, pp. 78-79, 91, 94. 
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corruption, extortion and rapine.115 Rumours were also circulating that Ramiro had 
conspired against the Duke. In Machiavelli's legation of December 23, he predicted the 
Governor-General's end: "Messer Ramiro, one of the Duke's first officers, returned 
yesterday from Pesaro, and was immediately confined at the bottom of the tower by order 
of his Excellency. It is feared that he will be sacrificed to the populace, who are very 
desirous that he should be."116 On the morning of December 26, the fully clothed corpse 
of Ramiro was found lying on a block in the piazza of Cesena next to his decapitated head 
on a pike. 
As Cesare was now reconciled with his condottiere-Francesco Orsini, Paolo 
Orsini, Oliverotto da Fermo and Vitellozzo Vitelli-they took the town of Sinigaglia, 
which surrendered without a struggle, in his name. The Duke arrived there on December 
31, greeting the condottiere amiably and asking them to join him at the house he would 
occupy. Once they were inside, he gave a signal and the four condottieri were taken 
prisoner; Vitelli and Oliverotto were garrotted late that night. He held the Orsini prisoner, 
sending an urgent letter to the Pope telling him to arrest Cardinal Orsini, the man who had 
held the meetings at his castle in Magione. When the Cardinal arrived at the Vatican on 
January 3 to congratulate the Pope on the Duke's capture of Sinigaglia, he was 
surrounded by armed men and imprisoned. Isabella d 'Este, wife of the Marquis of 
Mantua, wrote to congratulate Cesare on "these glorious undertakings" and sent him a gift 
of one hundred carnival masks. 117 Machiavelli was still with Cesare's court when this 
115 The manifesto is quoted by Sabatini in Life of Cesare Borgia, bk. 3, ch. 16. 
116 Legation of December 23, 1502. 
117 Quoted in Hibbert, The Borgias, p. 239. 
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occurred, and on January 8 he wrote to the Ten: "People here wonder that you have not 
written, or in some way sent your congratulations to the Duke upon what he has lately 
done for your advantage."118 After having killed Vitelli, the lord of Citta di Castello, 
ambassadors from the city surrendered it to Cesare on January 5. Cesare then turned 
towards Perugia to rid it of Gianpaolo Baglioni, who had also conspired against him. 
Baglioni fled to Siena, and, on January 6, ambassadors from Perugia offered the city to 
Cesare, telling him the people had raised the cry of "Duke, Duke."119 On January 18, after 
he received news that Cardinal Orsini was imprisoned, he had his two Orsini prisoners, 
Paolo and Francesco, strangled. 
That summer, 1503, the Duke was at the height of his power. He had created his 
own militia and killed many of his enemies. Ostensibly in the name of the Church, his 
dominion now included Imo la, F orli, Cesena, Piombino, Urbino, Camerino, Rimini, 
Sinigaglia, Pesaro, Faenza, Castel Bolognese, Citta di Castello and Perugia. In 
Machiavelli's short piece On How to Treat the Populace of Valdichiana after Their 
Rebellion, he raises the pressing topic of Cesare Borgia's threat to Florence: 
One can only conjecture that he intends to create such a powerful state in Italy 
that he will be unassailable, making allegiance to him desirable for any ruler. 
Should this be his design, then he is clearly aspiring to possess all of Tuscany in 
order to form a greater kingdom with the states surrounding Tuscany that he 
already holds.120 
118 Legation of January 8, 1503. 
119 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 63. 
120 Essential Writings, p. 363. The date of the work is contested. Some place it in the 
summer of 1503 (see Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 269 n. 25; Pesman, "Machiavelli, 
Piero Soderini, and the Republic," p. 55; Constantine, Essential Writings, p. 359); others 
think it may have been a later piece intended as part of a historical work (see Machiavelli, 
Chief Works, vol. 1, p. 161; Black, "Machiavelli in the Chancery," p. 39). 
53 
! ! 
Here Machiavelli shows his devotion to the well-being of Florence, yet, despite that 
devotion, we see in his official reports to the government of Florence that he did not hide 
his admiration for the skill, fortune and ambition of this new prince. 
Pope Alexander was the cause of both the Duke's initial good fortune and his 
sudden turn of fortune. When the Pope died of tertian fever on August 18, 1503, Cesare 
himself was also gravely ill of the same disease. The Venetians and Florentines, while 
always wary of each other's power, both seized the opportunity to detach what cities they 
could from the Duke. As Machiavelli writes in his Decennale: 
Poi ch' Alessandro fu dal ciel ucciso, 
Lo stato del suo duca di Valenza 
In molte parte fu rotto e diviso. 
When Alexander was by Heaven killed, 
The state of his Duke of Valence 
Was broken and divided into many pieces. 121 
With the conclave for the next Pope at an impasse, the Cardinals settled upon the 
ailing Cardinal of Siena. On September 22, he assumed the name of Pope Pius III, and 
only four weeks later, on October 18, he died. After his dea~h, the Ten sent Machiavelli to 
Rome as an envoy, instructing him to "keep us diligently informed from day to day of all 
that may occur worthy of notice. "122 Machiavelli arrived in Rome on October 27. Two 
days later Cardinal della Rovere-a man who had spent years in exile due to his fear and 
hatred of the Borgias---came to an agreement with Cesare:· in exchange for the votes of 
the Spanish cardinals, Rovere would confirm Cesare's appointment as Gonfaloniere of 
121 Tutte le opere, ed. Casella, p. 809, lines 463-65; Machiavelli, Chief Works, vol. 3, p. 
1455 (translation modified). 
122 Commission and Instruction of October 24, 1503, in The Historical, Political, and 
Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, vol. 3. 
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the Church and help preserve him in his dominion in the Romagna. 123 On November 1, 
with all but three votes, Rovere was elected Pope, taking the name Julius II. On 
November 4, Machiavelli wrote the Ten a clear-sighted letter: "it is not to be supposed 
that Julius II will so quickly have forgotten the ten years of exile which he had to endure 
under Pope Alexander VI. The Duke meantime allows himself to be carried away by his 
sanguine confidence, believing that the word of others is more to be relied upon than his 
own." This is the one error for which Machiavelli criticizes him in The Prince, that is, for 
having believed that by benefiting a man who hated him, he could make him forget old 
injuries (P 7). 
Machiavelli kept the Ten informed about the three meetings he had with the Duke 
in Rome. Then, on November 19, Cesare left the city with the intent of returning to the 
few strongholds in the Romagna that still held out for him. He planned to sail from Ostia 
since Florence had denied him safe-passage ~hrough its territory, but an envoy from the 
Pope arrived at Ostia, asking him to hand over the castle of Forli and his other fortresses. 
When the Duke refused, he was arrested. Seeing Cesare further reduced to these straits, 
Machiavelli wrote to the Ten: "We see now that the Duke's sins have little by little 
brought him to expiation. May God guide things for the best!"124 After surrendering his 
fortresses to the Pope, Cesare regained his freedom, but his fortune only declined further 
when he put his faith in Gonsalvo de Cordoba, the Spanish viceroy in Naples. Ferdinand 
and Isabella, at the behest of Julius, had Gonsalvo arrest Cesare, and, in August of 1504, 
123 For Gonfaloniere of the Church translators often use a more descriptive title such as 
Standard-bearer, or Captain-General, of the papal forces. 





he was sent to Spain as a prisoner. 125 Near the end of Machiavelli's first Decennale, 
written in 1504, he shows the conventional Florentine contempt for Cesare: 
E benche fussi da Consalvo visto 
Con lieto volto, Ii pose la soma 
Che meritava un rebellante a Cristo. 
Though Gonsalvo looked upon him 
With a pleasant face, he put on him 
The burden deserved by a rebel against Christ. 126 
Nine years later, in the final chapter of The Prince, he alludes to Duke Valentino as 
someone who almost became powerful enough to free Italy from foreigners: "although up 
to now a glimmer has shone in someone who could judge that he had been ordered by 
God for her redemption, yet later it was seen that in the highest course of his actions, he 
was repulsed by fortune." In these two conflicting portraits-the Decennale and The 
Prince-we see Cesare's two faces: a man who used force and fraud to become so 
powerful that he threatened Machiavelli's beloved Florence, and a man who, through that 
very acquisition of power, could have brought much needed strength to a weak and 
divided Italy. 
Eight years later, in 1512, the Medici were able to return to power in Florence by 
taking advantage of Julius H's ire at Piero Soderini. After Julius' death in February of 
1513, Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici became Pope Leo X. Although Machiavelli lost his 
125 He escaped from prison in October 1506 and died the following March fighting as 
Captain-General for his brother-in-law, the King of Navarre. 
126 Tutte le opere, ed. Casella, p. 810, lines 511-513; Chief Works, vol. 3, p. 1456 
(translation modified). De Grazia suggests that Machiavelli may have been motivated to 
make such a pointed critique of the Duke in this-a poem intended for a public 
audience-in order to counter the opinion that he had shown too much admiration for this 
Florentine enemy, see Machiavelli in Hell, pp. 303-305. 
56 
l. 
political office when the Medici returned to power in Florence, he nonetheless hoped to 
find employment under them. Further, he saw the benefit a Florentine Pope could bring to 
Florence: what Alexander VI and Duke Valentino had achieved through their fortune and 
virtu could be achieved by Leo X and his brother Giuliano de' Medici on terms more 
favorable for Florence. Roused by these thoughts, he started to systematize in a concise 
handbook for princes what he had learned about the art of the state through his reading 
and experience. 
Virtue, Fortune and Crime 
In The Prince, Machiavelli discusses five ways that a prince may come to power: 
heredity, virtue, fortune, crime and election. Chapter 2 briefly discusses hereditary 
princes, pointing out that a hereditary principality. is easier to maintain than a new 
principality since a hereditary prince has less need to offend his subjects and is thus more 
loved. In chapter 6, he discusses attaining a principality through virtue and one's own 
arms. His primary examples are the greatest classical founders: Moses, Cyrus, Romulus 
and Theseus. Machiavelli emphasizes that their success was due not only to their virtue 
but also to their ability to use force, force being necessary in his view since men are easily 
persuaded to follow new orders but then just as easily waver. Founding a principality 
through virtue is difficult along the path, he writes, but once it is founded it is easy to 
maintain and "very happy." Chapter 7 discusses those who become new princes through 
the fortune and arms of others. For them the path to the principate is easy; the difficulty 
occurs after they have attained it, for they must still lay its foundation if they wish to 
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~aintain it. For such a prince, Machiavelli advises that he imitate the actions of Cesare 
Borgia. Chapter 8 discusses the criminal path to the principate, using the ancient example 
of Agathocles of Syracuse (361-289 BCE) and the modem example ofLiverotto of Fermo 
(d. 1502). 
The interpretation of the relation between these three paths tends to take one of 
two lines of argument. Some see Machiavelli's discussion of crime as a clear demarcation 
of a moral limit. In Isaiah Berlin's view, Machiavelli's key point is that Agathocles and 
Liverotto "went too far, and so did not gain glory."127 Skinner follows the same tack: "for 
Machiavelli a man of completely vicious character, like Agathocles, can never be 
considered a man of true virtu. "128 On the other hand, some readers argue that the chapter 
on crime points in a veiled manner to the very permeability of the distinction between 
virtue and crime. Strauss, for example, writes: "It is true that he contrasts Cesare with the 
criminal Agathocles by not calling Cesare a criminal. But if one looks at the actions of the 
two men, the contrast vanishes."129 Coby makes a similar argument: "Machiavelli-
quietly, discreetly-redeems Agathocles and nominates him for glory."130 In Victoria 
Kahn's view, Machiavelli's distinction between virtue, fortune and crime is "an ironic 
concession to the reader's moral sensibility."131 In order to examine this question, I will 
turn to a close analysis of chapter 8 as well as a comparison of Cesare Borgia and 
127 The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 176. Whitfield also makes this argument, see 
Machiavelli, pp. 80, 104. 
128 Foundations, vol. 1, p. 138. 
129 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 310 n. 53. Sydney Anglo makes the same argument: "It is 
quite impossible to distinguish Cesare and Agathocles, or, for that matter, Oliverotto da 
Fermo" (Machiavelli: A Dissection, p. 232). 
130 Machiavelli's Romans, p. 236. 
131 
"Virtll and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince," pp. 206, 210. 
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Agathocles. I argue that Machiavelli carefully separates the three types of princes of 
chapters 6-8 because he sees important moral as well as analytic distinctions between 
them. 
Chapter 8 is entitled, "Of Those Who Have Attained a Principality through 
Crimes." Machiavelli begins the chapter by summarizing the four ways one may rise from 
private individual to prince: virtue, fortune, crime or the support of fellow citizens, the 
respective topics of chapters 6 through 9. His reason for discussing the criminal path 
would be justifiable if it were merely for the sake of completeness (as his two examples 
show, such methods were sometimes used); however, in what must be one of The 
Prince's most troubling sentences, he seems to condone the criminal path: "it will be 
shown with two examples, one ancient, the other modem, without entering into the merits 
of this issue, because I judge it sufficient, for whomever would find it necessary, to 
imitate them."132 The sentence at least contains two qualifications and is delivered with 
coldness rather than any zeal. The first qualification is seen in his scruple of mentioning 
that he is leaving the moral question aside. His second qualification rests in his reference 
to necessity. When is such a crime necessary? In the example of both Agathocles and 
Oliverotto, their crime was necessary only in relation to their ambition. Thus, for one who 
desires the principate but lacks sufficient virtue, fortune or support, crime would be 
necessary. Is Machiavelli stooping to counsel such a man? Indeed, he is making the same 
counsel available to all, though surely he would find little to commend in one who must 
132 
"E parlando del primo modo, si monsterra dua essempli, l'uno antiquo, l'altro 
modemo, sanza intrare altrimenti ne' meriti di questa parte, perche io iudico, a chi fussi 
necessitate, che basti imitargli" (p. 150). 
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resort to crime to fulfill his own blind ambition. On the other hand, his counsel could be 
used by a man willing to resort to crime for the sake of the common good. It may be 
thought, for example, that the way Agathocles and Liverotto seized the principate. shows 
what would be required to unite Italy, that is, to do what they did on a much larger scale. 
Yet, in Prince 4, Machiavelli points out that in a province with many lords "you can 
neither content them nor eliminate them." Thus the crime committed by Agathocles and 
Liverotto is useless as an example of how to unite Italy where numerous cities with their 
own militias and strongholds are dispersed across a large province. The more relevant 
example for how to create a strong central state in Italy is Duke Valentino. 
While the purpose of chapter 8 still appears enigmatic, the Discourses sheds 
further light on Machiavelli's view of the type of crime committed by Agathocles and 
Liverotto. In Discourses 1.9.2, Machiavelli argues that having "the common good" as 
one's "intent" makes a bad deed excusable. Thus, in his view, crime is excusable for the 
sake of ordering a state, for renewing a corrupted state or for founding equality. Romulus 
and Moses provide examples of the first case. Romulus "killed his brother" to found 
Rome (1.9.1-2). Moses, to found his new orders, "was forced to kill infinite men" 
(3.30.1). 133 Yet, in The Prince, Machiavelli discusses Romulus and Moses in chapter 6 
since their end was the common good. 
Cleomenes offers an example of the second case: using crime to renew a corrupt 
state. In Discourses 1.9.4, Machiavelli writes that in order to return Sparta to its original 
133 When Moses came down from the mountain and discovered his followers worshipping 
a golden calf, he ordered faithful volunteers to "kill your brother, your friend, and your 
neighbor." The result was that "about three thousand of the people fell on that day" (Ex. 
32.2r28). 
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laws and ancient virtue, Cleomenes "had all the ephors and anyone else who might be 
able to stand against him killed." In Machiavelli's view, this action was "just and 
worthy." However, while he justifies eliminations for the sake of renewal, he also notes 
how rare it is that someone will be willing to use violence for the sake of a good end: 
Because the reordering of a city for a political way of life presupposes a good 
man, and becoming prince of a republic by violence presupposes a bad man, one 
will find that it very rarely happens that someone good wishes to become prince 
by bad ways, even though his end be good, and that someone wicked, having 
become prince, wishes to work well, and that it will ever occur to his mind to use 
well the authority that he has acquired badly. (1.18.4) 
The argument of Discourses 1.18 would suggest that Agathocles is a sort of border 
example: although he seized the principate out of private ambition, he then used his 
authority well insofar as he used it to preserve Sicily's liberty from the Carthaginians. 
Thus, Machiavelli treats him ambivalently in The Prince. 
A third case that requires violence is changing a feudal state to the condition 
necessary for the maintenance of a republic, namely, equality. Machiavelli discusses the 
case in a neutral tone, simply noting that a republic cannot successfully be ordered where 
powerful men live in castles and hold the people down with force. The only way to order 
a lasting republic in such a place would be to eliminate all the lords and gentlemen 
(1.55.5). However, as he points out in Discourses 1.17.3, to do so would require "many 
dangers and much blood." 
Machiavelli also discusses the case of those who use violence for a destructive 
end. His judgement of such princes is stated in the title of Discourses 1.rn: "As Much As 
the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a 
Tyranny Are Worthy of Reproach." In the first paragraph of that chapter, he says "men 
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are infamous and detestable who are destroyers of religions, squanderers of kingdoms and 
republics, and enemies of the virtues, of letters, and of every other art that brings utility 
and honor to the human race" (1.10.1). Considered together, the three cases where 
violence is excusable and the counterexamples where it is inexcusable clearly show 
Machiavelli's framework for thinking about crime. He takes a bold and unorthodox 
position in not opposing the elimination of men if the act serves the common good. He 
does not, however, push the argument further than that; rather, he takes it for granted that 
no one will ever be "so crazy" or "so wicked" as not to blame those who use violence for 
the sake of destruction (1.10.1). 
Returning to Prince 8, there is no reason to doubt that when Machiavelli discusses 
Agathocles and Liverotto under the ignoble heading of crime he has not already 
condemned them. Nonetheless, one of the things that makes Prince 8 disconcerting is that 
Machiavelli not only condemns Agathocles but also gives him praise. His source for the 
life of Agathocles is Justin's Epitome of the Philippic History, and he relates the details in 
an abridged but accurate manner. Machiavelli attributes Agathocles' success in rising 
through the military ranks to his "virtue of spirit and body" (virtu d'animo e di corpo). He 
then describes how Agathocles seized the principate through the murder of the senators 
and the richest of the people, and how, once he made himself prince, he defended Sicily 
against Carthage. In line with the schema he develops to categorize the princes of 
chapters 6-8, he points out that nothing in Agathocles' life was the gift of fortune. While 
the main idea of the sentence pointing that out is clear, it has two readings: "whoever 
might consider the actions and virtu [or vita] of this man will see nothing or little that can 
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be attributed to fortune." While scholars are split fairly evenly on which variant is correct, 
I would add in favour of "vita" that it would point to the status of Agathocles' low birth, a 
detail noted by Machiavelli and which further evinces his lack of fortune. 134 Machiavelli 
also points out that Agathocles neither attained nor maintained the principate through 
moral virtue: "one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be 
without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire 
empire, but not glory [ acquistare imperio, ma non gloria]." While Machiavelli recognizes 
that virtu has a range of meanings, he imposes a limit on how far it can be taken ("one 
cannot call it virtue ... "). Agathocles' success was wholly the result of his military virtue 
and his criminal actions. Machiavelli follows the previous sentence by again praising him 
for the former and condemning him for the latter: 
For if one considers the virtue of Agathocles in entering into and escaping from 
dangers, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and overcoming adversities, 
one does not see why he has to be judged inferior to any most excellent captain. 
Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, 
do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one 
cannot attribute to fortune or to virtue what he achieved without either. 
At this point in the chapter Machiavelli has twice or thrice (depending upon the text) 
mentioned Agathocles' virtue yet also said his actions cannot be called virtue. He is of 
course using the word virtu in its two different senses: moral excellence and military 
excellence (these two senses go back to the Latin virtus and the Greek arete, but a fuller 
discussion of them will have to await chapter 6 on Machiavelli and the ancients). To fit 
134 The edition by Casella uses "vita." The editions by both Bertelli and Martelli use 
"virtu." The edition by Flora and Cordie uses "vita." Among the English translations, 
Mansfield follows Casella's text but chooses "virtue." Wootton follows Bertelli, using 
"virtue." Connell uses Casella, Martelli and Inglese and chooses "life." Alvarez, 
following the text by Flora and Cordie, uses "vita." 
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Agathocles into his schema, Machiavelli needs to show that he rose to the principate 
through neither virtue, like the princes of chapter 6, nor fortune, like the princes of 
chapter 7. Yet, while maintaining that Agathocles lacks both moral excellence and good 
fortune, he polemically points out that Agathocles possessed military virtue. He likely 
took some pleasure in pointing out against the tradition that Agathocles had some 
virtuous qualities, just as he does in chapter 17 when he argues against "the writers" that 
the much praised unity of Hannibal's army would not have been possible without the 
cruelty for which they condemn him. 135 Although Machiavelli acknowledges Agathocles' 
military prowess, he still maintains the moral difference between Agathocles and the men 
of chapter 6; that is, he concedes that Agathocles was a "most excellent captain" but 
maintains that his criminal nature prevents him from being classed among the "most 
excellent men." 
At the end of the chapter, Machiavelli asks how it was that Agathocles was able to 
rule securely despite his cruelty. His answer is that cruelty can be "badly used or well 
used." He explains: "Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak well of 
evil) that are done at a stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not 
persisted in but are turned to as much utility of the subjects as one can."136 We should 
first note Machiavelli's presupposition that cruelty is evil. However, since in his view 
135 Justin never uses the word "virtus" to describe Agathocles; he merely speaks of his 
"audacity" (audacia) in attacking Carthage while Syracuse was under siege (Epitome of 
the Philippic History 22.4.2. Latin text is from http://www.forumromanum.org/.) 
136 Emphasis added. "Credo che questo avvenga dalle crudelta bene usate o male usate. 
Bene usate si possono chiamare quelle, se del male e licito dire bene, che si fanno a un 
tratto per necessita dello assicurarsi, e dipoi non vi si insiste dentro, ma si convertiscono 
in piu utilita de' sudditi che si puo" (pp. 160-61). 
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cruelty is necessary for a new prince, he argues that the most effective way to use it is to 
be decisive. Cruelty is badly used when a prince tries to avoid it in the beginning but, as a 
result, is pressed to use cruelty on an ongoing basis, or, as Machiavelli graphically puts it, 
to always "hold a knife in his hand." For that reason, those who advise a new prince to 
avoid cruelty offer "bad counsel." 
What here justifies cruelty is "the necessity to secure oneself." However, the 
murders ordered by Agathocles and Liverotto were necessary for neither their own 
security nor that of their state. The murders were necessary only in regard to their own 
ambition. We must then differentiate necessity to secure oneself and necessity resulting 
from ambition. Machiavelli does not explicitly formulate this difference, though he notes 
ambition was the motivation for both men. Agathocles "decided to become prince and to 
hold with violence and without obligation to anyo~e else that which had been conceded to 
him by agreement." Liverotto thought it "servile to be at the level of others." Thus, their 
criminal act was not necessary to secure themselves but merely to satisfy their ambition. 
Machiavelli nonetheless points out that Liverotto' s crime allowed him to rule securely 
since in one stroke he had eliminated all those who could have hurt him. His mistake was 
letting himself be deceived by Cesare Borgia, and Machiavelli suggests the fittingness of 
his ignoble death by recalling that it occurred "one year after the parricide he committed." 
Agathocles also committed his most offensive crime in one stroke, and, as Machiavelli 
points out, he turned it to the good of the people. According to Machiavelli, those two 
factors explain how he was able to rule securely (a rule which lasted for about twenty-
seven years). Machiavelli even argues that such a prince will not be punished by 
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providence: "Those who observe the first mode [cruelty well used] can have some 
remedy for their state with God and with men, as had Agathocles."137 By writing that 
Agathocles found some remedy with God, Machiavelli expands the belief that God 
condones just wars to his acceptance of the principle that a good result excuses an evil 
act. 138 Since Agathocles turned his crime to the good of the state he was able to maintain 
his rule, yet his crime was committed out of ambition and due to his criminal nature. 
Thus, Machiavelli's position on Agathocles is ambiguous and ambivalent, part praise, 
part condemnation. 
We may now turn to a comparison of Agathocles and Cesare. The outline of 
Cesare's actions and life at the beginning of the chapter should serve to dispel the notion 
that Machiavelli's praise was intended to be ironic or that he presents an idealized 
account of the Duke. In Prince 1 7, Machiavelli provides a succinct assessment of the 
Duke's character and accomplishment: "Cesare Borgia was held to be cruel; nonetheless 
his cruelty restored the Romagna, united it, and reduced it to peace and faith." Prince 7 
also points to the goods ends Cesare achieved in the Romagana: "well-being," "good 
government," "obedience," "peace and unity." This judgement is shared by 
Guicciardini-no friend of the Borgias-as well as many modem historians. 139 
Both Cesare and Agathocles used cruelty well by turning it to the good of the , 
state, but we can efface the difference between them only if we are prepared to say that 
137 
"Coloro che oservano el primo modo, possono con Dio e con Ii omini avere allo stato 
loro qualche remedio, come ebbe Agatocle" (p. 161 ). 
138 I return to this important sentence in chapter five in the section on "Princes and God." 
139 Guicciardini, The History of Italy, bk. 6, p. 168; Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," 
pp. 117-18, 121 n. 30. 
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the actions of Borgia are no different than the actions of Agathocles. As we saw, Borgia 
used the cruelty of Ramirro de Lorqua to pacify the Romagna and then appeased the 
people by having him beheaded and establishing a civil court in his place. Secondly, the 
Duke used deception to kill four of his condottieri who had plotted to ruin him. 
Agathocles, on the other hand, "had all the senators and the richest of the people killed" 
in order "to hold with violence and without obligation to anyone else that which had been 
conceded to him by agreement" (P 8). Machiavelli calls Agathocles' act a crime whereas 
he singles out Cesare's above two acts for praise. Agathocles attained the principate 
through the murder of the leading citizens, Cesare became Duke of Romagna through the 
fortune of his father, the aid of French arms and his own virtit. To argue that 
Machiavelli's secret intention is to efface the difference between the two men is to be 
more Machiavellian than Machiavelli. While he shows admiration for Agathocles' 
military virtit and even the swiftness with which he executed his terrible cruelty, he shows 
no admiration for him as a criminal man. On the other hand, even when Cesare Borgia 
presented a threat to his beloved Florence, Machiavelli still admired his fortune and virtit. 
The mere fact that the representatives from chapters 6, 7 and 8 all rely on force to become 
new princes does not erase the differences between them in terms of the path they trod 
and the end they sought. Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus cut a path through their 
own virtue and arms. The end they achieved was to found happy states (Israel, Persia, 
Rome and Athens) ennobled by their virtit. These princes are "the most excellent" (P 6). 
Then there are princes like Cesare Borgia who find a path opened for them by the fortune 
and arms of others, but who then, through their own virtit, set about laying a firm 
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foundation for their state. Agathocles represents a much more ignoble class of men. From 
the start of his career his path was marred by his predilection for crime, and, although he 
possessed military virtue, his crimes "do not permit him to be celebrated among the most 
excellent men" (P 8). 
As we have seen, Machiavelli argues that rulers may have to resort to immoral 
actions to maintain their rule and that cruelty, when used wisely, will be seen to be 
merciful. Nonetheless, Machiavelli takes for granted that, under normal conditions, moral 
goo<:Iness is itself praiseworthy. In Prince 18, he makes both points clearly-that morality 
is praiseworthy and that it must sometimes be violated. If a ruler "always" observes the 
traditional virtues, he argues they will be harmful, adding that "by appearing to have 
them, they are useful, as it is to appear merciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, 
and to be so" (emphasis added). 140 While his polemical point is that the traditional 
exhortation to princely virtue needs to be qualified, his addition of "e essere" ("and to 
be") shows beyond doubt his valorization of the moral virtues. He even repeats both 
points in the same paragraph, writing that a ruler should "not depart from good, when 
possible, but know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity" (emphasis added). 
He could not have made these two points more clearly nor more carefully; the virtues are 
praiseworthy, but they cannot always be observed by a ruler who wishes to maintain his 
140 
"parendo di averle, sono utile, come parere pietoso, fedele, umano, intern, relligioso e 
essere" (pp. 239-40, emphasis added). 
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state. Machiavelli argues for what we could call, to adapt an expression from Sheldon 
Wolin, an economy of moral transgression. 141 
The necessity and utility of an economy of moral transgression is one of the 
central ideas running throughout Machiavelli's writings. By being parsimonious, one will 
come to be seen as liberal (P 16). By being cruel in effecting justice, one will come to be 
seen as merciful (P 17). Cruelties should be done in a stroke and then "not persisted in"; 
what is much worse is when cruelties "grow with time" (P 8). Machiavelli's economy of 
moral transgression is also set forth in his poem The Ass: "when evil comes-for it 
always does come-take it down I like a medicine, for he is crazy who tastes it and gets 
its flavor."142 The idea takes on a comic guise in Mandragola where the issue is adultery: 
"Flee from evil, but if you can't bear it like a man" (4.1). In his Exhortation to Penitence, 
he states that one need not fear divine punishment as long as one repents and does not 
persist in evil. We see then that in Machiavelli's view it is difficult to avoid all evil in life, 
especially for a ruler, and so, if the necessity arises, one should be able to do it but take no 
· pleasure in it nor draw it out. While the drive of this Machiavellian thesis is the 
disconcerting claim that rulers must know how to do evil when forced by necessity, the 
· argument shows his belief that evil is evil and that it is only excusable for a good. 
141 For Wolin's thesis that Machiavelli's political theory is premised on utilizing "an 
economy of violence" see Politics and Vision, ch. 7, sec. 5. 




The Human Basis of Morality and Justice 
Machiavelli ignores natural law in all his writings. 143 This silence shows his 
disdain for the importance of natural law in scholastic philosophy. But since the natural 
law the scholastics found in Aristotle is also evident in other canonical Greek and Roman 
. writers, Machiavelli's silence on it shows a more general disregard for that aspect of 
ancient thought. He also gives little consideration to what scholastics and devout 
Christians consider the most important type of law: divine law. While Machiavelli breaks 
with those two aspects of tradition, he remains highly concerned with civic law, honour, 
the virtues and the distinction between good and bad. 144 In both The Prince and the 
Discourses, he shows his awareness of tradition and of where he parts from it. He 
generally uses moral words such as "good" ( buono) and "bad" ( cattivo) according to their 
conventional meaning; commentators, however, disagree over whether he valorizes them 
in the conventional manner. In short, some believe he shares conventional moral beliefs, 
while others argue that his conventional statements are merely provisional. 
To get a sense of those two positions, I will begin with Benedetto Croce's 
argument since it has been influential on the side of those who believe that Machiavelli 
143 On this point see Mansfield, "Introduction," The Prince, p. xii; Mansfield, 
Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 22; Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 93. 
144 On civic law see, e.g., "On Ambition," lines 79-99; P 12; D 1.3.1, 1.10.4, 1.45.1-2. He 
also cites "the law of nations" when commenting on Livy in D 2.28.1 and twice in 3.1.2. 
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accepts the validity of morality. His Elementi di politica appeared in 1925 and was 
translated into English as Politics and Morals in 1945.145 In its second chapter, he writes: 
It is known that Machiavelli discovers the necessity and autonomy of politics, of 
politics which is beyond or, rather, below moral good and evil, which has its own 
laws against which it is futile to rebel, politics that cannot be exorcised and driven 
from the world with holy water. 146 
Croce here acknowledges that this thesis-for which he is so often quoted-was already 
"known." This vague acknowledgement points to Francesco de Sanctis, a nineteenth-
century Italian literary critic, who wrote that Machiavelli's "revolutionary" conception 
was to distinguish "man as he is" from man "as he ought to be."147 After Croce eloquently 
casts this thesis in his own words, he adds what he considers to be his more original 
contribution: the observation that Machiavelli discovered the autonomy of politics with 
"sharp bitterness" (acre amarezza). 148 According to Croce, Machiavelli's bitterness--or 
anguish, as it is sometimes translated-is occasioned by his "sorrowful moral conscience" 
and his "moral disgust" for brutality and treachery. 149 Thus, in Croce's view, the talk of 
Machiavelli's immorality rests on the failure to appreciate the bitterness with which he 
discovered the autonomy of politics and because "the common people term as moral only 
moralistic unctuosity and bigoted hypocrisy."150 The Italian scholar Federico Chabod 
145 In 1931, Elementi di politica was included in a larger work Etica e politica. 
146 Politics and Morals, p. 59. "Ede risaputo che il Machiavelli scopre la necessita e 
l' autonomia della politica, della politica che e di la, 0 piuttosto di qua, dal bene e dal male 
morale, che ha le sue leggi a cui e vano ribellarsi, che non si puo esorcizzare e cacciare 
dal mondo con l'acqua benedetta" (Etica e politica, p. 256). 
147 De Sanctis, History of Italian Literature, p. 464. On this point see Whitfield, 
Discourses on Machiavelli, pp. 1-3; Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 169 n. 66. 
148 Croce, Politics and Morals, p. 60. 
149 Ibid., pp. 61, 66. 
150 Ibid., p. 61; "l'unzione moralistica e l'ipocrisia bacchettona" (Etica e politica, p. 257). 
71 
I.· 
accepted Croce's separation thesis, arguing that Machiavelli's discovery of the autonomy 
of politics was "his true and essential contribution to the history of human thought."151 
There are, on the other hand, those writers who argue that Machiavelli's 
references to conventional moral views cannot be given much weight. For Meinecke, they 
are merely a relic of his Christian inheritance; Machiavelli, he writes, "retained the basic 
Christian views on the difference between good and evil" but was "at heart a heathen."152 
Some of the more recent writers skeptical about.Machiavelli's commitment to 
conventional morality have shifted the terms of the debate from morality to rhetoric. 
Maurizio Viroli writes that Machiavelli's argument excusing Romulus' fratricide in 
Discourses 1.9 "is not a philosophical discussion about moral truth which assumes the 
existence of stable moral standards and of a clear way of demarcating right and wrong, 
but a rhetorical discussion on opinions about what is praiseworthy and what is 
blameworthy which assumes that there are no stable moral standards."153 He makes the 
same argument about Machiavelli's discussions of praise and blame in The Prince. 
Likewise, Virginia Cox uses classical rhetorical theory to question Croce's line of 
argument: "considerable weight has been attributed within certain modem traditions of 
criticism to The Prince's not infrequent gestures of deference to conventional moral 
values, such as the series of statements on the desirability of virtue in the opening lines of 
chapters 16 through 18 or the moral reflections on Agathocles." Her counter is that such 
151 Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 116. The essay was first published in 1925 as Del 
'Principe' di Niccolo Machiavelli. 
152 Machiavellism, pp~ 31-33. 
153 Viroli, Machiavelli, pp. 94-95. 
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statements are better seen as "strategic qualities of Machiavelli's rhetoric."154 Strauss 
pushes this line of argument to its logical conclusion since in his view Machiavelli's 
rhetoric has a philosophical aim. According to Strauss, the reason Machiavelli appeals to 
patriotism when questioning morality is to make ~is "questioning of morality" appear 
publicly defensible. 155 Thus, in Strauss' view, Machiavelli's questioning of morality in 
the name of the common good in fact masks a critique of morality in general. 
In my view, the interpretation outlined first-the one shared by de Sanctis, Croce 
and Chabod-is correct. In particular, I argue that Machiavelli believes honour and virtue 
to be praiseworthy and that he excuses their violation not for any end but only for the 
sake of political utility (and, as I argue in chapter six, his concern for political utility is 
based on a genuine concern for security, well being and virtu). While Machiavelli 
questions the received tradition on certain essential points that does not mean he intends 
to undermine the whole tradition or that he was unconcerned with moral truth. My aim in 
this chapter is more exegetical than evaluative, but if the view that Machiavelli esteemed 
honour and the virtues is correct, he then appears in a less "Machiavellian" light. 
Since Machiavelli's treatment of the virtues is one of his most original 
contributions, it will be helpful to begin with an outline of the tradition that he and his 
contemporaries received. Since the meaning of virtue is twofold, I will began with a 
historical sketch of how it came to have those two meanings-in Greek, in Latin, in 
Italian and even in English. I will then narrow my focus to the tradition of the virtues 
154 Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium," p. 1132. 
155 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 285; also see pp. 11, 79-81. 
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which stems from Plato in particular since it remained influential throughout the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance. 
The two meanings of virtue can be traced to both the Greek word arete and the 
Latin word virtus. The original meaning of arete referred to the "skill" or "excellence" of 
someone or something. For example, in the Iliad, the arete of horses refers to their speed 
(23.276). In the Odyssey, Penelope says her arete is her beauty and form (18.251). For 
Homer's warriors their arete is courage. 156 After the time of Homer, some of the pre-
Socratic poets and philosophers began to give arete a new interpretation, focusing on 
excellence as a moral or intellectual virtue. 157 The sixth century poet Theognis, for 
example, writes: "Injustice (dikaiosune), in a word, is every virtue (arete)." 158 And, 
according to Heraclitus, "thinking soundly (sophronein) is the greatest virtue (arete)." 159 
Plato's writings on moral virtue became particularly influential; in the Republic, Socrates 
distinguishes four traditional Greek values as the virtues needful for both city and man: 
wisdom (sophia), courage (andreia), self-restraint (sophrosune) and justice 
(dikaiosune). 160 Aristotle adopted the same view, arguing that the best way of life for both 
individuals and cities is that accompanied by courage, moderation, justice and prudence 
(Politics 7.1). And in the Nicomachean Ethics he argues that moderation, courage and the 
other virtues are a mean between excess and deficiency. We see then that in the Greek 
156 See, for example, the conversation between Meriones and Idomeneus in book 13 of the 
Iliad. On this topic, see Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers, pp. 8-9; Geerken, "Homer's 
Image of the Hero in Machiavelli: A Comparison of Arete and Virtu." 
157 See Xenophanes, fragment 1 in Diels-Kranz (hereafter DK). 
158 Gagarin, ed., Early Greek Political Thought, p. 32. 
159 Ibid, p. 152, fragment 112 DK. 
160 Bk. 4, 427e and the following. Also see Plato's Protagoras (330b) where the same 




tradition arete originally referred to any type of excellence, but was later given a moral 
interpretation, though continuity between the older and newer conceptions remained in 
the arete of courage. 
Turning to the Latin word virtus, its original sense referred to the qualities that 
Romans considered manly: courage, strength, excellence, ability, manliness. 161 To 
translate arete into Latin, Roman writers used virtus (or honestas); thus, just as arete had 
a wide range of semantic possibilities, virtus did too. Cicero, in On Invention, writes: 
"Virtus may be defined as a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of 
nature" (2.53.159). In Tusculan Disputations, he tries to square virtus' older heroic 
meaning with its moral interpretation: "it is from the word for 'man' [ viro] that the word 
virtue [ virtus] is derived"; all the virtues "have got the name from the single excellence 
[excello] which was found to outshine the rest," that is, courage (fortitudo) (2.43). In 
classical Roman texts, we can see the broad range of meanings virtus had, something 
which causes problems for translators. In William Batstone's translation of Sallust's 
works, he variously translates virtus as "virtue," "excellence," "courageous virtue," 
"manly virtue" and "merit."162 Likewise, Livy uses virtus in the old sense when he has 
Camillus proudly says that the Roman way of capturing a city is "virtute opere armis" 
(virtue, works and arms) (5.27). Machiavelli uses virtu with the same polysemous range it 
has in the Roman authors he admired, but even in Machiavelli's time that usage was not 
unique. For example, to translate the various senses of virtus in Leonardo Bruni' s 
celebrated Panegyric to the City of Florence (1403-4), Benjamin Kohl uses "skill," 
161 Catiline's Conspiracy, pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
162 See for example Catiline's Conspiracy 1.4, 2.3, 6.5, 58.1; Jugurthine War 1.1. 
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"military skill," "excellence," "valor," "courage" or simply leaves it as "virtue," letting 
the context suggest whether it has the sense of military virtue, moral virtue or a 
combination of both. We see then that during the Renaissance, virtu was commonly used 
in both a moral sense and a non-moral sense, the non-moral sense simply referring to 
excellence or the power of an action to achieve a certain end. 163 As many commentators 
have noted, Machiavelli's discussion of Agathocles in Prince 8 brings these two senses 
into direct conflict: Machiavelli attributes virtu to Agathocles while saying many of his 
actions lacked virtu. Only the context indicates when Machiavelli is referring to military 
virtue, the type of virtu Agathocles possessed, and moral virtue, the type of virtu he 
lacked. 
As we will here see, the influence of Plato's categorization of four virtues 
extended, with only slight variations, from classical Greece to Rome to Renaissance 
Europe. (Since virtue ethics died out in the Enlightenment, Alasdair Macintyre 
characterizes it as "a peculiar kind of darkness"164). As we saw above, Socrates in the 
Republic argues that the good city-and the individual who is ordered like it-possesses 
·four virtues: wisdom (sophia), courage (andreia), self-restraint (sophrosune) and justice 
(dikaiosune). 165 Cicero, in On Invention, his earliest work, follows this fourfold schema, 
translating these virtues into Latin as prudentia,fortitudo, temperantia, iustitia (2.15~). 166 
In On Duties, he devotes the majority of the first book to describing the duties which fall 
163 For examples see Seigel, "Virtu in and since the Renaissance," pp. 476-77. 
164 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 92. 
165 Bk. 4, 427e and the following. 
166 The anonymous writer of the Rhetorica ad Herennium cites the four virtues as 
prudentia,fortitudo, modestia, iustitia (3.2.3). 
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under each of the four types of virtue. As in On Invention, he divides the honourable 
(honestum) into four parts, but in On Duties he classifies them more broadly: the first part 
includes both sapientia (wisdom) and prudentia (practical wisdom or prudence); the 
second consists of iustitia (justice) and liberalitas (liberality), the third of magnitudo 
animi (greatness of spirit) andfortitudo (courage), and the fourth includes all the virtues 
related to temperantia (restraint). On Duties was greatly influential throughout the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, but Cicero's broad presentation of the virtues presented a few 
difficulties for later writers. For one, in order to present a neat sch~ma based on four 
principal virtues later writers had to choose one type of wisdom, either sapientia or 
prudentia (a difference based on the Greek distinction between the type of reasoning that 
deals with universals (sophia and episteme) and the type that deals with particulars 
(phronesis)). Also, by equatingfortitudo and magnitudo animi (a word he coined to 
translate the Greek megalopsukhia) (1.61), his text made the exact relation between them 
. fi l 161 a question or ater commentators. 
Saint Ambrose, in the late fourth century, was the first to graft this pagan tradition 
to Christianity, coining the expression "the cardinal virtues."168 In On the Duties of The 
Clergy, written about 391, he marries Cicero's On Duties with the Bible, writing that "the 
holy men of Old Testament time ... were well furnished with what men call the cardinal 
virtues/'169 He then shows how their acts embodied prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance. Macrobius' Commentary on the Dream of Scipio (written around the turn of 
167 For how later thinkers resolved this question, see Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 2, 
pp. 64-67. 
168 Macrobius, Commentary, pp. 120-21 n. 2 . 
. 169 Bk. 1, ch. 24. 
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the fifth century) names the same four virtues-prudence, temperance, courage and 
justice-arguing that they are not only philosophical virtues but also "political virtues."170 
Through influential pagan texts such as Macrobius' Commentary and the numerous 
appropriations in Christian writers such as Ambrose and Augustine, pagan ideas 
continued to exert an influence throughout the Middle Ages. In the twelfth-century the 
texts of Cicero, Virgil, Macrobius and other Latin writers experienced a new popularity, 
reawakening the question of the proper relation between the pagan virtues and the 
Christian virtues.171 The authoritative source for the theological virtues is the canonized 
letters of St Paul, in particular 1 Corinthians 13.13 where he writes: "And now faith, hope, 
and love, these three; and the greatest of these is love [agape]. " 172 The Greek word 
"agape" was translated into Latin as "caritas," and caritas is usually translated into 
English as "love" or "charity." 
Abelard, in his Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian (1130s), 
discusses the pagan virtues but argues they are incomplete without the Christian 
virtues. 173 Alan of Lille, writing in the 1170s, stresses the usefulness of the pagan virtues 
for political and social life, adding that charity can transform them into virtues which lead 
to man's heavenly end. 174 Brunetto Latini's The Books of Treasure (1266) discusses the 
Christian virtues of charity, faith and hope as well as the pagan virtues of prudence, 
temperance, fortitude and justice. This twofold schema of Christian and ancient virtues is 
170 Bk. 1, ch. 8. 
171 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 167. 
172 Also mentioned by Paul in 1 Thess. 1.3 and 5.8; Col. 1.4-5. 
173 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 168. 
174 Ibid., p. 171. 
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also adopted by Aquinas, the most influential of the scholastic writers. 175 The 
Renaissance writers of handbooks for rulers inherited this dual tradition and warned that 
any advantage found through dishonourable conduct would find its due in the afterlife. 176 
As Skinner points out, Renaissance writers on princely government concur on the 
ends of a prince: maintaining his state, achieving great things, attaining honour and 
glory. 177 As the means to those ends, they generally prescribed the observance of 
Christian and classical virtues. 178 That Machiavelli takes the same ends for granted is seen 
through their various iterations in The Prince: to found or acquire a state (P 3, 6, 18, 19), 
to maintain your state (P 6, 18, 19), to secure yourself (P 9), to maintain your reputation 
(P 18), to avoid ruin, maintain oneself and save one's state (P 15), to acquire more 
territory (P 3, 12), to acquire empire and glory (P 8), to do "great things" (P 18), to 
acquire "glories and riches" (P 25). Machiavelli also states the virtues for which a ruler is 
commonly praised: being "liberal," "a giver," "merciful," "faithful," "fierce and spirited," 
"humane," "chaste," "honest," "hard," "grave" and "religious" (P 15). Indeed, he accepts 
·that there is such a thing as "what should be done" (che si doverrebbefare), that is, acting 
in accord with the virtues. He does not question the goodness of honour itself, and in 
Prince 18 he is clear that rulers should "not depart from good, when possible." Where 
Machiavelli parts from the orthodox tradition is in his insistence that "human conditions" 
( condizioni umane) do not allow rulers to act according to the virtues at all times (P 15). 
Without abandoning his respect for the moral good, he rejects its consistent applicability 
175 Ibid., p. 177. 
176 Skinner, Machiavelli, pp. 56-58. 
177 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, pp. 131, 134. 
178 Ibid., pp. 131, 134, 182-83. 
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to the art of state: "it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to 
be able not to be good" (P 15). While earlier writers allowed some concessions when 
advising on affairs of state, for Machiavelli the necessity of acting against morality in 
order to avoid ruin becomes a central idea. 179 However, when it comes to subjects and 
citizens, the place of the virtues remains unshaken in his writings-except as a matter of 
comedy, as in Mandragola. When Machiavelli wrote The Prince at age forty-four, he 
could claim to his friend Vettori: "one should not doubt my faith, because having always 
observed faith, I ought not now be learning to break it. Whoever has been faithful and 
good for forty-three years, as I have, ought not to be able to change his nature, and of my 
faith and goodness my poverty is witness."180 In the Florentine Histories, we hear a 
guildsman rouse his fellow partisans to reject the type of conduct that Machiavelli himself 
observed: "For faithful servants are always servants and good men are always poor" 
(3.13). While that criticism may apply to Machiavelli himself, he nonetheless chose to 
remain a poor and faithful servant of Florence. He considers honest dealings in citizens to 
be a sign of "goodness" and "religion" (D 1.55.1-2). 
Since Machiavelli assumes the ends of security and well-being to be paramount, 
he critically examines how the virtues correspond to that end. His conclusion is that "if 
one considers everything well, one will find something appears to be virtue, which if 
pursued would be one's ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if pursued 
results in one's security and well-being [la sicurta et ii bene essere suo]" (P 15). He 
179 On scattered precedents for "Machiavellian" arguments see in particular Allan 
Gilbert's Machiavelli's Prince and its Forerunners. Chapter 6 below discusses some 
important classical precedents. 
180 Letter to Francesco Vettori, December 10, 1513 (The Prince, ed. Mansfield, p. 111). 
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shows this in the next two chapters by arguing that a ruler who is liberal will eventually 
have to maintain his liberality at the expense of the people, whereas a parsimonious ruler 
will not have to burden his subjects and thus will come to be seen as liberal (P 16); the 
same reversal happens when a ruler's mercy results in an unsafe, disordered state, 
whereas a few cruel punishments can provide security for all-for the state as a whole, 
cruelty is more merciful than mercy badly used (P 17). While this makes the virtues 
relative to the ends of security and well being, Machiavelli's analysis follows the advice 
given in the influential classical text the Rhetorica ad Herennium. After the Rhetorica 
summarizes the conventional praises of the four virtues, it then discusses the case where 
one is "urging that they be disregarded." In such a case, one of the strategies the text 
offers is to show "that the virtue consists rather of qualities contrary to those here 
evinced" (3.3.6). Cicero uses this strategy in On Duties: "For often the occasion arises 
when something that is generally and customarily considered to be dishonourable is found 
not to be so" (On Duties 3.2 ); he gives the example of killing a man, an act which under 
normal circumstances would be dishonourable but becomes honourable if the man is a 
tyrant. The idea that the virtues are relative qualities, dependent upon the people, the time, 
the place and so on goes back to Aristotle's analysis of the virtues. 181 Thus while 
Machiavelli's arguments on liberality and cruelty were unique, his rhetorical methods 
were not. Further, although his arguments are hardheaded, the reasoning behind them is 
clear; similar reasons are still often offered for the Right' s policies on low spending and 
being tough on crime. 
181 See for example Nicomachean Ethics 1195a, 1104a-b, 1120b, 113 la. 
81 
I, 
Prince 18 comes to the virtue of faith, a virtue held up by scholastics and 
humanists alike. According to Aquinas, it is "always unlawful" to lie or break a promise, 
even to enemies. 182 Leonardo Bruni, in his Panegyric to the City of Florence, writes that 
"nothing can be judged more proper to the dignity of a state than a reputation for 
observing all its commitments," and he claims that Florence "has scrupulously observed 
agreements even with its enemies."183 In On the Prince (1468), the Neapolitan humanist 
Giovanni Pantano maintains "there is nothing more despicable than not keeping faith. 
This is so important that once you have given your word, even to an enemy, it is still right 
to keep it."184 When Machiavelli turns to the topic of faith in Prince 18, he takes its 
praiseworthiness for granted: "How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his faith, and to 
live with honesty and not by astuteness [astuzia], everyone understands." He then points 
out that there are nonetheless "infinite modem examples" of rulers failing to observe their 
word. In light of that fact he writes: "A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor 
should he, when such observance turns against him" (P 18). Machiavelli now uses 
prudence as a more respectable name for the astuteness that he just granted is commonly 
shunned. In his view astuteness or prudence is a quality which a prince should have. 185 
Later, in Prince 21, he gives a definition of prudence which accords with his view that 
political options are rarely black and white: "prudence consists in knowing how to 
recognize the qualities of inconveniences, and in picking the less bad as good." 
182 Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, question 40, article 3 (Political Writings, p. 246). 
183 Bruni, Panegyric, p. 161. 
184 Pantano, On the Prince, p. 71. 
185 As Kahn points out, astuzia was sometimes used at Machiavelli's time to signify a 
demoralized prudence (Machiavellian Rhetoric, pp. 255-56 n. 5). 
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Machiavelli returns to this point in the Discourses, arguing that republics should follow 
the "prudence" of the Roman Senate since it "always took the less bad policy for the 
better" (1.38.1-2). The most influential definition of prudence goes back to Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics; therein, he writes that phronesis (which was translated into Latin as 
prudentia) "is a true and practical state involving reason, concerned with what is good 
and bad for a human being" (1140b ). 186 This definition is not as different from 
Machiavelli's as it may at first seem since Aristotle himself recognizes that what is good 
and bad are relative: "the lesser evil is counted as a good in comparison with the greater 
evil; the lesser evil is more worthy of choice than the greater, what is worthy of choice is 
a good" (NE 1131b). The same idea can also be found in Pontano's De obedientia, 
Diomede Carafa's I doveri de! principe and Guicciardini's Ricordi (series c, maxim 
126).187 According to this argument, the good is sometimes the less bad. While this 
introduces some relativity into the judgement of what is good and what is bad in a 
particular case, that relativity exists within a larger and more stable conception of what is 
good and bad in general, and the ultimate end is still to choose the good, the better or the 
more choice worthy. 
Which Ends Excuse Which Means? 
While Machiavelli speaks to a prince's desire to attain and secure his rule, a 
thoughtful reading of The Prince makes it apparent that the prince's private good is 
186 For similar definitions see Cicero, On Invention 2.53.159; Rhetorica ad Herennium 
3.2.J; Macrobius, Commentary 1.8. 
187 For quotations see Gilbert, Machiavelli's Prince and Its Forerunners, p. 127 n. 34, p. 
177 n. 59, p. 177 n. 58. 
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·inseparable from the common good. That is, if a prince were to carefully follow all of 
Machiavelli's counsels, the prince's good would redound to his subjects, further securing 
his rule. 188 This inseparability becomes clear when one assembles a picture of 
Machiavelli's ideal prince and principality from the various counsels he offers in different 
chapters of The Prince. 
If the prince is a new prince, he commits all necessary cruelty in one stroke and 
then turns his rule to the benefit of his subjects (8). H~ then founds his state on "good 
laws and good arms" (12). As a model to imitate, he takes one of the excellent men from 
antiquity (6, 14). He knows how to command, is full of heart and keeps the people 
inspired (9). He hunts to accustom his body to hardship and to learn the nature of the 
land, and he reads histories in order to imitate the actions of great men (14). He arms his 
subjects to show he trusts them and goes to battle as their captain (12, 14). He is careful to 
avoid hatred, in particular by abstaining from great cruelty and the property and women 
of his subjects (10, 16, 17, 19, 20). He avoids contempt by never appearing variable, light, 
effeminate, pusillanimous nor irresolute (19). He does not fear a reputation for 
parsimoniousness since it means he does not have to burden his subjects (16). He is more 
concerned to be feared and revered than to be loved ( 17, 19). To those who bring disorder 
into the state by killing or robbing, he is cruel, executing them rather than letting 
criminals hurt the whole community (17, 21). He breaks promises to other princes 
according to the state's interests but always points out the legitimacy of his reason for 
188 Hornqvist provides an excellent discussion of how Machiavelli turns the prince's 
selfish desire for security and grandeur to the common good (Machiavelli and Empire, 
pp. 281-82). 
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doing so (18). He is merciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, but when such 
virtues would harm the state he does what is necessary while taking care to appear to 
uphold them (18). Those who do extraordinary good, he rewards in an extraordinary 
fashion. He honours those who excel in an art and encourages the citizens to pursue their 
livelihoods by providing security for their goods and keeping taxes low; he meets with the 
different communities in his city and keeps the people entertained with festivals and 
spectacles (21 ). He asks questions of his counselors and listens to them patiently but 
decides by himself and is obstinate in his decision (23). While the times are calm, he 
develops the virtu of his principality as a defense against the ravages offortuna (25). 
Taken together, these counsels conjure the image of a united, content, secure and martial 
principality. Although it is not the most just state one could imagine, it is, for 
Machiavelli, the most ideal principality that accords with human conditions. A prince 
following his counsels would find that his security goes hand-in-hand with the common 
good (though, as we will see, in a more limited sense than the common good of a 
republic). While a bad prince may pick and choose the maxims that suit him, the type of 
prince and principality that Machiavelli yearns for is clear enough. 189 
The Discourses maintains many of the same principles and counsels that are found 
in The Prince. However, in the Discourses, where Machiavelli is freed from the constraint 
of appealing to a prince, he himself argues that the prince's "particular good" is at odds 
with the people's interest in acquiring dominion, riches and honour (2.2.1). This is 
because the prince does not want his subjects to elevate themselves to the level of 
189 On this point also see Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 164.· 
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competitors. In the Discourses, the common good means maintaining freedom.from 
internal tyranny and external domination, engendering virtue, acquiring riches and glory, 
expanding in dominion and maintaining the safety of the fatherland. 190 Renaissance 
writers generally accepted the idea, found in the ancients, that one of a city's ends is to 
expand. Petrarch, in How a Ruler Ought to Govern His State, begins his mirror-for-
princes by quoting from Cicero's On the Commonwealth: 
all these who have preserved, aided or enlarged their fatherland have a special 
place prepared for them in the heavens, where they may enjoy an eternal life of 
happiness. For nothing of all that is done on earth is more pleasing to that supreme 
god who rules the whole universe in justice, which is called the State. 191 
We also get a glimpse of this ethos in Leonardo Bruni's History of the Florentine People 
(c. 1414-29) when a speaker in favour of purchasing Lucca lays out the common· 
understanding of the common good: "I confess that I am moved by what men think good: 
to extend one's border, to increase one's power [imperium augere], to extol the splendor 
and glory of the city, to look after its utility and security."192 Although the city of 
Florence had a long history of pursuing territorial aggrandizement, it was not until the 
middle of the trecento that Florentine writers began to openly justify and praise Florentine 
imperialism.193 The view that one end of a republic is expanding in dominion leads to the 
difficulty that the common good of one republic signifies the common bad of another 
190 Machiavelli reiterates these ends in D 1.6.4, 1.29.3, 2.2.1, 3.41.1. 
191 Petrarch, How a Ruler Ought to Govern His State, p. 41. 
192 Quoted in Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, pp. 61, 64 n. 82. 
193 On the mid-trecento as a turning point see Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, p. 41, 
and Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 40. On the various and changing Florentine 
attitudes towards imperialism see Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, pp. 40-42; 
Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, pp. 12-18, 26, and, especially, Hornqvist, Machiavelli and 
Empire, pp. 38-75. Homqvist meticulously shows how deeply and pervasively the theme 
of imperial expansion runs throughout Florentine humanist writings. 
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state. While earlier writers who upheld Florentine imperialism colour their arguments 
with one thinly-veiled justification or another (defending liberty against tyranny, 
Florentine security, Florence's Roman heritage, the other city's own good, Florence's 
observance of justice), Machiavelli is more frank about the matter: "the end of a republic 
is to enervate and to weaken all other bodies so as to increase its own body" (2.2.3). In 
Machiavelli's writings the common acceptance of imperialism is stripped of its rhetorical 
justifications and instead based on the necessity of a city's own well-being and security. 
Having considered the ends of both principalities and republics, we may now 
look more closely at which ends excuse which means. Machiavelli's morality of ends is 
evident in both The Prince and the Discourses. Ill Prince 18, he declares: "in the actions 
of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no court to appeal to, one looks to the 
end." While he claims that the actions of both citizens and rulers are judged by their end, 
this is "especially" true for princes since, unlike citizens, they have "no court to appeal 
to." Thus, his comment points to the fundamental difference between internal and 
external affairs. For a prince, the most important judge of his actions is the opinion of his 
subjects. His argument rests on what he claims happens in fact: "So let.a prince win and 
maintain his state: the means will always be judged honorable, and will be praised by 
everyone. For the vulgar [ii vulgo] are taken in by the appearance and the outcome of a 
thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar" (P 18).194 Not only do people judge 
a prince's actions by their end, but if the result is good they will think the prince's actions 
were honourable (at least his domestic audience will and perhaps also other objective 
194 According to Gilbert, "ii vulgo" in the Italian of Machiavelli's period had the sense of 
"the mob" (Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 24). 
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observers impressed by the result). Machiavelli's point is, however, far from a praise of 
consequentialism as the only measure of a ruler's conduct. In describing those who judge 
this way Machiavelli could have said "the people" or "the multitude" but decided upon 
"the vulgar" with its more base connotation. The prudent understanding is limited to the 
few, those who are close to the ruler or see through his dissembling; but the people, being 
forced to judge "by. their eyes," judge by the appearance and the outcome (P 18). 
Machiavelli already recognized the significance of popular opinion in a letter he wrote to 
Piero Soderini's nephew in 1506: "I think not according to your perspective, wherein 
nothing but prudence is visible, but to the perspective of the many, which must see the 
ends, not the means, of things."195 While Machiavelli himself accepts consequentialism of 
the common view, he is not one of the vulgar taken in by the mere appearance and 
outcome of a prince's action. Rather, his point in The Prince is twofold. First, when a 
prince must act aga~nst virtue he should dissemble it (and we can say it is a merit of the 
people that they are offended by the dishonourable conduct of their rulers). Second, it is 
easy to dissemble because as long as the end is good, the vulgar will judge the means to 
be honourable. Machiavelli ends the chapter with the example of an unnamed prince who 
always preaches "peace and faith" while·repeatedly breaching them in order to maintain 
his state. Thus, his example shows that while a prince needs to act against the traditional 
virtues, he can maintain his reputation so long as he is careful to always appear virtuous. 
What Machiavelli advises is nothing novel, but rather the practice of successful princes. It 
is ironic, however, that he was willing to risk bringing public calumny upon himself by 
195 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 134. 
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openly counseling such offensive but, in his view, necessary arts of state. Perhaps, it is 
simply the case that he hoped to impress the prudent with his understanding of affairs of 
state without concerning himself with how "the vulgar" may misinterpret it. 
Machiavelli returns to the morality·of ends in Discourses r.9 but without going as 
far as in The Prince. The principal example in the Discourses is Romulus killing his 
brother and consenting to the death of his co-ruler. Machiavelli agrees that Romulus' 
actions would set a "a bad example" if it were not for the fact that his intention was "the 
common good" (r.9.r-2). Machiavelli's argument is premised upon the further claim that 
it is necessary for one individual alone to have authority when ordering or reforming a 
republic; otherwise, "diverse opinions" give rise to conflict (r.9.2). Based on Romulus' 
example, he states: "It is very suitable that when the deed accuses him, the effect excuses 
him; and when the effect is good, as was that of Romulus, it will always excuse the deed" 
(r.9.2). Implied in this example is the notion that the greater the end, the more excusable 
the_ act. The founding of the greatest city excuses fratricide, one of the greatest crimes. 
While the argument is similar to that of Prince 18 it goes less far in that Machiavelli 
argues such means will merely be "excused" rather than "judged honorable." Further, in 
the Discourses, Machiavelli specifies that "he who is violent to spoil, not he who is 
violent to mend, should be reproved" (D r.9.2). With these two essential qualifications-
that the end must be "the common good" and "to mend"-all the Machiavellian 
guidebooks to the pursuit of private goods lose their claim to his name. 
In Discourses 3.3, Machiavelli discusses a counterfactual example that particularly 
speaks to his fellow disenfranchised republicans. If Piero Soderini had taken 
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extraordinary power in order to eliminate those who wished to return the state to the 
Medici, the maintenance of the republic would have excused his act: "Since his works 
and his intention had to be judged by the end, he should have believed that if fortune and 
life had stayed with him, everyone could certify that what he had done was for the safety 
of the fatherland and not for his own ambition" (3.3.1). Although the intention behind the 
extraordinary measure would at first appear ambiguous and fortune may thwart the plan, 
Machiavelli advises the gamble since one "should never allow an evil to run loose out of 
respect for a good, when that good could easily be crushed by that evil" (3.J.1). Even if 
fortune does not allow one to carry one's plan for the common good to its desired end, as 
happened in the case of Cleomenes, Machiavelli maintains that such a course is still ''just 
and praiseworthy" (1.9.4). 
Machiavelli's principal examples of ends which excuse unjust means are all based 
on the notion of "the common good." The end of ordering a good constitution excuses 
murder and even fratricide (1.9.2). The end ofretuming Sparta to the virtue of its ancient 
laws excuses Cleomenes' murder of those who opposed it (1.9.5). The end of"the safety 
of the fatherland" excuses the means of assuming extraordinary authority (3.3.1). The end 
of maintaining the "life" and "liberty" of the fatherland excuses any policy necessary to 
achieve it (3.41.1). While the above means are grave, their ends are good governance and 
the survival of the state. Risking the ruin of the state means risking property, rape, death 
and a change of governing power from within or subjection to a foreign state. Machiavelli 
prioritizes having a well-ordered state as well as maintaining the state's security and well-
being .over the rulers' strict adherence to moral virtue. Thus he argues that a ruler's 
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violation of moral virtue for the sake of security and well-being will be either praised or 
at least should be excused. 
Machiavelli was aware that the idea that the end excuses the means could also be 
applied in a more unfettered way. He applies it to love in his comedy Mandragola, and in 
The Life of Castruccio Castracani and Florentine Histories he puts the idea into the 
mouth of others in circumstances where its danger is more apparent. The Life of 
Castruccio Castracani (1520) is a fictionalized biography of Castracani, a prince of 
Lucca who menaced Florence in the 1320s. Describing this prince, Machiavelli writes: "If 
he could win through deception, he never sought to win through force. 'Victory brings 
glory' was his mott~it mattered little how victory was achieved."196 This formulation 
makes more apparent one of the problems inherent in the view that a good end excuses 
bad means: the problem, as stated earlier, that the common good of one state (expansion 
through victory) may be the common bad of another state (submission through defeat). 
Castracani' s motto makes it clear that a good end has no necessary relation to justice; he 
puts the argument that the end excuses the means to the service of imperial expansion, 
and Machiavelli's other works show that he shares the argument. In the case of imperial 
expansion the idea that victory, however it is achieved, brings glory may describe the 
common way of praising, but it hardly masks the injustice of it. Machiavelli's argument is 
radical and offensive on this point since he does not scruple about neglecting the question 
of justice altogether. 
196 Essential Writings, p. 425. 
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In Florentine Histories Machiavelli shows the destructiveness of the argument 
that the end justifies the means when it is applied to partisan politics. In the aftermath of a 
violent revolt against the Florentine nobility in 13 78, a plebeian guildsman encourages his 
fellow plebs to further violence by telling them: "neither conscience nor infamy should 
dismay you, because those who win, in whatever mode they win, never receive shame 
from it" (3.13). In the speech, the guildsman pushes this identifiably Machiavellian 
argument to its extreme; however, he uses it to justify their particular good, not the 
common good. As the violence is intended to further spoil, not to mend, the guildsman 
should be reproved (according to the argument of Discourses r.9.2). The guildsmen, 
however, follow the pleb's advice, and Machiavelli in his own voice twice refers to their 
acts as "evils" (3.13-14) . 
. In Florentine Histories, Machiavelli also uses the people's rash judgment over 
losing a single battle to show why it is not true that only the end matters in judging an 
action. When the growing power of duke Filippo Visconti of Milan was threatening 
Florence, the leading citizens persuaded the Florentines that it would be prudent to aid the 
city of F orli which had just been acquired by the duke. When the two sides then came to 
arms, the duke's troops defeated Florence's in the battle of Zagonara. Due to that defeat, 
the people turned against the citizens who had advised the war. In response, a high-
ranking Florentine, Messer Rinaldo, tells the people: "it was not prudent to judge things 
by their effects, ·because many times things well advised do not have a good outcome and 
things ill Cl:dvised have a good one" (4.7). Good advice, Rinaldo adds, should be praised 
even if it is not successful, for otherwise men will lose the incentive to give good counsel. 
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Machiavelli evinces his approval of the prudent perspective by pr~ising Rinaldo's "good 
words" and his disapproval of the popular view by writing that they "said all the things an 
angered people are wont to say" (4.7). Since the people are quick to judge a thing by its 
end, they may condemn a prudent course merely because the end did not come out as 
planned. Although Machiavelli himself insists on taking the end as the most important 
standard, he knows it is not prudent to judge things solely by their end, as the· intention 
also, of course, matters. 
To sum this section up, I will draw together some of the main problems that arise 
from Machiavelli's argument that the end excuses the means. In The Prince, the ruler's 
most fundamental ends are security and well-being, and they may excuse dishonourable 
conduct on the part of the ruler. But, in addition to security, a ruler also seeks "glories and 
riches" (P 25) or, as he says in the Discourses, "empire and glory" (2.9.1). Many of 
Machiavelli's statements, as well as explicit arguments, show that in his view those latter 
ends may also excuse dishonourable conduct. 197 However, he extends his justification of 
dishonourable conduct only so far, for when a ruler goes too far he loses one of the very 
ends he is seeking: glory. As he famously says about Agathocles: he acquired "empire, 
but not glory" (P 8). In the Discourses, Machiavelli's argument that the end excuses the 
means rests on "the common good." The problem, as discussed above, is that when it 
comes to foreign affairs Machiavelli does not distinguish between the just common good 
and the unjust common good. In relation to internal affairs there is a further problem: 
197 See for example his praises of Cesare Borgia and Castruccio Castracani, as well as his 
praise of deceit in discussing Cyrus and Rome in Discourses 2.13.1-2. 
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different factions may hold different notions of the common good and, in pursuit of those 
ends, may apply the argument that the end excuses the means. Although Machiavelli 
himself has a fairly clear notion of the common good ( virtu, strength, order, lack of 
partisan conflict, expansion), where the pursuit of different ends leads to armed conflict, 
Machiavelli's theory provides the means to judge the matter only afterwards; that is, only 
the end that is instituted may demonstrate whether the victor was acting for the common 
good. His discourse on Romulus makes his thoughts on this matter clear. Since men have 
"diverse opinions," the founding of new orders must be done by "one alone." Further, that 
Romulus' crimes were motivated by the common good "is demonstrated by his having at 
once ordered a Senate with which he took counsel and by whose opinion he decided" 
(1.9.2). In such cases, different ideas about the common good may lead to extralegal 
internal conflict, but, in the case of Romulus, Machiavelli excuses his crimes since his 
good intentions were revealed by the good he did for Rome. 
The argument that the end excuses the means is most convincing in the case of 
preserving the security of the state. When it comes to maintaining the well-being of the 
state, the closer well-being is tied to security the more justification the argument still has. 
However, if the argument itself rests on necessity, then it becomes increasingly less 
justified when it comes to cases that relate to well-being in the sense of increasing power 
and grandeur. For those who accept the reasonableness of Machiavelli's argument in its 
more limited applicability, his writings offer only general principles and a few examples 
as guidance for deliberating about which particular ends excuse which particular means 
(something I tried to outline above). Machiavelli's main goal is simply to make a case for 
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the argument itself. My own concern is not with the difficult and troubling questions 
raised by particular modern situations, but only to put the problem's thought-worthiness 
on the table and to consider its moral and religious implications. 
The Chain of Obligation and the Role of Justice 
In the tradition which Machiavelli's period received, justice was a paramount 
virtue. The handbooks for princes written by other humanists make this point evident. 
Pontano, in On the Prince, written for the son of Ferdinand I of Naples in 1468, begins by 
emphasizing the importance of 'justice, piety, generosity and clemency."198 Bartolomeo 
Sacchi, in On the Prince (1470), highlights justice as the greatest of the virtues: "as 
Aristotle maintains, justice is not a particular part of virtue, but the whole of virtue."199 
When he comes to discuss military matters, he allows wars only for "just causes," and his 
list of such causes shows the influence of Cicero's On Duties. Thus, it is anomalous that 
Machiavelli mentions justice only twice in The Prince and that it is not to be found in his 
list of princely virtues in chapter 15. Rather, the first time he mentions justice is in 
chapter 21 when discussing what a ruler should do if a friendly power requests your aid 
against another power while the other power asks you to remain neutral. In such a 
situation he advises against neutrality: 
when the prince discloses himself boldly in support of one side, if the one to 
whom you adhere wins, although he is powerful and you remain at his discretion, 
he has an obligation to you and has a contract of love for you; and men are never 
so indecent [ disonesti] as to crush you with so great an example of ingratitude. 
198 Kraye, Cambridge Translations, vol. 2, p. 71. 
199 Ibid., p. 97. 
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Then, too, victories are never so clear that the winner does not have to have some 
respect, especially for justice. 
According to Machiavelli, neutrality turns you into the prey of both powers since it shows 
you are not "a true friend" to either. On the other hand, if you aid one power and he is 
victorious, he will be restrained from turning on you by his obligation for your aid; if he 
loses, he will give you what help he can and you will have the friendship of one whose 
power may revive (P 21 ). Florence found itself facing such a choice in 1510 while 
Machiavelli was Florentine Secretary. The King of France wanted Florence to declare its 
support for France in the event of war with the Pope, and the Pope wanted to detach 
Florence from France. 'Machiavelli was sent to France to temporize and, in a letter to the 
Ten of War from France, hinted at the importance of avoiding neutrality: "Your 
Lordships may believe as you believe the Gospels, that if the King and Pope make war, 
you will be obliged to declare for one side or the other."200 
Some scholars have questioned the consistency of Machiavelli's argument in 
Prince 21 that "obligation," "a contract of love" and "justice" will restrain a powerful 
ally. Chabod sees the assertion as an improvisation to buttress his argument against 
neutrality, pointing out that it is inconsistent with his argument in Prince 18 that since 
other men are wicked they will not keep faith with you.201 However, Machiavelli's point 
is not as inconsistent as it may seem since he often presupposes, what could be called, the 
affective power of obligation. To cite a few examples: since a new prince is obligated to 
those who called him into the state, he "cannot use strong medicines against them" (P 3); 
200 Quoted in Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 115. 
201 Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 63 n. 1. Mansfield points to the same 
contradiction in his "Introduction" to The Prince, p. xi. 
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"men who receive good from someone from whom they believed they would receive evil 
are more obligated to their benefactor" (P 9); difference of treatment obligates those who 
are shown preference (P 20); the prince should obligate his ministers to himself (P 22); 
virtue obligates men to you (P 24); if a prince benefits his subjects only when he is facing 
adversity, they will not feel any gratitude for it (P 8); he expands on the last point in the 
Discourses: a republic or prince should win over the people with benefits during times of 
peace so they will oblige the people; if benefits are bestowed in a time of war, the people 
will think the rulers were forced to bestow them and feel no obligation (1.32.1). So 
although Machiavelli knows (as he puts it i~ Prince 15) that the "chain of obligation" is 
easily "broken" he nonetheless is serious about its affective power. Further testimony to 
Machiavelli's respect for obligation is seen in Felix Gilbert's description of how 
Machiavelli himself "felt so obligated to Soderini that in the years of the Medici 
restoration, he hesitated to go to Rome, where Soderini was living, because he thought 
that while a visit to Soderini would damage his chances with the Medici, he could not go 
to Rome without calling on his former chief."202 Thus, returning to Machiavelli's 
argument in Prince 21, there is more reason for supporting a friend in war than remaining 
neutral since the bond of obligation may have some effect, and, without it, "you have no 
reason, nor anything, to defend you or give you refuge." For a friend whom you have 
aided in war to turn around and crush you would be "indecent" ( disonesti) and a great 
"example of ingratitude" (P 21 ). Guicciardini makes the same point in his Dialogue on 
the Government of Florence when he has Bernardo del Nero say that in a war between 
202 Machiavelli .and Guicciardini, p. 172. 
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two powers who are more powerful than you, "neutrality is a bad policy, because you will 
be at his mercy, whoever wins, and he won't have to consider you; whereas if you had 
adhered to one of them, you could at least hope that if he won you wouldn't be 
destroyed. "203 Both of these realistic thinkers are willing to resort to hope in a victor's 
decency when that policy seems to offer the most security. 
Machiavelli also offers another reason for trusting in a more powerful ally. If the 
ally considers breaking, or does break, the chain of obligation, it still has to worry about 
justice: "Then, too, victories are never so clear that the winner does not have to have 
some respect, especially for justice" (P 21 ). Although he does not elaborate on this point 
the thrust of the idea is that the.ally's disregard for justice may reverse its fortunes. 
Perhaps he means it would not be too late to switch to the other side and reverse the 
perfidious power's victory or even that such an indecent betrayal would also rally others 
against such an unjust power. Victors, then, should have some respect for justice because 
where there is great injustice the spirit of justice will be animated with arms. Thus the 
first mention of justice in The Prince shows that rulers must have some regard for it, if 
only out of prudence. 
Machiavelli's concern with indecent violations of justice is also seen in the 
Discourses. In book 2, chapter 28, he argues against such conduct based on an event from 
Livy book 5. When the Romans sent three ambassadors to warn the French against 
making war on the Tuscans, war broke out while the ambassadors were with the Tuscans. 
The ambassadors, disregarding their neutral status, fought with the Tuscans against the 
203 Dialogu.e on the Government of Florence, bk~ 1, p. 64. 
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French. The French, indignant over the conduct of the ambassadors, turned their anger 
towards Rome and demanded that the Senate hand over the three men. The Romans 
instead honoured them with high office. Enraged further, the French assaulted Rome, 
taking all of the city, except the Capitol. From this event, Machiavelli draws the 
following point: "This ruin arose for the Romans only through the inobservance of 
justice, for when their ambassadors sinned 'against the law of nations' and should have 
been punished, they were honored" (2.28.1). He thus CQunsels that princes and republics 
should avoid such a flagrant violation of justice since the indignation that arises from it 
creates an implacable enemy. We see here that Machiavelli pays particular attention to the 
relation between affect and justice: in this case the indignation of the French over the way 
the Romans flaunted justice twice in a row. Thus, in Machiavelli's view, it is prudent to 
observe justice because of"what indignation makes men do" (2.28.1). A third example of 
Machiavelli's concern with justice for prudent reasons occurs in the Art of War. 
Machiavelli has Fabrizio explain that armies are constrained to "observe justice" where 
they encamp because if they fail to do so food supplies will not come to them from those 
who live nearby (6.150-52). Although these three examples of the need to observe justice 
are far from the rigorous natural law of the scholastics, respect for justice in each of these 
cases rests on the solid ground of prudence. 
On the other hand, returning to Prince 21, Machiavelli's advice on asking a 
greater power for aid and being asked by a lesser power for aid shows how limited his 
concern with justice is. In the first case, Machiavelli advises princes "never" to associate 
with a greater power in order to attack another, unless pressed by necessity. He repeats 
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the point in the Discourses: a prince or republic that calls in a powerful state for aid in 
offense (or defense) usually becomes its prey due to the power's "malignity" or 
"ambition" (2.20.1). In neither work does he ask if the acquisition one seeks is just; he 
only argues that it is imprudent to call in a larger power to make such an acquisition. In 
this case his focus on power and mistrust of human nature again have a moderating effect 
for a prince or republic that would follow his counsel. However, in the obverse case of a 
smaller power requesting one's aid in making an acquisition, Machiavelli advises it: 
when those who fight together are of such quality that you do not have to fear the 
one who wins, so much greater is the prudence of joining sides; for you assist in 
the ruin of one with the aid of the other who ought to save him, if he were wise; 
and when he has won, he remains at your discretion. (P 21) 
While it is unwise to request the aid of a stronger power unless it is necessary, if a weaker 
power makes that mistake by requesting your aid, it is prudent to join them. Again 
Machiavelli raises no question about the justice or injustice of joining together to ruin a 
third state. After the ensured joint victory, Machiavelli does not advise preying on the one 
who called you in-he merely points out that "he remains at your discretion." The 
different counsels he gives on making alliances depends on the relative power of the 
parties and who contracts the obligation: when you aid a stronger power, it contracts an 
obligation to you. If a stronger power aids you, you acquire the obligation (and find 
yourself at its discretion). When you aid a lesser power, it acquires an obligation to you 
(and you have nothing to fear from it). Machiavelli's concern here is merely with 
calculations of physical power and the affective power of obligation. 
In Prince 21, Machiavelli's understanding of justice seems merely to signify 
honoring an obligation that has accrued through receiving someone's aid (as we will see 
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in the following section, this view is consistent with the theory of justice that he adopts in 
the Discourses). The second and last time Machiavelli refers to justice in The Prince 
occurs in the work's concluding chapter. He exhorts the Medici to free Italy from the 
barbarians to "put an end to the sacking of Lombardy, to the taxes on the kingdom and on 
Tuscany, and cure her of her sores that have festered now for a long time" (P 26). In this 
context, Machiavelli quotes a line from Livy: "Here there is great justice: 'for war is just 
to whom it is necessary, and arms are pious when there is no hope but in arms"' (P 26). 
When it comes to the justice of freeing Italy from foreign powers, Machiavelli turns not 
to Cicero or the Christian writers who drew on him but to Livy's history of Rome. 
According to this definition, the only requirement of a just war is that war is necessary. 
And in Prince 26 the context is war for the sake of liberty from foreign rule. 
The quotation from Livy in The Prince's concluding exhortation recurs in the 
Discourses where Machiavelli provides its context. After the Samnites broke their treaty 
with Rome by raiding Roman confederates, they offered to return what had been 
plundered and asked for peace with Rome. The Romans, however, rebuffed the Samnites. 
When this news reached Samnium, the captain of the Samnites encouraged the people, 
telling them: "War is just to whom it is necessary, and arms are pious to those for whom 
there is no hope save in arms" (3.12.2). The context here provided by Machiavelli shows 
that it was Rome which rejected peace and the Samnites who claimed to fight a just and 
pious war. Machiavelli's citation of this line here and in Prince 26 shows that he accepts 
wars fought for liberty to be just. About the injustice of offensive wars he is, however, 
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silent. The latter is not the case for those writers who uphold the tradition stemming from 
Cicero. 
laws: 
In On Duties, Cicero bases the definition of a just war on Rome's ancient religious 
a fair code of warfare has been drawn up, in full accordance with religious 
scruple, in the fetial laws of the Roman people. From this we can grasp that no 
war is just unless it is waged after a formal demand for restoration, or unless it has 
been formally announced and declared beforehand. (1.36) 
Cicero also defines a just war in book 3 of On the Commonwealth, a work lost around 600 . 
CE but known through quotations in Augustine and other writers. 204 Augustine draws 
from Cicero in his definition of a just war: "A just war is customarily defined as one 
which avenges injuries, as when a nation or state deserves to be punished because it has 
neglected either to put right the wrongs done by its people or to restore what it has 
unjustly seized. "205 Aquinas, in his treatment of the question "Whether it is always a sin 
to wage war," lays down what became the three authoritative requirements for a just war: 
it must be commanded on the authority of a prince in order to protect the commonwealth 
from enemies; it must have a just cause, that is, be waged against those guilty of 
wrongdoing, and the prince must have the intent of promoting a good or averting an 
evil. 206 The just war tradition was adopted by the Florentine humanist Matteo Palmieri in 
204 Zetzel, "Introduction" to On the Commonwealth, pp. xv, xx; Homqvist, Machiavelli 
and Empire, p. 77. 
205 From Quaestiones in heptateuchum, quoted in Aquinas, Political Writings, pp. 240-41. 
206 Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, question 40, article 1 (Political Writings, pp. 240-41). 
102 
r I 
his Vita civile (1435-40).207 Bartolomeo Sacchi in On the Prince (1470) allows wars only 
for "just causes," and his list of causes shows the influence of Cicero's On Duties:208 
Leonardo Bruni's Panegyric to the city of Florence (1403-4}incidentally shows 
how just war theory may be put to misuse. Bruni first states: "the fact that the Florentine 
race arose from the Roman people is of the utmost importance." Based on that premise, 
he then- argues: 
there was no people on this side of the ocean that had not been subdued and 
brought under Rome's power by force of arms. Therefore, to you, also, men of 
Florence, belongs by hereditary right dominion over the entire world and 
possession of your parental legacy. From this it follows that all wars that are 
waged by the Florentine people are most just, and this people can never lack 
justice in its wars since it necessarily wages war for the defense or recovery of its 
own territory. Indeed, these are the sorts of just wars that are permitted by all laws 
and legal systems. 209 
Machiavelli's Florentine Histories also shows just war theory being abused in a debate 
over whether Florence should attack Lucca. On one side it was argued that "no other 
campaign ever undertaken by the Florentine people was easier, more useful, or more 
just." On the other side, Niccolo da Uzzano argued that such a war would be "unjust"; he 
added, however, that "since one lives today in such a way that just and unjust do not have 
to be of much account, he wished to leave out this point and think only of utility to the 
city" (4.19). While Uzzano cares for justice and believes that a war against Lucca would 
be unjust, he knows he must address himself to the spirit of the times. In order to argue 
against war with Lucca in a language persuasive to his fellow citizens, he argues, 
unsuccessfully, that such a war would bring loss rather than profit to the city. Machiavelli 
207 On Palmieri see Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, pp. 65-66, 78. 
208 Kraye, Cambridge Translations, vol. 2, pp. 103-104. 
209 Bruni, Panegyric, pp. 149-50. 
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comments disapprovingly on this episode, pointing out that the same multitude which 
censured the defensive war against duke Filippo Visconti was now set on an offensive 
war to seize the freedom and belongings of others (4.18). The way he frames the two wars 
shows the prudence of the defensive war and the imprudence of the offensive war. 
Machiavelli uses Uzzano's speech to shows that "today" everyone openly cares more for 
profit and loss than justice. Machiavelli also shows how appeals to justice may be used as 
a rhetorical tool and how the prudent appeal to utility can in fact be more just. His own 
departure from j:ust war theory should perhaps be seen in this light and at least has the 
merit of being more honest than using justice as a rhetorical weapon. 
Machiavelli is considered the first important realist because he sees relations 
between states functioning in terms of avarice, ambition and power more than justice. In 
his vision, external relations are little more than an endless power struggle. As we have 
seen, he himself never scruples to question whether an acquisition is just or unjust. 
Rather, he condones the desire to acquire as natural (P 3), and in the Discourses he states 
as a generality that men "wish to seek to command others" (1.1.4). Because he accepts the 
desire to acquire as natural, he only censures it when it leads to acquiring more than one 
can hold.210 While failing to question the justice of acquisition, he holds it is just to fight 
to defend or regain your liberty. Further, as we saw above, he thinks justice has a role in 
restraining a power from betraying a friend, warns about the hatred generated by flagrant 
acts of injustice and points out the importance of treating justly the people where one's 
army is camped. Although his silence on just war theory presents a major rupture with 
210 See P 3 and D 1.6.4 for example. 
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tradition, his writings still show it is prudent to have some respect for justice even if it is 
only for consequentialist reasons. While this is an impoverished normative position, it 
avoids hypocrisy, rests on the solid ground of prudence, and still has a restraining effect. 
Machiavelli and Polybius on Justice 
Discourses 1.2 contains one of the most important passages for showing that 
Machiavelli's understanding of justice and morality rests on a human foundation and that 
such a morality provides an objective standard for moral judgement. His account of the 
origin of justice is based closely on book 6 of Polybius' Histories, leading to debate about 
how and when he came to know it. A Latin translation of books 1-5 was printed in Rome 
in 1473 and in Venice in 1498 but no complete translation of book 6 was printed in Latin 
until 1549, and there is no evidence that any Italian writer used book 6 before 
Machiavelli.211 Yet considering how closely he follo~s Polybius' argument, its order of 
presentation and even word choice, it seems he must have had a Latin translation at hand. 
Since Machiavelli uses book 6 in the Discourses but not in The Prince it seems likely that 
he acquired access to a translation through the discussions he joined at the Oricellari 
Gardens after writing The Prince.212 
To see how much Machiavelli takes from Polybius and what he changes, we first 
have to consider the origin of cities and justice in book 6 of his Histories. We have been 
told, Polybius writes, that in the past natural causes have reduced the human race almost 
211 Hexter, "Machiavelli, and Polybius vi: The Mystery of the Missing Translation," p. 76 
and p. 76 n. 7. 
212 Ibid., pp. 90-91; Whitfield, Discourses on Machiavelli, pp. 197-98, 206. 
105 
to extinction. Based on that supposition Polybius speculates that the scattered survivors 
would be stripped of their culture and arts and that their weakness would cause them to 
herd together like animals for protection. The strongest or most brave would emerge as a 
ruler, and, since his rule is based on strength, it should be called "despotism" ( 6.5) . 
. Machiavelli follows this sequenc·e in the Discourses, writing that "in the beginning of the 
world" men were dispersed and lived like beasts. As they multiplied they gathered 
together and, to better defend themselves, chose as "head" whoever was "more robust and 
of greater heart" (1.2.3). 
Polybius' account of how justice would arise in such a rudimentary society is 
worth quoting at length in order to compare it to Machiavelli's condensed version: 
as soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst such 
agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and then for the 
first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and justice and their reverse. 
The way in which such conceptions originate and come into existence is 
this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of nature, and the result is the birth 
of children. Now, if any one of these children who have been brought up, when 
arrived at maturity, is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was 
nurtured, but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is plain 
that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and have seen the care 
and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture and bringing up of their 
children. For seeing that men differ from the other animals in being the only 
creatures possessed of reasoning powers, it is clear that such a difference of 
conduct is not likely to escape their observation; but they will remark it when it 
occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will have an eye to 
the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the same occurring to each of 
themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued or helped in an hour of danger, and, 
instead of showing gratitude to his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly 
probable that the rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know 
it: sympathizing with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case. Hence 
arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of duty, which is in fact 
the beginning and end of justice. ( 6.5-6) 
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For Polybius, the offense, annoyance and displeasure that arise when one observes an act 
of ingratitude make human beings understand the meaning of duty, justice and goodness 
through a combination of empathy and self-interest. In Machiavelli's account, Polybius' 
two examples of parenthood and a helper are reduced to their basic affective and moral 
structure: 
From this [having united under a head] arose the knowledge of things honest and 
good [oneste e buone], differing from the pernicious and bad fperniziose e ree]. 
For, seeing that if one individual hurt his benefactor, hatred and compassion 
among men came from it, and as they blamed the ungrateful and honored those 
who were grateful, and thought too that those same injuries could be done to them, 
to escape like evil they were reduced to making laws and ordering punishments 
for whoever acted against them: hence came the knowledge of justice [la 
cognizione della iustizia]. (1.2.3) 
For both Polybius and Machiavelli, the knowledge of justice is not based on the 
observations and reasonings of a particular community but on human nature. Machiavelli, 
however, elides Polybius' argument about duty, emphasizing instead that justice must be 
upheld through "laws" and "punishments." 
It is noteworthy that this theory begins with the good deed of a benefactor. 
Problems only arise due to ingratitude: human beings feel hatred towards one who hurts a 
benefactor and compassion for the benefactor. Because men blame the ungrateful, 
ingratitude is seen to be bad; on the other hand, because the grateful are honoured, 
gratitude is seen to be good. According to this view, human emotions and judgements 
arise predictably and universally. From the observation of these causes and effects, 
human beings gained knowledge of good and bad; from knowledge of good and bad arose 
knowledge of what is just and unjust. The standards of this innate morality are the honest, 
the good, the pernicious and the bad ( oneste, buone, perniziose, ree ). The universal moral 
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emotions are gratitude and ingratitude, compassion and hatred. The universal response is 
to honor the good and to blame the bad. The good-gratitude-is just, and the bad-
ingratitude-is unjust. Machiavelli posits a standard of morality which rests on a 
universal moral psychology. It is rooted not in divine law or natural law but in human 
nature. 
In Polybius' book 6, Machiavelli found a moral theory he could wholly 
appropriate (though shifting the emphasis from voluntaristic duty to law and punishment). 
Justice in this theory originates from a combination of empathy for benefactors, 
condemnation of the ungrateful and self-interest in avoiding injury from others. It 
explains his understanding of justice in Prince 21 where it means not betraying a friend 
who benefited you. However, as Machiavelli points out in Prince 18, there are no courts 
to uphold justice between rulers; thus, there is no assurance they will act justly. 
Nonetheless, as seen above, Machiavelli argues that rulers must have some respect for 




Of Natural Things 
This chapter develops an interpretation of Machiavelli's view of natural things. 
The first part analyzes his frequent deployment of the argument from "necessity" or, what 
he calls in Prince 3, "natural necessity"; the second part analyzes his concern with the 
question of a ruler's particular nature and his fortuna (or fortune); the final part builds 
upon the foregoing to argue that for Machiavelli the true way to govern affairs of state is 
to be in accord with natural necessity. For Machiavelli, necessity is the greatest teacher; it 
challenges the orthodox notion of th_e true way-whether associated with Christianity, the 
middle way or both-and establishes an alternative notion of the true way based on the 
effectual truth, a truth to which he subordinates everything else. 
The Nature of Necessity 
When Machiavelli appeals to nature, he rests his argument on a long tradition: 
nature as a universal standard. According to Leo Strauss, the discovery of nature (phusis) 
marks the birth of philosophy itself; this discovery was, he writes, the recognition that 
some things are "always and everywhere the same" and that other things are merely by 
convention (nomos). 213 Aristotle presents this Greek view when he writes: "What is 
natural is what has the same force everywhere and does not depend on people's 
thinking."214 The idea that nature is a normative standard for conduct can be seen as early 
213 Natural Right and History, pp. 82, 90. 
214 Nicomachean Ethics 1134b20-21. 
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as Heraclitus: "wisdom is saying what is true and acting with understanding according to 
nature."215 Cicero points out that almost all the ancient philosophers accepted the view 
that a life is good because it is in accord with nature.216 Nature as a universal normative 
standard was also incorporated into Christian theology through the appropriation of Greek 
and Roman thought on natural law. However, in Greek thought there were two views of 
what is natural; according to one, nature signifies moral norms; according to the other, 
nature is something harsh. Thucydides expresses the latter view in his History when he 
writes: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessity [ananke] of 
their nature [phusis] they rule wherever they can."217 Thus when Machiavelli appeals to 
nature as an objective standard he has a long tradition behind him. While he accepts that 
one ought to act in accord with nature, for him nature is not a moral norm; rather, acting 
in accord with nature usually means acting against morality for the sake of maintaining-
and even for the sake of expanding-the state. In Machiavelli's view, nature is closely 
associated with necessity. This becomes particularly clear in Prince 3 when he combines 
the authority of nature with the authority of necessity in the expression "natural 
necessity" (necessita naturale). 
Like the argument from nature, the argument from necessity rests on an ancient 
and authoritative standard. It is not a coincidence that the importance of necessity is 
prefigured in the oldest fragment of Greek philosophy, the saying of Anaximander: 
215 DK fragment 112 in Gagarin et al., eds., Early Greek Political Thought, p. 152. 
216 Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 95 n. 19. See Definibus 4.6. 
217 5.105.2 (translated by Crawley, p. 354; translation slightly modified). On the darker 
view of nature also see Thucydides 3.82.2; the fable of the hawk and nightingale in 






"according to necessity [chreon]; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for 
their injustice according to the assessment of Time."218 The notion of necessity also 
appears in Greek tragedy. A pertinent example occurs in Sophocles' Electra when the 
eponymous character justifies her father's sacrifice of Iphigenia by saying that he did so 
under "compulsion" (biazo). 219 The idea that acting under compulsion excuses what under 
normal circumstances would be evil encapsulates Machiavelli's use of the argument from 
necessity. Also germane is the political use of ananke by writers such as Thucydides and 
Xenophon, and necessitas by Livy. The legacy of the argument from necessity is also 
apparent in the adage "necessitas legem non habet" (necessity has no law), a saying 
recorded in Gratian' s twelfth-century legal compilation the Decretum, but which goes 
back earlier.220 While the argument from necessity was limited to extraordinary 
circumstances during the medieval period, by Machiavelli's time the idea that "necessity 
has no law" was a commonplace among Florentine policymakers, also embodied in the 
sayings: "when necessita chases us, we don't need to deliberate" and "necessita 
dictates."221 Felix Gilbert, describing policymaking at Machiavelli's time, explains: 
"Necessita entered when the accumulation of adverse circumstances was so great that no 
choice was left to man and human calculations were reduced to automatic reactions. "222 
218 DK fragment 110 in Kirk et al., eds., The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 118. For an 
example of chreon (necessity) in Heraclitus see DK fragment 80, and for an example of 
ananke (necessity) in Parmenides see DK fragment 8, lines 30-31. 
219 Sophocles, Electra, line 575. 
220 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 24; Giesey, review of Studies in Medieval Legal 
Thought, p. 1072. 
221 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 41, translations slightly altered. 
222 Ibid., p. 41. 
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Machiavelli also takes up the argument from necessity in his writings, but he uses 
it with such frequency as to suggest its general application in affairs of state. In The 
Prince alone he evokes necessity seventy-six times in its various grammatical forms.223 
Machiavelli uses the argument from necessity in his writings in at least three ways. First, 
it can be used to justify acting against the moral virtues. On the other hand, he also argues 
that necessity can make human beings act more virtuously. As an example of the latter, he 
writes that "there is greater virtue" where men cannot afford to be idle but rather must 
work due to necessity (D 1.1.4). Similarly necessity produces virtue when soldiers' only 
choice is to fight obstinately or to die. 224 A third way he uses the argument from necessity 
is, as we saw in the previous chapter, to justify defensive wars and wars for liberty. My 
concern here is largely with the first case: Machiavelli's deployment of necessity to argue 
against orthodox moral positions. He uses necessity not in the strict causal sense but with 
the understanding that any other option spells ruin. For Machiavelli, necessity has its own 
laws, and rulers should follow them even when it means acting against the moral virtues. 
As he makes an old, wise man say in Florentine Histories, "things done out of necessity 
neither should nor can merit praise or blame" (5.n). In Machiavelli's view, it is prudent to 
act in accord with necessity, and those who understand that will neither praise nor blame 
others for doing so. 
Some writers have explained Machiavelli's break with orthodoxy by arguing that 
his perspective was so focused on affairs of state that he simply failed to see the conflict 
between his counsels and morality. According to Chabod, his singular passion for affairs 
223 Whitfield, Machiavelli, p. 67. 
224 s d ee D 3.12.1-2 an 2.12.3. 
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· of state blinded him to the conflict between politics and ethics, and the conflict only 
became apparent to those who came after him. 225 Meinecke suggests that Machiavelli was 
insensible to the contradiction in arguing that a state needs religion, morality and law, yet 
that rulers can act against them for the sake of the state's self-preservation: "He was not 
able to feel it, for the reason that his cast-iron theory of necessita concealed it from him, 
or because (as he believed, at least) the theory of necessita resolved the contradiction."226 
According to Isaiah Berlin, Machiavelli himself experienced no moral conflict because he 
embraced pagan morality and ignored Christian morality.227 It is hard to believe, 
however, that Machiavelli did not see the implication of his argument while repeatedly 
marshalling it in a polemical fashion throughout his works. Thus I will try to show that 
Machiavelli himself believed-as Meinecke suggests in parentheses-he had resolved the 
conflict between morality and politics through his theory of necessita. That ~s, 
Machiavelli's writings do not only incidentally pose.the problem of politics and morality 
for posterity; rather, he uses the argument from necessity to resolve it. 
An analysis of what Machiavelli means by "nature," the "natural" and "necessity" 
reveals that they are the keys to his thought. To begin with The Prince, it is in chapter 
three that he uses the expression "natural necessity" to excuse acting against the moral 
virtues. The surprising argument he makes is that it is a "natural and ordinary necessity" 
(necessita naturale e ordinaria) that a ruler "must always offend [offendere] those over 
whom he becomes a new prince" (P 3). A hereditary prince, on the other hand, has "less 
225 Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 191. 
226 Machiavellism, p. 40. 
227 See the quote on pp. 13-14 above and for an explanation and critique of Berlin's 
interpretation chapter 6 below. 
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necessity to offend" since he is maintained by ancient tradition (P 2). However, a new 
prince, in order to give his power a foundation, is forced to use measures that injure some 
of his new subjects, though the degree of injury will depend upon the way he holds his 
new acquisition. If the prince goes there to live in person "it is enough to have eliminated 
the line of the prince whose dominions they were" (P 3). If he does not go there in person 
he must hold the acquisition either with men-at-arms, which offends many, or send 
colonies, which offends only those who are stripped of their fields and houses. Thus, 
Machiavelli, economizing, concludes that the latter is the better remedy. In Discourses 
1.26.1, he expands upon what a prince must do to hold a new city or province taken by 
him: "not to leave anything untouched in that province, so that there is no rank, no order, 
no state, no wealth there that he who holds it does not know it as from you." He bluntly 
acknowledges that "[ t ]hese modes are very cruel, and enemies to every way of life, not 
only Christian but human." He even concludes it is therefore best to live a private life but 
that "he who does not wish to take this first way of the good must enter into this evil one 
ifhe wishes to maintain himself' (1.26.1). These injuries to which a new prince must 
subject the people he attains rule over are, as .Machiavelli argues in Prince 3, natural 
necessities. While Machiavelli was of course interested in the practical problem of how a 
new prince may secure new acquisitions, he may also have been interested in new princes 
because their situation exemplifies the conflict between the moral good and the political 
good and how the political good requires acting in accord with necessity. 228 
228 Wolin similarly argues that for Machiavelli the new principality presents "a purer form 
of politics" (Politics and Vision, p. 179). 
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The natural necessity to offend new subjects in tum gives rise to "a natural 
difficulty": those inhabitants who supported the new prince find they fare worse rather 
than better due to the offenses perpetrated by the new prince (P 3). Thus, acquisition 
leads to difficulties for both the new prince, since he must commit inhumane offenses, 
and to those inhabitants who supported him, since they find themselves among the 
offended. Nonetheless, although acquisition naturally leads to these difficulties, 
Machiavelli maintains that the desire to acquire is natural: "And truly it is a very natural 
and ordinary thing to desire to acquire" (E cosa veramente molto naturale e ordinaria 
desiderare di acquistare) (P 3). By calling the desire to acquire "natural," Machiavelli 
gives acquisition the normative authority of nature. By saying it is "ordinary," he also 
gives it the authority of convention. He justifies acquisition by both phusis and nomos, 
nature and convention. 
After positing that the "desire" to acquire is natural, Machiavelli makes a further 
claim: 
and always, when men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed; but 
when they cannot, and wish to do it anyway, here lie the error and the blame. 
Thus, if France could have attacked Naples with his own forces, he should have 
done so; ifhe could not, he should not have divided Naples. (P 3) 
In making the claim that acquisition will be praised or not blamed, Machiavelli ignores 
the question of whether or not the acquisition is just. For him, it is merely a question of 
power, thus, his cold analysis that the king of France should have attacked Naples if he 
had the power to conquer it or left it if he did not (P 3). Setting aside the fact that 
Machiavelli ignores justice, his argument that acquisition will be praised or not blamed is 
still rather one-sided since there are several points of view to consider. Firstly, the prudent 
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observer, objectively analyzing from the point of view of power, may praise or not blame 
the prince for making new acquisitions (as Machiavelli does of Cesare Borgia). Secondly, 
those who benefit from the acquisition may praise the victor, but, thirdly, the 
disenfranchised surely will not. When Machiavelli himself considers foreign conquerors 
in Italy from an Italian point of view, he refers to them as barbarians, castigating their 
"barbarous cruelties and insults" (P 26). While he neither praises nor blames the 
conquerors, he does blame the Italians. Comparing foreign invasions to a flood, he places 
the blame for their ruin on Italy's lack of"knowledge of arms" and "suitable virtue" (P 
12, 25). From Machiavelli's perspective, a prince's ambition should not exceed his 
power, and men should be able to defend themselves against others through their own 
virtue and prudence. His detachment when he is being the cold analyst of power is the 
basis for the interpretation of Machiavelli as a proto-political scientist as well as a realist. 
However, he is not a scientist in the sense of avoiding all normative judgments, nor is he 
a realist in the sense of reducing political life only to power since he also considers other 
factors such as the power of obligation and the importance of winning glory. 
One reply to the argument from necessity is that one always has moral freedom. 
Machiavelli's assumption, however, is that using moral freedom in a situation constrained 
by necessity is to invite ruin. For him, necessity likewise trumps reason. He begins 
Discourses 1.6.4 by admitting that "the true political way of life" would be to remain 
within one's boundaries, ordered only for defense, without posing any threat to one's 
neighbours. However, he then rejects the feasibility of the true political way of life, 
arguing that "since all things of men are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must 
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either rise or fall" (1.6.4). His argument is not that a state must have imperial ambitions, 
only that it must be ordered such that "if necessity leads it to expand," its expansion will 
not be its ruin. By "motion" and "necessity" he means such things as population growth, 
another City jumping in your lap, the necessity of increasing one's strength to defend 
oneself against an enemy and so on. When such motion brings a state to expand, it must 
have the type of constitution that will allow it to expand with a strong foundation. The 
Spartan and Venetian constitutions provide a weak foundation: the Spartan because it 
admits no foreigners and thus has a small population, the Venetian because it does not 
arm its people. A state must be ordered like Rome-admitting foreigners and arming the 
people-so that if it expands it will have enough arms to hold what it acquires (1.6.3). 
Thus, "the true political way of life and the true quiet of a city" is, according to 
Machiavelli, an impossibility. He backs up this radical conclusion with a generalization: 
"to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you" (1.6.4). 
Another reason Machiavelli favours a constitution ordered for expansion is that a 
quiet city becomes "either effeminate or divided" (1.6.4). Thus, the result of being 
ordered for peace is not only a lack of arms but also effeminacy and internal division. 
Machiavelli resolves a topical question of his day-which type of constitution is better, 
the Roman or Venetian-by an appeal to "necessity." When he returns to the topic of the 
best constitution in Discourses 2.3.1, he there appeals to "nature," comparing a small 
population to a weak tree trunk: "And since all our actions imitate nature, it is neither 
possible nor natural for a thin trunk to support a thick branch." According to Machiavelli, 
a constitution like Rome's is not only necessary but also in accord with nature. 
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At Machiavelli's time, the Venetian republic was seen as a model of stability.229 
On the other hand, the Roman republic, as Machiavelli acknowledges, was seen to have 
good military orders but to be too tumultuous due to the power the plebs held (1.4.1). 
Machiavelli argues, however, that the greater "inconvenience" rests with the Venetian 
constitution since it maintains its serenity by keeping its people unarmed and thus must 
depend upon mercenaries (1.6.3). The city's weakness became apparent when it was put 
to the test and lost all its acquisitions "in one day" (1.6.4).230 Since it is then necessary to 
arm citizens as Rome did, tumults cannot be avoided. However, Machiavelli, judging the 
tumults by their end, argues they in fact had a good effect. He notes that they rarely led to 
blood or exile but rather resulted in "laws and orders in benefit of public freedom" (1.4.1). 
In particular, the tumults led to the creation of the tribunes of the plebs, an office that 
balanced the power of the consuls and the Senate; thus, by accident, Rome came to what, 
according to Machiavelli, is the best form of government: a mixed constitution of "the 
principality, the aristocrats, and the popular government" (D 1.2.5). According to Skinner, 
Machiavelli's argument that tumults advance freedom was "completely heterodox. "231 
Likewise; Strauss sees his praise of tumults as "wholly new."232 However, since 
Machiavelli argues that it is "necessary" for a republic to be ordered for expansion, it was 
necessary for him to excuse Rome's tumults. Thus one of his most original arguments 
originated as a necessary buttress for his privileging of the Roman constitution. 
229 See Gilbert, "The Venetian Constitution in Florentine Political Thought," particularly 
rro· 182-83. 
0 On this point also see D 3.31.3. In Prince 12, Machiavelli had already censured the 
weakness of Venice due to its "mercenary arms." 
231 Foundations, vol. 1, pp. 180-83. 
232 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 95. 
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Nonetheless, Machiavelli himself acknowledges that the tumults between the senate and 
the plebs eventually devolved into civil war and that with the final victory of Caesar 
Rome was never again free. 233 Thus tumults gave birth to public liberty and then 
maintained it but eventually "altogether ruined Roman freedom" ( 1. 37 .2 ). This history of 
the rise and fall of Roman liberty also accords with Machiavelli's acceptance of another 
natural necessity: "all worldly things have a limit to their life" (D 3.1.1). 
Machiavelli's defense of the Roman constitution vis-a-vis the Spartan constitution 
is likely in part directed at Polybius. In book 6 of his Histories (a book that Machiavelli 
himself borrows from in the Discourses), Polybius posits that once a country has enough 
power to ensure its security, further expansion is merely a matter of preference: 
for guarding their own country with absolute safety, and for preserving their own 
freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was entirely sufficient; and for those who are 
content with these objects we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has 
existed, a constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any one is 
seeking aggrandizement, and believes that to be a leader and ruler and despot of 
numerous subjects, and to have all looking and turning to him, is a finer thing than 
that,-in this point of view we must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is 
deficient, and that of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. 
(6.50) 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli refutes such a position by making the imitation of the 
Roman constitution a matter of necessity rather than preference. But is his argument as 
definitive as he claims, or is it mixed up with what, according to Polybius' terms, is really 
just a preference for aggrandizement? Machiavelli's fervour for political greatness does 
suggest that his own argument is at least partly coloured by what is really a preference for 
Roman grandeur over the more limited grandeur of Sparta and Venice. Another clue that 
233 See in particular Discourses 1.37 but also 1.6.1 and 3.24.1. 
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his argument is mixed up with his own preference is found in his admission that the 
Spartan state "lasted more than eight hundred years" (1.2.6), whereas the period of Roman 
greatness-from the creation of the republic to the civil wars spurred by the Agrarian 
law-lasted only "more than three hundred years" (1.4.1). It seems then that for 
Machiavelli what makes Rome greater than Sparta and Venice is its public freedom, its 
mixed government and the glory of its empire. Also, expansion makes virtu necessary, 
and it is clear that for Machiavelli virtu and the greatness achieved through it are two of 
the things that make human life meaningful. 
For Machiavelli, when it comes to affairs of state, necessity is the greatest teacher, 
a higher law than reason. In The Prince, necessity and nature justify acquisition and the 
offenses that come with it. Further, as Machiavelli makes clear in the Discourses, the only 
choice for a city is to "molest others" or to be "molested" (2.19.1). In his view, this 
constant struggle necessitates being ordered for expansion. Since a city cannot simply opt 
to stay "within its limits" (D 1.6.4), there is no possibility of taking a middle way. This is 
Machiavelli's most "Machiavellian" argument, for if expansion is necessary for the sake 
of security then the moral contraventions permissible to preserve security also become 
permissible for the sake of expansion. The idea that expansion increases security was a 
commonplace at his time, and the argument that exceptions can be made in extreme 
situations is found in several ancient texts (to be discussed in chapter 6). Machiavelli, 
however, combines the two arguments to endorse a vision of political life where the 
perpetual struggle for survival, liberty and imperium means that the rational end of 
natural justice must be subordinated to the dictates of natural necessity. 
120 
I' ' 
Whether One Can Vary One's Way of Proceeding to Match the Times 
How a ruler's particular nature affects his success or failure is a question 
Machiavelli considers on several occasions: a letter written in 1504, another written in 
1506, his poem "On Fortune," Prince 25 and Discourses 3.9.234 The problem he keeps 
returning to is that a ruler must vary his conduct with the times to be successful, yet 
Machiavelli takes it as axiomatic that one "cannot deviate from what nature inclines him 
to" (P 25). Since he consistently maintains these two antithetical positions, his final view 
is unclear. Is his point simply that a ruler is doomed to failure when his nature is out of 
accord with the times? Is his point that a ruler can and must learn to deviate from his 
nature? Or, was Machiavelli himself unresolved about the remedy to this problem? In this 
section I will argue that what his writings presuppose, and sometimes state, is that 
although one cannot change one's nature, one can accommodate oneself to the times if 
constrained by necessity· or if one is prudent enough to accommodate necessity. 
In 1504 Machiavelli wrote a letter to Bartolomeo Vespucci, a Florentine doctor of 
arts and medicine and professor of astronomy at the University of Padua. Although 
Machiavelli's letter has been lost, the professor's reply explains in passing the classical 
view of the relation between the influence of the planets and free will. As Vespucci 
writes: 
234 Machiavelli's long interest in this question has been considered by many writers; I go 
over it again to focus on what it tells us about Machiavelli's understanding of nature. See, 
e.g, Burd, ed., II principe, notes to chapter 25; Flanagan, "The Concept of Fortuna in 
Machiavelli"; Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire; Parel, "Natural Philosophy in 
Machiavelli"; Brown, The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence, p. 72ff. 
121 
11 ' 
It is better that I pass over the praises of astronomy, and what utility it has for 
humankind, with dry feet rather than be drowned in the deepest whirlpool. Suffice 
it that your opinion must be called absolutely correct, since all the ancients 
proclaimed with one voice that the wise man himself is able to alter the influences 
of the stars-although of the stars' influences themselves no change can happen 
throughout eternity. But that statement is understood with reference to changing 
one's own step, now one way and now another.235 
The "statement" the professor alludes to and explains in his reply is presumably the 
popular aphorism vir sapiens dominabitur astris (the wise man may overcome the stars), 
a view he attributes to all the ancients. A similar saying, upon which the former is thought 
to be based, is aphorism 5 of the Centiloquium, a collection of one hundred aphorisms 
attributed to Ptolemy. 236 According to this view, the influence of the stars cannot be 
altered, but the wise man may change his way of proceeding to remain in accord with the 
stars. Vespucci, in accepting that view, assumes that human beings possess the free will 
to change their way of proceeding; only the wisdom of the wise man is needed to know 
how to change one's step to stay in tune with the stars. Machiavelli's later reflections on 
this topic show that while he agrees with that view as an ideal, his understanding of 
human nature.makes it impossible in practice. 
The first writing we have where Machiavelli examines the relation between a 
ruler's nature and his fortune dates to September 1506 when he was travelling with the 
papal court as a Florentine envoy. At that time, Pope Julius II took Bologna from the 
Bentivogli and Perugia from Giovampagolo Baglioni. Machiavelli used the occasion of a 
letter in reply to Giovan Battista Soderini, one of the Gonfalonier' s nephews, to meditate 
235 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 103. . 
236 Parel, Machiavellian Cosmos, p. 11. The aphorism is: "He that is skillful may divert 
many effects of the stars when he knows their natures, and will prepare himself before 
their event or coming" (Ptolemy, Centiloquium). 
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on the theoretical implications of the pope's unlikely success.Due to the letter's 
importance as a seed of The Prince, it has been given a name: the Ghiribizzi (or 
Fantasies). Reflecting on the pope's success, Machiavelli writes: "This pope, who has no 
scales or measuring stick in his house, obtains through chance-and disarmed-. what 
ought to be difficult to attain even with organization and with weapons."237 The pope's 
success leads Machiavelli to reflect on how opposite modes of proceeding can lead to the 
same good result. To support his observation he turns to the ancient examples of Hannibal 
and Scipio since the former attainted success through "cruelty, treachery, and impiety" 
and the latter through "compassion, loyalty, and piety."238 He also observes that a way of 
doing something which is successful one time may lead to failure another time. The 
problem underlying his observations is the difficulty they present for finding successful 
principles to follow in affairs of state. To be successful it seems a ruler must be able to act 
differently at different times; thus, he airs the wise-man solution: 
anyone wise enough to adapt to and understand the times and the pattern of events 
would always have good fortune or would always keep himself from bad fortune; 
and it would come to be true that the wise man could control the stars and the 
Fates. 
However, he immediately rejects it: 
But such wise men do not exist: in the first place, men are shortsighted; in the 
second place, they are unable to master their own natures; thus it follows that 
Fortune is fickle, controlling men and keeping them under her yoke. 
Machiavelli rejects both of the assumptions implicit in the view that the wise man can 
control the stars: first, that men can have enough wisdom to know in advance how to 
237 For the letter see Machiavelli and His Friends, pp. 134-36. 
238 Machiavelli returns to this comparison in Discourses 3.21. 
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adapt to the times; second, that a person's nature is flexible enough to change. His reason 
for rejecting the latter is based on his view of human nature: "I believe that just as Nature 
has created men with different faces, so she has created them with different intellects 
[ingegno] and imaginations [fantasia]. As a result, each man behaves according to his 
own intellect and imagination"239 According to Anthony Parel, this argument is based on 
the "scientific" view of Machiavelli's day: "Each individual has his or her temperament, 
sometimes called also 'particular nature.' Being determined by its material basis, it 
remained inflexible in the face of choices the person had to make. Thus it was not 
possible for a person of choleric temperament to act as a person of phlegmatic one. "240 
Guicciardini shares the same view: "To be sure, if a man could change his nature to suit 
the conditions of the times, he would be much less dominated by Fortune. But that is most 
difficult, and perhaps even impossible."241 The idea can also be traced back to Dante's 
Paradise: 
Should natural disposition find itself 
not in accord with Fortune, then it must 
fail as a seed in alien soil must die. (canto 8, lines 139-141) 
Rather than calling this a scientific view, it seems more adequate to call it a materialist 
view since what it really opposes is the idea that one's will is free from one's material 
substratum. According to the materialist view, since altering one's nature is difficult or 
impossible, hope for success lies strictly in one's character being in accord with the needs 
239 
"Credo che come la natura ha fatto all 'uomo diverso volto, cosi gli abbia fatto diverso 
ingegno at diversa fantasia" (Italian quoted by Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 97 
n. 23, fromLettere, ed. Gaeta, pp. 230-31). 
240 Parel, "Natural Philosophy in Machiavelli," p. 18. 
241 Maxims and Reflections, series C, maxim 31. 
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of the times. There is, on the other hand, a tradition stemming from Boethius' argument in 
. book 5 of the Consolation of Philosophy that despite divine providence, the human mind 
still has free will. Aquinas, who was influenced by Boethius, follows a similar position 
when he discusses the influence of the heavenly bodies in the Summa Theologiae. While 
positing that the heavenly bodies influence material things, including the bodily organs 
and the passions, he argues: "nothing stops a man from resisting his passions by his free-
will [liberum arbitrium]. Thus these very astrologers say that the wise man is master of 
the stars in that he is the master of his own passions."242 Machiavelli, however, accepts 
the materialist view, a position consistent with his emphasis on necessity and natural 
necessity. 
When Machiavelli revisits the question of one's disposition in his poem "On 
Fortune," his position remains the same, though he entertains a little more hope about the 
possibility of some flexibility. The poem was written between 1506 and 1512 and is 
dedicated to Giovan Battista Soderini, perhaps suggesting that the poem grew out of the 
letter he had written him.243 On the question of what causes one's success or failure, the 
poem offers the same view as the Ghiribizzi: "the inclinations [gli umor] that make you 
act, so far as they conform I with her [Fortune's] doings, are the cause of your good and 
your ill."244 While in the Ghiribizzi he called that which determines one's disposition 
"nature," here he uses heaven: "you cannot change your character nor give up the 
242 Summa Theologiae la, question 115, article 4 (vol. 15, pp. 105-107). 
243 On the dating see Albert Ascoli and Angela Capodivacca, "Machiavelli and Poetry," p. 
196. The poem can be found in Chief Works, vol. 2, pp. 745-49. 
244 Chief Works, vol. 2, lines 103-105. 
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disposition that Heaven [ ciel] endows you with. "245 Again, he muses that a man who · 
could change his character "would always be happy and fortunate" but maintains it is 
impossible due to "the occult force [ occulta virtu] that rules us. "246 
While Machiavelli argues that one cannot change one's nature, he offers three 
remedies for .dealing with the power of Fortune. One is to choose "a wheel befitting her 
wish."247 Secondly, he counsels that "a man should take her for his star and, as far as he 
can, should every hour adjust himself [accomodarsi] to her variation."248 This argument 
seems to be the key to Machiavelli's view since it carves out a sort of middle way 
between strict determinism and free will. Finally, he adopts the conventional wisdom that, 
as he puts it, "Audacity and Youth make highest showing."249 To support that view he 
cites the examples of Alexander and Caesar. However, the main point of the poem is the 
tyranny of Fortune, as can be seen in the poem's closing lines: "few have been successful, 
and they have died before their wheel reversed itself or in turning carried them down to 
the bottom. "250 
In chapter 25 of The Prince Machiavelli returns to the topic of "How Much 
Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed." He restates 
his earlier arguments, though he adds a further existential speculation: "so that our free 
will [libero arbitrio] will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that fortune is 
245 Ibid., lines 112-14. 
246 Ibid., lines 115-20. 
247 Ibid., line 102. Dante makes the same point in Paradise, canto 8, lines 142-48. 
248 Ibid., lines 124-26. "Pero si vuol lei prener per sua stella, IE quanta a noi e possibile, 
ogni ora I Accomodarsi al variar di quella." 
249 Ibid., line 75. 
250 Ibid., lines 190-93. 
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arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to 
govern." Rejecting the view that everything is determined "by fortune and by God," he 
carves out a place for sweaty virtue. The power of fortune may, he argues, be averted 
through preparation and ordered virtue, just as the power of a flood may be averted 
through the construction of dikes and dams. Thus, for Machiavelli, the remedy for the 
power of fortune is not wisdom but virtu. 
Machiavelli makes his argument about free will in relation to his discussion of 
"opposing fortune in general"; it does not, however, seem to extend as far as changing 
one's particular nature, for, when he moves on to that topic, he returns to his usual view: 
if one governs himself with caution and patience, and the times and affairs turn in 
such a way that his government is good, he comes out happy; but if the times and 
affairs change, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of proceeding. 
Nor may a man be found so prudent as to know how to accommodate 
· [ accomodare] himself to this, whether because he cannot deviate from what 
nature inclines him to or also because, when one has flourished by walking in one 
path, he cannot be persuaded to depart from it. 
In addition to his earlier argument that one's nature is detemiined by nature or heaven, he 
adds the argument that people become habituated to acting in a certain way. He has no 
remedy for this other than the one prefigured in "On Fortune"; as he puts it in The Prince: 
"it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman" and "she is a 
friend of the young, because they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her 
with more audacity." This idea goes back to the ancient Roman belief that Fortune's 




"fortune favours the brave. "251 Three hundred years before Machiavelli, the idea was 
already adopted by Giraldus Cambrensis in his De principis instructione (c. 1217): 
"fortune aids and exalts the bold [audaces]."252 The idea is also found in Piccolomini's A 
Dream of Fortune (1444) where Fortune says she is most aroused "by those who put me 
to flight."253 However, in light of Machiavelli's view that one cannot change one's 
particular nature, this remedy depends upon one already having an impetuous nature and 
coming to power at a time when impetuosity is effective (something he acknowledges is 
not always the case). For example, he writes that although impetuosity brought Julius II 
great fortune, if he had lived longer, the needs of the times would have changed and his 
impetuosity would have brought him to ruin (P 25). 
The last iteration of the problem occurs in Discourses 3.9, "How One Must Vary 
with the Times If One Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune." As Machiavelli 
acknowledges it is a topic he has "often considered," and, as one may now expect, his 
discourse rules out precisely the happy solution proclaimed in the chapter's heading. As 
he explains: "Two things are causes why we are unable to change: one, that· we are unable 
to oppose that to which nature inclines us; the other, that when one individual has 
prospered very much with one mode of proceeding, it is not possible to persuade him that 
he can do well to proceed otherwise" (3.9.3). As in The Prince, this means that good 
fortune depends upon a match between one's particular nature and the quality of the 
251 On this topic see Skinner, Machiavelli, pp. 37-46. For classical topoi see Terence's 
Phormio; Livy, The History of Rome 8.29; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.4.11; Virgil, 
Aeneid rn.284. 
252 In Gilbert, Machiavelli's Prince and Its Forerunners, pp. 204, 239. 
253 Quoted in Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 46. · 
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times. 254 He provides his usual example of Julius II as a ruler whose impetuosity brought 
good fortune; he also adds the example of Fabius Maximus to show a ruler whose 
hesitation produced good fortune. However, when it comes to the possibility of a ruler 
varying with the times, his examples are all negative: Fabius acted "by nature and not by 
choice" and "he did not know how to vary his procedure as the times varied" (3.9.1). 
When Piero Soderini "needed to break with patience and humility, he did not know how 
to do it, so that he together with his fatherland was ruined" (3.9.3). Julius II would have 
been ruined if other times had come for "he would not have changed either mode or order 
in managing himself' (3.9.3). 
Machiavelli's remedies for this problem in Discourses 3.9 reveal much about his 
political vision (a topic to be discussed further in the following section). He begins the 
discourse by acknowledging that it is an error to proceed with either impetuosity or 
hesitation since both exceed the mean: "because in both of these modes suitable limits are 
passed, since one cannot observe the true way, in both one errs."255 While he grants it is 
an error not to observe the true way-that is, avoiding impetuosity and hesitation-he 
offers some remedy in the next sentence: "But he comes to err less and to have 
prosperous fortune who matches the time with his mode, as I said, and always proceeds as 
nature forces you [e sempre mai si procede secondo ti sforza la natura]" (3.9.1). In light 
of his argument later in the chapter (quoted above), the first remedy is a matter of chance 
254 We can see the continuing relevance of this view in Henry Kissinger's description of 
Reagan's Cold War policy during the 1980s: "The phenomenon of Reagan sprang from a 
fortuitous convergence of personality and opportunity: a decade earlier, he would have 
seemed too militant; a decade later, too one-track" (Diplomacy, p. 802). 
255 
"perche nell 'uno e nell' altro di questi modi si passano e' termini convenienti, non si 
potendo osservare la vera via, nell 'uno e nell' altro si erra." 
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since only fortune determines if one's mode of proceeding matches the times. His second 
remedy for good fortune-that one "always proceeds as nature forces you"~ounsels 
acting in accord with one's nature even if it exceeds suitable limits. In other words, rather 
than trying to accommodate oneself to the middle way, one should follow one's nature. 
Machiavelli already expressed such an idea in the Ghiribizzi: "each man must do what his 
mind prompts him to--and do it with daring. "256 Seen in a certain light, this argument 
shows Machiavelli's humanity, for he advises accepting the character nature has given 
one rather than trying to battle its excesses with reason as the tradition stemming from 
Greek thought teaches. Machiavelli's point is to stake one's fortune on the character one 
has. Compare this to Aristotle's influential text on the ethics of the mean: "we each have 
different natural tendencies .... And we should drag ourselves in the opposite direction, 
because we shall arrive at the mean by holding far off from where we would miss the 
mark.[hamartano], just as people do when straightening warped pieces ofwood."257 
Hamartano is also often translated as "error," a translation which fits more closely with 
the vocabulary Machiavelli uses. 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli also points to another remedy, one which would 
have been out of place in The Prince.2?8 In a republic, there are "diverse citizens and 
divers humors" (3.9.1); thus, the problem of matching the needs of the present with a 
certain humor is not totally in the hands of fortune. From that point of view, republican 
256 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 134. 
257 Nicomachean Ethics 1109b2-8. 
258 On this point also see Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, pp. 251-52. 
130 
I I 
governance is the best way to have good fortune. However, the danger for republics, he 
cautions, is that they are slow to vary their way of proceeding (3.9.3). 
When it comes to the question of how one should inwardly face one's fortune, 
Machiavelli maintains the traditional Stoic position: "great men are always the same in 
every fortune; and if it varies-now by exalting them, now by crushing them-they do 
not vary but always keep their spirit firm and joined with their mode of life so that one 
easily knows for each that fortune does not have power over them" (D 3.31.1). Likewise, 
in The Ass, he writes: "because weeping has always been shameful to a man, he I should 
· tum to the blows of Fortune a face unstained with tears. "259 When it comes to the 
question of whether one can vary one's way of proceeding, it seems his underlying view 
is the one expressed in "On Fortune" where he says one cannot change one's nature but 
should, as far as is possible, accommodate oneself (accomodarsi) to the variations of· 
fortune. 260 .Jn Prince 18, he says, without questioning it, that a prince "needs to have a 
spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and variations of things command him." 
And, in Discourses 3.8.2, he writes that men "should consider the times and accommodate 
[accommodarsi] themselves to them." To make sense of these various pronouncements, it 
seems we must accept his view to be that one cannot change one's nature but that one can 
acconimodate oneself to fortune if one is prudent enough. 
Further, his writings presuppose that rulers can accommodate themselves to the 
times. Discourses 3.21.4 gives an example of how Scipio did so, for, although his nature 
was humane and merciful, when faced with a rebellion among his soldiers, he "was 
259 Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 757, lines 85-87. 
260 Ibid., p. 748, lines 124-26. 
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constrained to use [us are] part of the cruelty he had fled from." Scipio, recognizing the 
necessity of acting against his nature, was able to accommodate himself to the needs of 
the times. The expression "to use" is also important in Prince 18 where Machiavelli says, 
"since a prince is compelled of necessity to know well how to use [ sapere bene us are] the 
beast, he should pick the fox and the lion." A prince must know how to use the lion and 
the fox. Although_ one cannot change one's nature, one can use cruelty, the lion, the fox. 
Even a beastly prince must know how to use the man: he must "know well how to use the 
beast and the man," for "the one without the other is not lasting" (P 18). It seems then that 
for Machiavelli prudent men may learn how to deviate from their nature enough to 
accommodate themselves to the times. If one could not vary one's way of proceeding at 
all, then Machiavelli's writings would have no purpose. He wrote a handbook for princes 
because successful leadership is a matter of "know-how" and he teaches that "know-
how. "261 The half of our actions that fortune leaves to free will allows a virtuous prince to 
prepare for fortune's rages, but also to learn how to use different modes to accommodate 
oneself to the times. 
The True Way 
This final section will focus on Machiavelli's statements about the true way and 
its relation to Christianity, the middle way, the Roman way and necessity. Machiavelli 
himself alludes to the Gospel of John in Discourses 2.2.2 when he refers to "our religion" 
as "the truth and the true way" (la verita e la vera via). As we saw above in Discourses 
261 For other instances of "know how" see D 1.17.3, 1.27.1, 3.27.2, 3.30.1. 
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3.9.1, Machiavelli also associates the true way with the middle way. Further, Christianity 
and the Aristotelian middle way were woven into the same fabric by scholastic writers 
such as Aquinas. While Machiavelli acknowledges these orthodox notions of the true way 
in passing, this section will show that he subordinates the orthodox true way to another 
more efficacious rival, the true way of the Romans and of necessity. 
At Machiavelli's time, taking the middle way was a conventional Florentine 
policy, supported by the authority of both Aristotle and scholasticism.262 Aristotle, in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, famously defines virtue (arete) in terms of the mean: "there is an 
excess, a deficiency and a mean in actions. Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, 
in which excess and deficiency constitute misses of the mark, while the mean is praised · 
and on target."263 Aquinas, the most influential of the scholastics, follows Aristotle on the 
doctrine of the middle way; comparing moral virtue ( virtus moralis) to works of art, he 
writes that for both of them, "evil consists· in discordance from their rule or measure, and 
it may come about either by exceeding the measure or by falling short of it. "264 When 
Machiavelli discusses the extremes of impetuosity and hesitation in Discourses 3.9, he 
begins, as we saw, by acknowledging the orthodox position that they are an error, 
whereas conduct that remains within "suitable limits" is "the true way" (3.9.1). However, 
he then flatly states: "one cannot observe the true way" (3.9.1). According to an implicit 
logic of the excluded middle, Machiavelli rejects the idea that nature makes people with 
middling dispositions or that one is free to chart one's way between the extremes. As he 
262 On the middle way in Florentine policy see Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 
34; Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 99. 
263 Nichomachean Ethics 1106b25-26. 
264 Summa Theologiae la2ae, question 64, article 1 (vol. 23, p. 167). 
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puts it in the Ghiribizzi: "it is impossible to be both cruel and compassionate."265 Thus, 
despite his initial concession, Machiavelli's argument in fact challenges the doctrine of 
the middle way, excusing impetuosity and hesitation, or, in other words, excess and 
deficiency. Since his argument implies that one's "nature" and "the true way" are in 
conflict, there is some ambiguity about which, in his view, has greater authority. The 
answer is supplied, it seems, by his argument that acting in accord with the way that 
nature f~rces you to leads to "prosperous fortune" (3.9.1). The conflict between the two is 
then resolved by the end. Thus, for Machiavelli, the conventional notion of the middle 
way, or the true way, is not a good guide in affairs of state. In his view, nature does not 
produce people in accord with the middle way, and even the quality of the times seems to 
favour extremes, usually impetuosity but sometimes hesitation. 
Machiavelli continues his polemic against the middle way in Discourses 3.21.3 
when he states: "One cannot hold exactly to the middle way, for our nature does not 
consent to it, but it is necessary to mitigate those things that exceed with· an excessive 
virtue, as did Hannibal and Scipio." In this chapter, Machiavelli again equates "the 
middle way" with "the true way" but again holds it up as an ideal that is out of reach. The 
two extreme.s under consideration in this discourse are wanting too much to be loved or 
too much to be feared. Machiavelli recognizes that both lead to trouble: "he who desires 
too much to be loved becomes despicable, however little he departs from the true way; 
the other, who desires too much to be feared, becomes hateful, however little he exceeds 
the mode" (3.21.3). Since Machiavelli rules out the possibility of holding to a middle way, 
265 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 134. 
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the only hope for correcting the error that arises from either extreme is to mitigate it by 
possessing "una eccessiva virtu" (3.21.3). Thus, a good type of excess, an excess of virtue, 
can mitigate the bad types of excess that arise from one's inability to take a middle way. 
A third example of Machiavelli's rejection of the middle way occurs when he 
addresses the question of whether one should distance oneself from a prince or bind 
oneself to him: 
It is true that some say that with princes one should not wish to stand so close that 
their ruin includes you, nor so far that you would not be in time to rise above their 
ruin when they are being ruined. Such a middle way would be the truest if it could 
be observed, but because I believe that it is impossible, one must be reduced to the 
two modes written above-. that is, either to distance oneself from or to bind 
oneself to them. (D 3.2.1) 
This last example has a Stoic poignancy since Machiavelli's own ruin came about 
through binding himself to Piero Soderini. We also see here that what the tradition 
considers to be the true way, that is, the middle way, "would be the truest" but is in fact 
an impossibility. 
These three arguments against the middle way present a further interpretive 
conundrum: on the one hand, Machiavelli argues that men cannot hold to a middle way; 
on the other, his argument aims precisely at men's propensity for taking a middle way. 
While his emphasis on the impossibility of taking a middle way seems in part tendentious 
(rather than based on its actual impossibility), his main point is to excuse the extremes 
and, further, to imply that greatness comes form them. Aiming for a middle way, on the 
other hand, leads to mediocrity. In this light it is interesting to compare his use of the 
archer metaphor in The Prince with Aristotle's in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, to 
demonstrate the usefulness of searching out the chief good for human beings, writes: "if, 
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like archers, we have a target, are we not more likely to hit the right mark?"266 
Machiavelli, to justify his counsel that a prince should imitate one of the great men of 
antiquity, writes: "He should do as prudent archers do when the place they plan to hit 
appears too distant, and knowing how far the strength of their bow carries, they set their 
aim much higher than the place intended, not to reach such height with their arrow, but to 
be able with the aid of so high an aim to achieve their plan" (P 6). While both analogies 
concern attaining one's end, Machiavelli's example suggests that in order to hit the mark, 
excess is a necessary part of one's calculation. Thus we see the method in his fervour: 
without aiming above the mark, one falls short of it. Th
1
is assumption is again evinced 
when Machiavelli, recalling the executions of several prominent Roman citizens, writes: 
"Because they were excessive [ eccessive] and notable, such things made men draw back 
toward the mark whenever one of them arose" (3.1.3). ·If a city's end is security, well-
being and greatness, then, in Machiavelli's view, excess, not the middle way, leads to the 
mark. In his polemic against the middle way, he is not, however, dogmatic; he himself 
sometimes points to the utility of the middle way (D 1.47.r; AW1.167). Likewise, he 
points to the prudence of measuring one's power so as not to "pass beyond the mark" and 
come to ruin (see D 2.27). Further, some of his positions implicitly promote a sort of 
middle way; for example, his position on accommodating oneself to the times takes a 
middle way between free will and determinism. Likewise, his argument that laws in 
266 NE 1094a23-24. 
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favour of public freedom arise from the conflict between the great and the people 
celebrates the compromise that results from the conflict (D 1.4.1).267 
When it comes to the middle way being the true way, Machiavelli usually adopts 
his familiar strategy of acknowledging the orthodox position as an ideal but then rejecting 
it in practice. However, in the Discourses, Machiavelli also speaks of another "true way," 
one which refers neither to the middle way nor to Christianity. He presents this other true 
way as the best guide for affairs of state, and he learns it from the Romans and from 
necessity. In Discourses 3.27 .2, Machiavelli declares that "the true" can be found in the 
judgments of "antiquity." His example is how the Romans killed the heads of a tumult; 
unlike the Florentines who could not bring themselves to execute the heads of a tumult 
the Romans avoided any middle path (3.27.1-2). This connection between the Roman's 
greatness and their avoidance of the middle way is also made in Discourses 2.23.2 where 
he writes "in judgments of state they always fled from the middle way." This position is 
something he learned from Livy early in his political thinking; in his short oration On 
How to Treat the Populace of Valdichiana after Their Rebellion (likely 1503), he already 
held up the Romans as a model for imitation: "The Romans regarded any middle way as 
harmful. In their resolutions, they chose one extreme or the other."268 If the Romans, in 
Machiavelli's view, acted according to the true, and if they always fled from the middle 
way in affairs of state, then the orthodox middle way is not, in fact, the true way. Rather, 
267 Also see Whitfield's essay "Machiavelli and the Via di Mezzo" where he shows that 
Machiavelli's proposals in 1506 on how to organize Florence's new militia urge a middle 
way (one of which, as just alluded to, he repeats inAW1.167); Whitfield also highlights 
instances where Machiavelli, in his major works, advocates prudent compromise over 
fervour and the extreme (see Discourses on Machiavelli, pp. 37-55). 
268 Essential Writings, p. 361. On the date of the text see above, p. 53 n. 120. 
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the Roman way is the true way. This connection between the Romans and the true way is 
also seen in Machiavelli's analysis of the best way for a state to expand: "That which the 
Romans took is known therefore to be the true mode, which is so much more wonderful 
inasmuch as before Rome there is no example of it, and after Rome there was no one who 
imitated it" (2.4.1-2). Thus, for Machiavelli, it is the way of the Romans that is the true 
way. The orthodox true way, on the other hand, he deals with in one of two ways. When it 
comes to matters of conduct, he presents it as an ideal that human things cannot measure 
up to, and, when it comes to religion, he brings it into harmony with the truth revealed 
through Rome's example. 
In Discourses 3.16, Machiavelli uses "the true way" to mean giving rank based on 
military virtue. This is another practice that was followed by Rome, for when the city had 
dangerous enemies and failed to, "so much disorder and danger soon followed for it that it 
at once returned to the true way" (3.16.2). However, after Rome defeated Carthage and 
Antiochus, it had no enemy to give it cause for fear and stopped appointing military ranks 
based on virtue (3.16.2). In this discourse, Machiavelli refers the reader to his earlier 
discussion of the same topic where he argued that once Rome attained supremacy it began 
to give rank to those who "knew better how to entertain men rather than those who knew 
better how to conquer enemies" (D 1.18.3). Because people follow the true way only out 
of necessity, even Rome erred from the true way once the necessity of ~ghting for its 
security was removed. Thus, ultimately, the true way is to be in accord with necessity and 
Rome followed the true way only until it reached its zenith. 
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The problem of ensuring that the highest ranks go to the most virtuous men is tied 
to Machiavelli's argument for why "the true political way of life" cannot be observed 
(1.6.4). In Discourses 1.6, he rejects the middle way of ordering a state only for defense: 
"since one cannot, as I believe, balance this thing, nor maintain this middle way exactly, 
in ordering a republic there is need to think of the more honourable part and to order it so 
that if indeed necessity brings it to expand, it can conserve what it has seized" (1.6.4). 
Since things are either rising or falling there is no viable middle path. Further, by being 
ordered for acquisition, "the more honourable part" receives their due honours by 
attaining military ranks (1.6.4). Thus Machiavelli's solution for ensuring that the highest 
ranks go to the most virtuous men is "to be ordered for war so that one can always make 
war" (3.16.2). The spirit of this argument is in keeping with Machiavelli's realist mode of 
analysis; that is to say, he is not looking at this problem from the point of view of justice, 
but from the point of view of how to order a lasting state. In terms of ordering such a 
state, his remedy of always being ordered for war solves three problems: it means the 
republic is ordered so it can hold its acquisitions if it expands (1.6.4); it allows the most 
virtuous men to be honoured with high rank (1.18.3; 3.16.2), and it prevents the ruin that 
arises when a "neglected and virtuous citizen" foments an imprudent war merely to attain 
the rank he would hold in a time of war (3.16.2 ). 
However, as we saw above, even Rome failed to appoint the most virtuous men 
once it attained it zenith. Further, Discourses 3.24 shows that the remedy of always 
having captains outside the city only defers the onset of corruption because, as Roman 
armies moved further outside the city, the command of the captains had to be prolonged, 
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and, as their command was prolonged, the soldiers became more loyal to them than to the 
common good. The personal loyalty that captains attained in that way allowed them to 
start civil wars for their partisan good and eventually allowed Caesar to turn the republic 
into a principate (3.24.1). Thus, another natural limit-the corruption that results from 
overextension-arises from Machiavelli's realist mode of analysis. If we consider all of 
Machiavelli's foregoing arguments, we see that it is necessary for a state to be ordered to 
expand, but that once it has no enemy that can equal it, corruption begins to set in since 
command is no longer awarded based on virtue; further, once an empire's reach grows 
too great, the commanders in the field are able to turn their soldiers from the common 
good to their partisan good. Thus, as Machiavelli acknowledges, there are so many ways 
a state can be disordered that "it is impossible to order a perpetual republic" (3.17.1). 
While necessary, expansion also has its natural limit, a limit that once crossed signifies 




Of Supernatural Things 
The cause of this I believe is to be discoursed of and interpreted by a man who has 
knowledge of things natural and supernatural, which we do not have. 
Discourses 1.56.1 
Although ·it is difficult to pin down exactly what Machiavelli means when he 
speaks of "jortuna," "the heavens" and "God," the three terms are woven into both his 
texts and the worldview of his time. Part of the difficulty may arise from the fact that 
Machiavelli, as he himself acknowledges, does not have knowledge of supernatural 
things. Nonetheless, he does make scattered assertions about the supernatural throughout 
his oeuvre. This chapter focuses on those assertions to three ends: to consider how they 
bear on his understanding of affafrs of state; to draw a picture of how he presents religion 
in his writings and, finally, to offer an interpretation of his personal beliefs about religion. 
In order to interpret his opinions about the supernatural it is essential to contextualize 
them within Renaissance thought and, in particular, Florentine thought. Otherwise, we 
run the risk of inadvertently distorting the premodern aspects of his thought by reading 
them through a post-Enlightenment view. 
To enter the worldview Machiavelli was born into, we must see ourselves at the 
centre of the cosmos on a spherical, motionless earth. Through the heavens above, the 
moon, sun, five planets and fixed stars revolve in perfect harmony. The moon, being the 
closest planet, divides the cosmos into the sub lunar world and the seven spheres of the 
heavens. God created-and is the prime mover of-the universe. His care for humans is 
evident in his interventions, as inscrutable as they often are. The movements of the 
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heavens affect sublunar things, and Fortuna turns her wheel causing the rise and fall of 
1 . . d . 269 peop e, c1ttes an emptres. 
Influential Christian writers reconciled Christianity with heavenly causation by 
taking God's providence to be its source and with Fortuna by subordinating her to God. 270 
Machiavelli, in accord with the dominant beliefs of his time, speaks of God's 
involvement in human affairs, attributes agency to the heavens and speaks of Fortuna as a 
goddess with her own will.271 He wrote two short religious works: the Hymn of the 
Blessed Spirits (Canto degli spiriti beati) and a sermon on penitence.272 He also refers to 
religious matters in his letters, poems and plays. He makes several passing references to 
the afterlife (almost exclusively in his lesser works), though in his play Mandragola and 
his novella Belfagor he treats the underworld as something to make light of. 
What his religious references mean for his personal view is a controversial topic. 
Since the diversity of interpretations is itself a marvel, I will briefly outline the major 
· variations. On the one hand, from Cardinal Pole in the sixteenth century to Leo Strauss in 
the twentieth, many have seen him as not only an atheist but as an evil man. In 1557, the 
Church placed his writings on the Index librorum prohibitorum; they remained there until 
1890. The Italian writer Botero refers to Machiavelli as "an ingenious man, but scarcely a 
269 Witt writes that in trecento Italy "belief in fortune was almost universal" (Hercules at 
the Crossroads, p. 63). 
27° For examples see pp. 157-58 below. 
271 Machiavelli speaks of God's involvement in his own voice in P 6, 11, 26; FH 6. 34, 
8.19. He mentions God's involvement, not in his own voice, in FH 4.7, 6.20, 6.21, 7.29, 
8.23. 
272 As his autograph manuscript is untitled, this sermon is referred to as the Esortazione 
alla penitenza after its genre (see Germino, "Blasphemy," p. 150 n. 11). 
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Christian."273 In Marlowe's Jew of Malta, written around 1589, "Machevil" walks on 
stage and proclaims, "I count religion but a childish toy I And hold there is no sin but 
ignorance." Fichte, writing in 1807, defends the merits of Machiavelli as a political writer 
but grants he was "a professed pagan. "274 Meinecke maintains he was "a heathen" for 
whom "the fear of hell was unknown. "275 Cassirer contends that for Machiavelli religion 
is merely a means to a political end, not an end in itself. 276 Hulliung holds he was an 
atheist who wished to destroy Christianity.277 Parel opines: "Machiavelli is a neopagan 
whose aim is to paganize rather than to secularize Christianity.''278 Coby contends he was 
an atheist who wants "to paganize Christianity" but "never finally decides what to do 
about Christian modes and orders. "279 
On the other hand, many have defended his faith. The diplomat and Catholic 
humanist Gaspare Scioppio provided the first sustained defense of Machiavelli in his 
Apologia (1617), arguing that a proper understanding of his work shows that nothing he 
.says violates the Catholic faith. 280 Louis Machon in hisApologie (1643) states that 
Machiavelli writes with "fervor, justice and piety."281 Henry More uses Machiavelli's 
273 Quoted in Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 233. 
274 Quoted in Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 329 n. 2. Also see Berlin, The 
Originality of Machiavelli, pp. 152, 154, and Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 123. 
275 Machiavellism, p. 29. · 
276 The Myth of the State, p. 138. 
277 Citizen Machiavelli, pp. 210-11, 251. 
278 The Machiavellian Cosmos, p. 62. 
279 Machiavelli's Romans, p. 274. 
280 Viroli, Machiavelli's God, pp. 238-39; Ruffo-Fiore, Niccolo Machiavelli: an 
Annotated Bibliography, pp. 185-86. 
281 Quoted in Donaldson, Machiavelli, p. 188; also in Prezzolini, Machiavelli, p. 243. 
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writings to defend theism in his Antidotus adversus Atheismus (1653).282 In the nineteenth 
century, a book appeared entitled Religious Max.~ms faithfully extracted from the works of 
Niccolo Machiavelli.283 In the twentieth century, defenses of his faith become notably 
pronounced. In 1920, Giuseppe Toffanin acknowledges him to be a Christian.284 In 1930, 
Felice Alderisio describes him as a sincere Catholic. 285 While Luigi Russo criticizes 
Alderisio for going too far, he himself writes that "Machiavelli is a religious man, 
typically Christian in his religiosity. "286 According to Federico Chabod, Machiavelli's 
"emotion is still tempered by faith. "287 Roberto Ridolfi and Sebastian de Grazia, his two 
most distinguished twentieth-century biographers, both believe he was a Christian. Dante 
Germino is in·the middle; he points out the principal challenges to the atheist 
interpretation, which leads him to suggest that the enigma of Machiavelli's thought 
remains unsolved. 288 
Despite all the disagreement, at least a few things seem clear. For one, he puts no 
stock in the type of fire and brimstone Christianity preached by radicals like Savonarola. 
In his life and writings, we see no anguish over what some Christians take to be the 
conflicting demands of this world and the next. Nonetheless, he never questions the 
existence of God in any of his works, and, in his letters and legations, he makes 
282 Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos, p. 169 n. 41. 
283 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 152. 
284 Idid., p. 152; Cochrane, Machiavelli: 1940-1960, p. 117. 
285 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 152; Cochrane, Machiavelli: 1940-1960, p. 
117 n. 13. 
286 See Russo, Machiavelli (lst ed. 1945), quoted in Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 1n.1. 
Also see Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 332 n. 14. 
287 Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 14 7. 
288 For a summary of the evidence in support of the thesis that Machiavelli was a 
Christian see his "Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss's Machiavelli," p. 803 n. 16. 
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spontaneous references to God and Christ the way any Christian of the Renaissance · 
would (and it is hard to imagine that even in those seemingly spontaneous and casual 
references, whether to the Ten, a close friend or a family member, he was self-
consciously maintaining the illusion of piety).289 While the argument that he is an atheist 
may seem to account for some of his more unorthodox religious statements, it also means 
having to read against the letter of his text on numerous occasions. 
The argument I develop in this chapter is that while Machiavelli's main concern is 
worldly things, he shares in the general religious worldview of his age. While arguing that 
he accepts Christianity as the truth and the true way for his age, I suggest that he has a 
deeper commitment to theism than to Christianity per se; that Is, he does not seem to see 
Christianity as the one true religion for all times, but rather as a religious sect that has 
succeeded previous ones and will in tum eventually be succeeded. Underlying that view 
are his provocative hints that all religions, even Christianity, are in fact interpretations of 
the supernatural. Nonetheless, despite his acceptance of the obscurity of the supernatural, 
Machiavelli has the conviction that religion is not in conflict with the necessities of affairs 
of state. In other words, religions, which do change, should be interpreted in accord with 
the nature of man, which does not change. Thus he does not reject Christianity but rather 
interprets it in accord with his understanding of affairs of state. 
The Early Period and Letters 
289 For the point that Machiavelli never questions the existence of God see Viroli, 
Machiavelli's God, p. 3. Likewise, as de Grazia writes: "Niccolo cannot be found to 
speak irreverently of God" (Machiavelli in Hell, p. 87). 
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To begin with Machiavelli's early influences, it is of considerable interest that he 
transcribed Lucretius' De rerum natura (On the Nature of Things). Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that he produced his copy in 1497, the year before he entered the 
Chancery.290 De rerum natura poetically expounds not only Epicurus' atomistic theory 
but also his argument that the soul is mortal. Further, on the question of the gods, the text 
states: 
For perfect peace gods by their very nature 
Must of necessity enjoy, and immortal life, 
Far separate, far removed from our affairs. (2.646-648) 
In the margin of his copy of De rerum natura, Machiavelli glossed these lines by writing: 
"deos non curare mortalia" (the gods don't care about the affairs of mortals).291 Since the 
poem makes such arguments, those who were interested in the text had to keep quiet 
about it. Indicative of the need for self-censorship, the Church's Fifth Lateran Council of 
1513 condemned both Epicureanism and A verroism. And, in 1516, the Florentine synod 
prohibited the reading of Lucretius in Florentine schools.292 This is the milieu which 
nurtured Machiavelli, a time when Christianity and the studia humanitatis (humane 
studies) could go together harmoniously but could also find themselves dangerously at 
odds. Machiavelli's father made sure to provide his son with a solid humanist education, 
and, in the Discourses, Machiavelli writes, "it is very important that a boy of tender years 
begin to hear good or bad said of a thing, for it must of necessity make an impression on 
him, which afterward regulates the mode of proceeding in all the times of his life" 
290 Brown, The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence, p. 69. 
291 Ibid., p. 75. 
292 Ibid., pp. vii, 14, 68, 77, 108. 
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(3.46.1). Machiavelli is presumably also speaking of his own experience.293 In that regard, 
it seems that his reading of Lucretius and Livy, among other ancients, helped him place . 
his understanding of religion in a larger view of the relation between human beings and 
the supernatural. However, Machiavelli, unlike Epicurus, argues that religion, and even 
superstition, is essential to a well-ordered society. Also, as we well see, he questions the 
Epicurean (and Biblical) view that the world is of recent creation. Finally, the references 
to God in his writings and letters show a man who-while novel in so many ways--does 
not break with belief in a God who cares about the affairs of mortals. 
Machiavelli occasionally begins and ends letters with such customary expressions 
as: "In the name of God," "Christ keep you" or "Christ watch over you." As de Grazia-
who does not question Machiavelli's faith in God-admits, the use of colloquial religious 
language cannot be taken to _signify much on its own: "Such expressions in such contexts 
can easily be perfunctory, a linguistic habit without much ti.deistic import. "294 
Nonetheless, if Machiavelli were a hardened atheist, he couid easily avoid such theistic 
invocations. It is, rather, the very naturalness of his references to God that suggest his 
adherence to a theistic worldview. Several of such occurrences are particularly revealing. 
In a letter to his nephew dated June 26, 1513, Machiavelli writes: 
it is a miracle that I am alive, because my post was taken from me and I was about 
to lose my life, which God and my innocence have preserved for me. I have had to 
endure all sorts of other evils, both prison and other kinds. But, by the grace of 
God, I am well and I manage to live as I can-and so I shall strive to do, until the 
heavens show themselves to be more kind. 
293 That Machiavelli's statement in Discourses 3.46.1 is autobiographical is suggested by 
Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 4; Brown, The Return of Lucretius, p. 69, and Atkinson, 
"Niccolo Machiavelli: a Portrait," p. 15. 





He ends the letter, "Christ keep watch over you. "295 Writing to his nephew again on 
August 4, he says, "no other hope remains for me but that God may help me, and, until 
now, He has not in fact abandoned me. "296 These two letters show that Machiavelli's God 
is a God who cares about and is involved in human affairs. We may also note that he uses 
"God" and "the heavens" interchangeably. Ifhe were an atheist, we must read these 
seemingly passionate and pious references-made at a time when fortune had brought 
him to his lowest point and written to a family member with whom he could be frank-as 
nothing more than colloquialisms, metaphors or methodical deception. In a letter written 
to his son Guido in 1527, he ends the letter with "Christ watch over you all."297 In this 
case, the context of the letter adds poignancy to the words as Machiavelli was in Imo fa 
away from his family while the army of Charles V was descending on Tuscany. As the 
editors of his letters point out, in this case it is hard to read his use of the expression "as 
merely a conventional one. "298 
Letters have also been used to suggest that Machiavelli is of little faith. In a letter 
written by Francesco Vettori on November 23, 1513, he teases Machiavelli: "On feast 
days I go to mass and I do not do as you do who sometimes miss it. "299 A month later, on 
December 19, Machiavelli writes to Vettori about an apocalyptic sermon delivered in 
Florence adding, "I myself did not hear the sermon, for I do not observe such 
295 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 239. 
296 Ibid., p. 244. 
297 Ibid., p. 414. Letter of April 2, 1527. 
298 Ibid., p. 561 n. 7. 
299 Quoted in Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 332 n. 16. 
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practices. "300 However, on June 10, 1514, Machiavelli wrote to Vettori, "I cannot 
possibly go on like this for long, because I am rotting away and I can see that if God does 
not show a more favorable face to me, one day I shall be forced to leave home and to 
place myself as tutor or secretary to a govemor."301 While the first two letters show that 
Machiavelli was not always present at mass on feast days and that he was not one for 
sermons, the last letter shows that he and Vettori nonetheless share the same conception 
of a God who has power over human affairs. 
Other citations also support the case that Machiavelli was a theist. On January 3, 
1526, he wrote to Francesco Guicciardini and, in regards to the death of the latter's 
nephew, comments "since God has willed it so, so it must be." On his imminent visit to 
Faenza he writes, "nothing can hold me back except illness, may God protect me from 
it."302 While these two references to God's intervention in human affairs could be 
considered customary, Guicciardini was a man with whom he could be frank and a man 
for whom he would have no need to put on religious airs. His sincerity is further attested 
when he speaks of a more momentous expression of God's intervention in a letter to 
Bartolomeo Cavalcanti written around October 6, 1526; here he writes: "if God does not 
help us out in the south, as He has already done in the north, then there are few remedies 
left to us. "303 Machiavelli and Guicciardini also exchanged some telling letters in May of 
1521; however, since they make reference to the popular conception of Machiavelli's 
300 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 267. 
301 Ibid., p. 290. 
302 Ibid., p. 3 77. 
303 Ibid., p. 405. 
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religious views, it will be useful to first consider the writings upon which that popular 
view must partly be based. 
"Hymn of the Blessed Spirits" 
There is disagreement about when Machiavelli wrote his carnival song entitled 
"Degli spiriti beati." Tommasini dates it to soon after the election of Clement VII in 
1523, whereas Ridolfi argues he wrote it for the election of Leo X in March 1513.304 As 
the song is written for a pope, its religious tone is dictated by the.addressee; the main 
theme of the song, however, is political: blessed spirits come from heaven to advise "the 
new shepherd" to put an end to the fighting in Italy and instead unite against the Turks. In 
the song, Machiavelli fears not to interpret religion according to political dictates. In that 
regard, one stanza is particularly interesting: 
Dunque, alzate le mani 
Contr'al crudel nemico, 
Soccorrendo a le vostre gente afflitte; 
Deponete, cristiani, 
Questa vostro odio antico, 
E contra a lui voltate l' armi invitte; 
Altrimenti, interditte 
Le forze usate vi saran dal cielo, 
Sendo in voi spento di pietate il zelo. (lines 3 7-45)305 
Therefore, lift up your hands 
Against the cruel enemy, 
Relieving your afflicted people; 
Lay down, Christians, 
This your ancient hatred, 
304 On Tommasini see Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 878. Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, pp. 139, 
291 n. 21. Whitfield provides additional reasons for supporting Ridolfi' s judgement 
(Discourses on Machiavelli, p. 20). 
305 Tutte le opere, p. 856. · 
150 
I' 
And against him turn your arms invincible; 
Otherwise, your accustomed 
Strength will be forbidden to you by heaven, 
Since in you pious zeal is exhausted. 306 
According to the stanza's closing lines, heaven grants strength only to those with pious 
zeal. The piety of the Italians, Machiavelli warns, is exhausted but can be relit by turning 
their arms from each other to the Turks. 
Princes and God 
In The Prince Machiavelli never mention the conscience, heaven, hell or the 
soul.307 The word "Dio," however, appears twelve times, six in chapters 1-25 and six in 
the final exhortation. The first references to God occur in Prince 6, where Machiavelli 
includes Moses among the excellent men who became new princes through their own 
virtue and arms. The other excellent princes he names are Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus. 
· The justification he gives for discussing Moses in this context shows that he anticipated 
criticism: "although one should not reason about Moses, as he was a mere executor of 
things that had been ordered for him by God, nonetheless he should be admired 
[ ammirato] if only for that grace which made him deserving of speaking with God. "308 
Machiavelli acknowledges the orthodox view that Moses acted in accordance with God's 
will; however, he argues that Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus are also "admirable" 
(mirabili) and that their "particular actions and orders" were no different from those of 
306 Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 880 (translation modified). 
307 Strauss, "Niccolo Machiavelli," p. 303. 
308 For an analysis of this passage in terms of ancient rhetorical strategies, as well as more 




Moses. Thus, despite his acknowledgment that one should not class Moses among pagan 
founders, he in fact does so and justifies doing so. While he analyzes the actions of all of 
them in political terms, his acknowledgment that God was Moses' "teacher" underlines 
God's approval of Moses' use of force. 309 Further, by comparing Moses' success with 
Savonarola's failure he shows that even with God as a friend one must be armed. As 
Machiavelli anticipated, some early readers of The Prince criticized him for analyzing 
Moses' actions as ifhe were a secular prince.310 On the other hand, one of Machiavelli's 
defenders, the Catholic writer Gaspare Scioppio, goes to the trouble of explaining in his 
Apologia ( 1617) that he did so because, as a politician, he wished to consider only natural 
causes.
311 
While it seems such a political analysis of Moses was unorthodox, Machiavelli's 
tone is hard to read; on the one hand, he speaks piously of Moses, but, on the other, his 
political analysis raises the question of whether he means what he says literally: that 
Moses was an instrument of God's will and .that he spoke with God. While in The Prince 
his personal view is concealed by ambiguity, the Discourses seems to supply the answer, 
though still obliquely. After Machiavelli therein lauds Numa's ploy of pretending to 
speak with a nymph in order to acquire authority, he adds: 
And truly there was never any orderer of extraordinary laws for a people who did 
not have recourse to God, because otherwise they would not have been accepted. 
For a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have in themselves 
evident reasons with which one can persuade others. Thus wise men who wish to 
309 As God says to Moses, "I will be with your mouth and teach you what you are to 
speak" (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Ex. 4.n-12). 
310 See Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric, p. 279 n. 21; Donaldson, A Machiavellian Treatise, 
f:· 18. 
11 Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 239. 
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take away this difficulty have recourse to God. So did Lycurgus; so did Solon; so 
did many others who have had the same end as they. (D 1.11.3) 
Machiavelli does not name Moses, but his pointed comments ineluctably evoke him. By 
writing "there was never any orderer," his categorical words necessarily include Moses, · 
the greatest orderer of extraordinary laws who had recourse to God. If that were not 
enough, his-"So did Lycurgus; so did Solon; so did many others"-again evokes 
Moses.312 Based on these comments in the Discourses, it seems likely that in The Prince 
Machiavelli also views Moses as a prudent and wise man who used the authority of God 
in order to found his new orders. If that is the case, then Machiavelli does not believe 
what he says about Moses speaking with God, yet he recites the orthodox view in order to 
justify his own point, namely, that the other essential element of Moses' success, in 
addition to his virtu, was his recourse to arms. If Moses did not in truth speak with God, 
then, like Numa, he was merely a prudent interpreter of religion. This then suggests that 
for Machiavelli even Judeo-Christian laws are not the result of revelation but rather are 
"goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade 
others" and thus required the authority of God (ibid.). 
The next reference to God occurs in Prince 8, "Of Those Who Have Attained a 
Principality through Crimes." In this chapter Machiavelli summarizes how Agathocles 
had the senators and the rich killed in order to seize the principate of Syracuse but then 
used his authority to defend Sicily from the Carthaginians. Machiavelli asks how 
312 Emphasis added in both quotations. Fontana also argues that Machiavelli intended for 
the reader to make this comparison ("Love of Country and Love of God," p. 646). For a 
more literal reading of Prince 6 see Nederman, Lineages, pp. 296-98. In Discourses 1.11.5, 
Machiavelli points out that Savonarola was able to persuade modem Florentines that he 
spoke with God. 
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Agathocles could live securely in. his state despite his cruelties and answers that since he 
did them at a stroke and turned them to the good of his subjects, he used cruelty well. He 
then adds: "Those who observe the first mode [cruelties well used] can have some remedy 
for their state with God and with men, as had Agathocles." The basis for the theological 
aspect of his claim is presumably the empirical fact that Agathocles "could live secure for 
a long time in his fatherland." In other words, he was not ruined by either God or his 
subJects. It is also noteworthy that this claim assumes God is operative in the pagan 
world. Such an assumption is however not unusual. As N ederman points out, it is present 
in the Hebrew Bible and was accepted in the Middle Ages.313 
What is original is Machiavelli's argument that despite Agathocles' "savage 
cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes," he met no punishment from 
Providence. His specific wording, as we saw above, is that those who turn crime to the 
common good "can have some remedy for their state with God and with men" (possono 
con Dio e con Ii omini avere a/lo stato loro qualche remedio ). His choice of the 
expression "remedy for their state" is interesting since it echoes the expression "remedy 
for one's soul," which signifies money in one's will designated for prayers.314 
Machiavelli, in The Prince, speaks not of remedy for one's soul but for one's "stato." In 
this sense, stato refers to the personal possession of the bases of power (such as men, 
money, property, territory and authority) but could also refer to his "status."315 If we 
consider both senses of stato, then Agathocles found some remedy with God for his 
313 Nederman, Lineages, pp. 298-99. 
314 Brown quotes from the will of Marcello Adriani which designates "fifty florins to be 
sBent 'for the remedy of his soul"' (The Return of Lucretius, p. 109). 
3 5 On "stato'' as "statusH see Mansfield, ed., The Prince, p. 5 n. 2. 
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"state" and his "status." Although Machiavelli qualifies the completeness of the remedy 
with the word "some" (qualche), even with that qualification his argument has far-
reaching implications: cruelties well used, even those of someone as criminal as 
Agathocles, will be excused by God and men.316 Machiavelli attributes this lenient 
disposition to God himself. As noted above, he has some justification in making the claim 
since, from the point of view of Providence, it is evident that God allowed Agathocles to 
hold his state despite his crimes. Nonetheless, it is striking that Machiavelli presumes to 
know God's intention and further that, in his view, God, like the vulgar, judges things by 
their end. Such a judgment would seem presumptuous unless Machiavelli believes either 
that religion is no more than an instrumentum regni or that God himself makes 
allowances for human conditions. While I am trying to build the case that in 
Machiavelli's view religion and natural necessity are not in conflict, and thus that his 
view accords with the latter of the two above positions, it is at least clear that Machiavelli 
portrays God to be rather lenient, especially compared to the God of fire and brimstone. 
The fourth reference to God occurs in chapter 11, "Of Ecclesiastical 
Principalities." Speaking of such principalities, Machiavelli writes: "as they subsist by 
superior causes, to which the human mind does not reach, I will omit speaking of them; 
for since they are exalted and maintained by God, it would be the office of a 
presumptuous and foolhardy man to discourse on them. "317 While Machiavelli says he 
316 Viroli, drawing on several texts, makes a similar argument about Machiavelli's view 
of God: "God forgives and gives His friendship even to those founders of states, 
redeemers of peoples, and rulers who are obliged to be bad in order to achieve their 
~oals" (Machiavelli's God, p. 63). 
17 Some editions read "superior cause" (see Mansfield, ed., The Prince, p. 45 n. 1). 
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will refrain from the foolhardy task of interpreting papal history in terms of God's 
providence, his pious acknowledgment in fact serves as an apologia for discussing papal 
history in secular terms. And, just as he analyzed Moses' actions in terms of virtu and 
arms, he discusses the temporal rule of the papacy in terms of "money and forces." It is 
also of note that Machiavelli subscribes to the view that the human mind cannot reach to 
the superior cause of God. Based on the way he discusses religion, the conclusion he 
draws from the former seems to be that any statement about God is necessarily an 
interpretation. And, as we saw in his discussion of Agathocles, Machiavelli himself does 
not refrain from interpreting religion in accord with his understanding of worldly things. 
The following chapter discusses different types of military forces. Therein 
Machiavelli argues that one of the reasons mercenaries are useless is because they have 
"no fear of God" (P 12). He does not explain how fear of God makes men better soldiers, 
but it is a theme he returns to several times in Art of War, where he spells out how a lack 
of religion leads to wickedness and the failure to observe discipline. 318 On the one hand, it 
seems Machiavelli wants to decrease a prince's fear of divine punishment, but, on the 
other, he recognizes the usefulness of fear in soldiers and citizens.319 This is, however, a 
difficult duality to maintain since the private view intended for the prince may come to 
undermine the public view. 
In Prince 25, Machiavelli acknowledges the common opinion according to which 
worldly things are "governed by fortune and by God." Since Machiavelli uses ''fortuna," 
"the heavens" and "God" interchangeably depending on the context and rhetorical need, 
318 See AW 1.129, 4.141-46 and 6.125. 
319 In addition to the above, see D 1.11. 
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he was evidently not concerned with differentiating their domains or clarifying their 
relation. As John Geerken points out-citing passages where Machiavelli variously 
attributes sublunar causality to "God," "Heaven" and "a hidden power"-"[s]uch 
passages suggest if not a conceptual identity, at least a degree of conceptual overlap--of 
the sort likely still tolerable in the relatively easy going eclectic intellectual milieu that 
preceded the Protestant and Tridentine Reformation."320 Boethius, in the sixth century, 
made an important contribution to that eclectic milieu by reconciling the pagan concept of 
Fate with the Christian belief in Providence. As he writes in The Consolation of 
Philosophy: 
whether Fate is carried out by divine spirits in the service of Providence, or by a 
soul, or by the whole activity of nature, by the heavenly motions of the stars, by 
angelic virtue [angelica virtute] or diabolical cleverness, or by some or all of 
these agents, one thing is certain: Providence is the immovable and simple form 
of all things .... It follows then, that everything which is subject to Fate is also 
subject to Providence, and that Fate itself is also subject to Providence. 321 
While Boethius leaves the agent of Fate open, his argument set the standard for 
reconciling Providence with that which goes under the name of Fate or Fortune. Further, 
one of the agents he proposes for the carrying out of Fate is heavenly motion, which 
shows the antiquity of the connection between God, the heavens and fate. In the Summa 
Theologiae, Aquinas asserts that the heavenly bodies affect sublunar material things and 
that the "pre-ordaining cause" of the heavenly bodies themselves is "divine 
Providence."322 Dante in the Inferno makes the power of Fortune a part of God's creation: 
320 
"Machiavelli's Moses and Renaissance Politics," p. 584. 
321 Book4, prose 6, p. 71. 
322 Summa Theologiae la, question 116, article 1 (vol. 15, p. 119). Also see la, question 
115, articles 3-4. 
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for worldly splendors He decreed the same 
and ordained a guide and general ministress 
who would at her discretion shift vain wealth 
from nation unto nation, house to house, 
without a chance of mankind's interference; 
so while one nation rules, another falls 
according to whatever she decrees. (canto 7, lines 77-83) 
While such major writers incorporated pagan concepts into Christian cosmology, some of 
Machiavelli's contemporaries saw the need to fend off astrology. Pico della Mirandola, in 
his Disputations Against Astrology ( 1496), produced a systematic critique of astrology, 
defending the view that God alone governs all things through divine Providence. The 
following year Savonarola popularized Pico' s arguments in a pamphlet entitled Against 
Divinatory Astrology. 323 Pontano responded to Pico in his De rebus coelestibus and De 
fortuna (1501), arguing for the natural causality of the heavens, subject to Providence, 
and that God leaves matters of wealth and power to Fortune. 324 
Machiavelli often recognizes the influence of supernatural powers in his writings, 
but at the same time he rejects determinism: "so that our free will not be ~liminated, I 
judge that it might be true that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she 
leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern" (P 25). In the following chapter of 
The Prince he writes: "God does not want to do everything, so as not to take free will 
from us and that part of the glory that falls to us." His insistence on the point that rulers 
have some control over and responsibility for their fortune is evident throughout The 
Prince. Like other Renaissance writers, he adopted the Roman view that fortune favours 
men of virtue. The idea that virtue is necessary for good fortune is also seen in 
323 Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos, pp. 7, 18-23, 58. 
324 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 58. 
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Xenophon's Cyropaedia (a work Machiavelli cites in Prince 14); therein, Cambyses 
reminds Cyrus that one's piety must heed natural cause and effect: "we decided that it 
was necessary to ask for the good things from the gods only after rendering ourselves 
such as we ought to be" (1.6.5). In The Prince, Machiavelli is evidently more concerned 
withfortuna than God; however, since the main issue for him is virtu, it is fitting that 
fortuna, its classical counterpart, plays such an important role in the work. 
Having referred to God only six times in the first twenty-five chapters, 
Machiavelli calls on God six times in the final "Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her 
from the Barbarians." According to the classical rules of rhetoric, a political oration 
should end with either a conclusion or an exhortation. 325 Machiavelli, following this 
tradition, ends with an exhortation praising the Medici and encouraging them to act. He 
writes that God was friendly to all the excellent founders mentioned in chapter 6 and that 
God will be as friendly to the Medici as he was to them. However, when it comes to a call 
to arms, he turns to the pagan Livy: "for war is just to whom it is necessary, and arms are 
pious when there is no hope but in arms." In chapter twenty-six, we see that Machiavelli's 
God leaves men with some free will and is friends with great founders, and also that arms 
are pious when used for liberation. 
Discoursing on Religion 
In the Discourses, the importance of religion is evident from the "Preface," where 
Machiavelli writes "the present religion" has led the world into "weakness." However, the 
325 See Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 122. 
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problem, he specifies, is not Christianity itself but the lack of "a true knowledge of 
histories"; something, he says, that may be rectified through his discourses on Roman 
history. Although modems imitate the ancients in the arts, law and medicine, they think it 
is "not only difficult but impossible" to imitate their political judgments. Machiavelli thus 
laments that while men "take pleasure" in reading ancient histories, imitating their actions 
is "shunned by everyone." He returns to this critique of the modem ethos in 3.27, writing: 
"the weakness of men at present, caused by their weak education and their slight 
knowledge of things, makes them judge ancient judgments in part inhuman, in part 
impossible." We see then that it is the Christian education which makes men shun ancient 
remedies. In the "Preface" he argues that the ancient judgments are still true since the 
heaven and men do not change. This explains why a lack of knowledge of history is the 
problem rather than Christianity. The Christian education which has made men weak can 
be corrected by interpreting it "according to virtue" (D 2.2.2 ). This is not impossible as 
the Swiss "live according to the ancients as regards both religion and military orders" (D 
1.12.2). 
Chapters eleven to fifteen of book 1 deal with Roman religion, how it made Rome 
strong and how the rulers used it well. From this knowledge of history, Machiavelli 
derives some universal prescriptions regarding religion: 
princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the 
religion they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain 
their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united. All things that arise 
in favor of that religion they should favor and magnify, even though they judge 
them false; and they should do it so much the more as they are more prudent and 
more knowing of natural things. Because this mode has been observed by wise 
men, the belief has arisen in miracles, which are celebrated even in false religions 
[celebrano nelle religioni eziando false]; for the prudent enlarge upon them from 
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whatever beginning they arose, and their authority then gives them credit with 
anyone whatever. (1.12.1) 
While this passage may seem to show an indifference to the truth of religion, the context 
is Machiavelli's elucidation of ancient history and in particular of Roman history. He 
points out that "every religion has the foundation of its life on some principal order of its 
own" and that the foundation of the pagan religion was its oracles, divinations and 
auguries (1.12.1). To demonstrate the importance of venerating religion, he writes that 
once the oracles became a tool of the powerful, and were exposed as such, "men became 
incredulous and apt to disturb every good order" (1.12.1). For Machiavelli, the religious 
devotion of the people and their good conduct are indissolubly linked. As a way to 
maintain their religiosity, Machiavelli argues that wise men enlarge upon natural 
occurrences to increase their faith. To demonstrate how such so-called miracles arise 
"even in false religions," he praises Camillus for magnifying his soldiers' belief that a 
statue of Juno nodded and spoke. Machiavelli advises rulers to magnify whatever favours 
religion even if one is "more knowing of natural things" and thus does not believe it to be 
a miracle oneself. While his comment that miracles are "celebrated even in false 
religions" differentiates pagan religion and Christian religion, his comment on the origin 
of miracles is made in a universal manner. Further, immediately after his comments about 
how the Romans used belief in miracles he writes: "If such religion,had been maintained 
by the princes of the Christian republic as was ordered by its giver, the Christian states 
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and republics would be more united, much happier than they are" (1.12.1).326 Since his 
comment on Jesus follows immediately after his discussion of Camillus, Machiavelli 
seems to be implying that Jesus himself was a prudent man who used belief in miracles to 
increase people's faith. In that case, we would have to add not only Moses but also Jesus 
to Machiavelli list of "orderer[ s] of extraordinary laws" who had "recourse to God" (D 
1.11.3).327 While that would be a radical interpretation of Jesus, the nature of miracles had 
been contested in the West since Avicenna's On the Soul was translated into Latin around 
1160. In it Avicenna provides a naturalistic explanation of prophecy and miracles, thereby 
sparking a philosophic debate about the nature of miracles that was still very much alive 
at Machiavelli's time. 328 
While Machiavelli's discussion of miracles seems to obliquely suggest that Jesus, 
like Camillus, was a prudent knower of natural things, what is explicit in his comment on 
Jesus is his praise for the political utility of the religion he originally ordered. Machiavelli 
then goes on to say that it is "the wicked examples" of the Roman church that have 
brought Christianity into decline (1.12.2). Discussing the same matter in a later chapter, he 
writes that Christianity would have been "altogether eiiminated" if Saint Francis and 
Saint Dominic had not drawn it back toward its beginning. Here again we see his praise 
for early Christianity: "with poverty and with the example of the life of Christ they 
brought back into the minds of men what had already been eliminated there" (3.1.4). 
326 
"La quale religione se ne' principi della republica cristiana si fusse mantenuta, 
secondo che dal datore d'essa ne fu ordinate, sarebbero gli stati e le republiche cristiane 
piu unite, piu felici assai, che le non sono." 
327 On Moses, see pp. 151-53 above. 
328 Hasse, "Arabic Philosophy and Averroism," pp. 121-25. 
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Although in the earlier chapter Machiavelli does not explicitly say what the foundations 
of Christianity are, based on his comment about Francis and Dominic, it would seem to 
be poverty and the example of the life of Christ. He also emphasizes the importance of 
religiosity when discussing Savonarola, pointing out that his followers, without having 
seen him do anything "extraordinary," put their faith in him due to "his life, learning" and 
claim "that he spoke with God" (1.11.5). In Florentine Histories, he attributes the success 
of early Christianity to the miracles and the holy lives of the pontiffs: "the first ones after 
Saint Peter had been revered by men for the holiness of their lives and for the miracles, 
and their examples so extended the Christian religion that princes had necessarily to 
submit to it" (1.9). In all three examples, Machiavelli emphasizes that credit for religion 
stems from the piety of the religious heads. Thus it seems that in his view the essential 
foundations of Christianity are the pious example of the religious leaders, miracles and 
poverty (the poverty of citizens, in contradistinction from the state, being an ideal 
Machiavelli often praises). 329 Likewise, in his view the princes of a republic or of a 
kingdom should show veneration for their religion (1.12.1). However, we again see that his 
understanding of religion presupposes two classes of people: those who are knowers of 
natural things but use religion well and the generality of people who are kept good 
through religion. 
The locus classicus on interpreting religion occurs in Discourses 2.2, a chapter 
which resumes the comparison of pagan and Christian religion begun in Discourses 1.12. 
Machiavelli begins, as usual, by acknowledging the orthodox position: "our religion, 
329 On the last point, see, for example, D 1.37.1, 3.16.2. 
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having shown the truth and the true way, makes us esteem less the honor of the world." 
However, since Christianity places "the highest good in humility, abjectness, and 
contempt of things human," it has "rendered the world weak and given it in prey to 
criminal men" (2.2.2). The religion of the Gentiles, on the other hand, placed the highest 
good in the honor of the world. As a result, they were stronger and greater lovers of 
freedom. Calling Christianity the truth and the true way but then saying it has led to the 
ruin of Italy could be seen as a thinly veiled condemnation of Christianity tout court; 
however, Machiavelli clearly explains it is only Christianity interpreted as it has been that 
leads to ruin: "although the world appears to be made effeminate and heaven disarmed, it 
arises without doubt from the cowardice of the men who have interpreted our religion 
according to idleness and not according to virtue" (2.2.2). As in Discourses 1.12.1, we see 
that the problem is not the religion ordered by Jesus; the problem is the way Christianity 
has been interpreted. 
Machiavelli's criticism of the way Christianity has been interpreted raises the 
question of which writers he has in mind. The men most responsible for interpreting 
western Christianity are the Latin Church Fathers, men such as Cyprian, Arnobius, 
Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine. Of those early interpreters, Augustine was 
the most influential and gave to Christianity the concept of the City of God. 330 
Machiavelli's object of critique in Discourses 2.2 is precisely the Augustinian view that 
the heavenly patria, not the earthly patria, is the highest good. For Augustine, the glory of 
the City of God far surpasses that of Rome: 
330 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, pp. 70-71. 
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that city in which it is promised that we shall reign is as far removed from Rome 
as heaven is from earth, as eternal life is from temporal joy, as solid glory from 
empty praise, as the fellowship of angels from that of mortal men, and as the light 
of the sun and moon from the light of Him Who made the sun and moon. (City of 
God 5.17) 
Machiavelli reverses that valuation, praising love of the terrestrial fatherland and 
interpreting Christianity in accord with the virtues that makes it great. The "false 
interpretations" of Christianity that Machiavelli speaks of are those with such an 
otherworldly orientation; he counters that if men "considered how it permits us the 
exaltation and defense of the fatherland, they would see that it wishes us to love and 
honor it and to prepare ourselves to be such that we can defend it" (2.2.2). While this 
claim is foreign to the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, the seed of a more worldly 
interpretation of Christianity can be found in Augustine himself. 331 As the latter points 
out, the New Testament tacitly condones just wars: 
If Christian teaching condemned war altogether, those who sought wholesome 
counsel in the Gospel would have been told to cast aside their arms and withdraw 
altogether from the military profession; whereas it was said to them: 'Do violence 
to no man and be content with your wages' (Luke 3:14). If He commanded them 
to be content with their wages, He did not forbid them to be soldiers. 332 
Thus, since at least the time of Augustine, the Gospel had already been interpreted as 
allowing for the defense of one's fatherland. Further, a string of Italian writers who 
preceded Machiavelli brought together the ideas of Christian caritas and Roman caritas 
331 Sullivan, for example, argues that Machiavelli's "new interpretation of Christianity" 
conflicts with the Sermon on the Mount ("Neither Christian nor Pagan," p. 264 n. 12). 
332 Quoted with approval by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, question 40, article 1 
(Political Writings, p. 240). The counsel recorded in Luke 3.14 is spoken by John the 
Baptist. The translation in the New Oxford Annotated Bible reads: "Soldiers also asked 
him, 'And we, what should we do?' He said to them, 'Do not extort money from anyone 
by threats or false accusation, and be satisfied with your wages."' · 
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patriae (love of the fatherland). 333 To avoid the error of evaluating Machiavelli according 
to an idea of religion foreign to his milieu, I will make a brief detour through this 
literature. 
After Aristotle's works were translated into Latin in the trecento, one passage 
from the Nicomachean Ethics was particularly useful for establishing a relation between 
the common good and God: "while the good of an individual is a desirable thing, what is 
good for a people or for Cities is a nobler and more godlike thing" (1094b). Aquinas, 
explaining this passage in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, says that 
procuring the common good is "divine because it shows greater likeness to God, who is 
the universal cause of all goods" (2.30).334 The same passage is mentioned in On the 
Government of Rulers, a work influential in the later Middle Ages and Renaissance; it 
was often attributed to Aquinas but is now thought to be largely the work of his student 
Ptolemy of Lucca. 335 In it, Ptolemy uses the above passage from the Nicomachean Ethics 
to support his claim that love of the fatherland "participates in the divine nature" (3.4.2 ). 
Further, the heading of the chapter reads: "God provided for the lordship of the Romans 
because of their zeal for their fatherland. "336 Remigio de' Girolami, another student of 
Aquinas and the prior of Santa Maria Novella in Florence, argued that love is the 
foundation of civil life and love of the fatherland a Christian duty.337 Coluccio Salutati, a 
Florentine chancellor whose intellectual leadership made Florence the centre of humanist 
333 For a more developed genealogy of this tradition see Viroli, Machiavelli's God, pp. 
46-61; also see Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, pp. 74-75, 342-44. 
3~4 Also see Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 46. 
335 Blythe, On the Government of Rulers, pp. vii, 1-5. 
336 Ptolemy, On the Government of Rulers, p. 153. 
337 Viroli, Machiavelli's God, pp. 46-4 7. 
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studies, wrote in 1377 that caritas "alone fosters the family, expands the city, and guards 
the kingdom."338 He also wrote that Jesus' love f~r his fatherland was apparent in his 
return from Egypt to Israel to suffer martyrdom there; thus, Jesus' example shows that 
one's caritas for others is greatest in relation to one's ownpatria.339 Leonardo Bruni, who 
became Florentine chancellor four years after Salutati' s death, claims. that one's 
fatherland- is sacred and that those who give their life for its liberty will be rewarded in 
the heavens.340 In light of this particularly Florentine tradition, Machiavelli's call for 
Christianity to be interpreted according to virtue should not be taken as a sign of atheistic 
indifference to religion. He even takes care to preempt such a judgement by referring to 
Christianity as "the truth and the true way." The question, as he makes explicit, is one of 
interpretation. Thus we should be diligent about not reading modem presuppositions 
about religion into a different period, a period in which different views of God could 
overlap as well as vie: the God of the Sermon on the Mount, the God of the Hebrew 
Bible, the God of the scholastics, the God of the laity, the God of civic-minded thinkers 
who believed the greatest good one can do is a good for one's city. 
In Discourses 2.5 Machiavelli addresses the question of whether the world is 
created or eternal. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Aristotle's argument that the 
world is eternal was given a renewed life through Latin translations of the Arabic 
philosopher Averroes. His commentaries on Aristotle were influential in universities 
throughout Europe, particularly in Renaissance Italy, and one of the positions identified 
338 Quoted in Henderson, Piety and Charity in Late Medieval Florence, p. 355. On 
Salutati, see Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, p. 272. 
339 Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, pp. 343-44; Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 49. 
340 Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 90. See Bruni's Oratio infunere Johannis Strozze. 
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as "A verroist" was the belief that human reason, which begins from the senses, 
necessarily teaches the eternity of the world.341 Petrarch is witness to the tension created 
by this Aristotelian position when he fires back at four friends who turned against him for 
his willingness to question the authority of Aristotle: "Except for Plato and the Platonists, 
nearly all the philosophers tend toward this view [the eternity of the world], together with 
my four judges, who wish to appear philosophers rather than Christians."34~ By 1513, the 
influence of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle was seen to be such a threat to 
orthodoxy that the Fifth Lateran Council condemned Averroist doctrines as heretical, in 
particular, banning belief "in the unity of the soul and the eternity of the world."343 When 
Machiavelli discusses the question in.book 2, chapter 5, he begins, following his usual 
method, with an argument supporting the orthodox position that the world is of recent 
creation: there is no memory of things beyond "five thousand years." This lack of any 
more ancient history casts doubt on "those philosophers who would have it that the world 
is eternal." Interestingly, Dante, in Purgatory, places the story of Adam and Eve "five 
thousand years" before the birth of Jesus.344 Thus the argument that there is no historical 
record beyond five thousand years is in accord with the biblical view that the world is of 
relatively recent creation. However, the second clause of Machiavelli's sentence then 
undermines the argument by pointing out that memories of ancient times are eliminated 
by many causes. Some of these causes are from "heaven" and some from "men." The two 
341 Hasse, "Arabic Philosophy and Averroism," pp. 113-14, 117; Hankins, "Humanism, 
Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy," pp. 35-38. 
342 Petrarch, On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others, paragraph 87. 
343 Quoted in Brown, The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence, pp. 77-78. 
344 Canto 33, line 61-63. Musa points out that Dante here follows the chronology of 
Eusebius (Alighieri, vol. 4, p. 325). 
168 
which come from men are the variations of language and the emergence of new religions. 
Machiavelli immediately proceeds to the example of "the Christian sect" (la setta 
Cristiana ), without in any way distinguishing it from any other sect. His argument 
pointedly disregards the claim of revelation: religions, including the Christian religion, 
come not from heaven but from men. This classification of religion again shows how 
important interpretation is for Machiavelli, for in saying that religion comes from men, it 
seems we can only understand religions as interpretations, that is, the ordini of good and 
prudent men. 
Machiavelli uses the example of the Christian sect to show how religious founders 
try to eliminate the previous religion, though, as he points out, since Christianity had to 
use the Latin language, it could not completely eliminate all Gentile history. Machiavelli 
extrapolates that the previous Gentile sect must likewise have attempted to eliminate the 
memory of the sect prior to it. Thus, since "sects vary two or three times in five or in six 
thousand years," and since each new sect tries to eliminate the memory of the previous 
one, no memory remains of anything more ancient than five thousand years. 
Machiavelli's explanation discredits an argument in favor of creation and also refutes one 
of the arguments made by Lucretius in The Nature of Things, a poetic exposition of 
Epicurus' atomic theory. To support the claim that the earth is of "recent" birth Lucretius 
smgs: 
Now here's another point. If earth and sky 
Had no beginning or no time of birth 
But have been always everlasting, why, 
Before the Theban war and doom of Troy 
Have the poets not sung other things? (book 5, lines 324-328) 
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Although Christianity and atomic theory disagree on the cause of creation, they do agree 
on the world's recent creation. Machiavelli, however, argues against this essential point 
of Judea-Christian theology and Epicurean cosmology. Instead, he provides an argument 
which supports the position of the philosophers he refers to at the beginning of the 
chapter, a position which obviates God's role as creator of the world. Machiavelli's 
argument also aligns him with the heretical A verroist position, and more generally shows 
his alliance to .reason over faith. As he states elsewhere: "it is good to reason about 
everything" (D 1.18.), and the Bible must be read "judiciously" (D 3.30.1). Nonetheless, 
the argument that the world is eternal is not synonymous with atheism since in Aristotle's 
famous formulation the first cause is ascribed to an unmoved mover. The one position 
which removes God's role in creation altogether is atomic theory, and Machiavelli's 
argument counters the recent creation of the earth whether that creation is ascribed to God 
or to atoms. 
When Machiavelli moves on in the next paragraph to the causes which come from 
heaven-plague, famine and floods-his discourse further undermines Judeo-Christian 
history. As he writes, floods eliminate the memory of ancient things most pervasively 
since they are "more universal" and because the only survivors are "mountain men" 
lacking any knowledge of antiquity. He further specifies: 
if among them someone is saved who has knowledge of it, to make a reputation 
and a name for himself he conceals it and perverts it in his mode so that what he 
has wished to write alone, and nothing else, remains for his successors. That these 
inundations, plagues, and famines come about I do not believe is to be doubted, 
because all the histories are full of them. (2.5.2) 
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For anyone in the Judea-Christian tradition, the most well-known history about a 
universal flood is of course the biblical one. If we assume, as it seems we must, that the 
"someone" saved from the flood and possessing knowledge of antiquity includes an 
allusion to Noah, then the unstated conclusion of his argument is that Noah invented the 
story of the creation, the fall of man and his distinguished genealogy in order to make a 
name for himself Strauss thus suggests: "Any tradition transmitted through Noah would 
then be no better than fraud."345 To put it more charitably, we could say it was a case of 
"religfon well used" (D 1.15). Machiavelli's skepticism about the truth of any antediluvian 
history further explains why he says religion comes from men and why he is willing to 
question the Biblical account of creation. It is true that he begins his poem "On 
Ambition" (1509) with the story of God's creation, Adam and Eve, and Cain and Abel; 
however, the latter story there serves the purpose of showing the origin of ambition and 
avarice, and his poetic license is apparent later in the poem when he mentions, not God, 
but the gods ("gli Dei'').346 In the Discourses, a work which he says contains "as much as 
I know," he classifies religions as human creations, shows that a lack of history cannot be 
an argument against the world's eternalness and suggests that any antediluvian history is 
fictional. 347 Nonetheless, from a willingness to use reason to question dogmas, it is still a 
long way to atheism and a denial of the supernatural. 
345 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 146. For Strauss' discussion of this chapter see Thoughts 
on Machiavelli, pp. 142-43, 146, 202-203. 
346 See "On Ambition" lines 16-60 and line 140. 
347 Quotation from the Discourses' dedicatory letter. 
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That Machiavelli did believe in supernatural signs is evident from Discourses 
1.56. To provide more context for his discussion of them, it is worth considering 
Guicciardini's reflection on a similar topic: 
I think I can affirm the existence of spirits-I mean those things we call spirits, 
those airy ones who converse familiarly with people. I have had the sort of 
experience with them that makes me think I can be quite sure. But I believe that 
their nature, what they are, is just as obscure to those who profess to know as to 
those who never give it a thought. This knowledge of spirits and the prediction of 
the future, which we sometimes see people making either through their art or in a 
frenzy, are occult potencies of nature--or rather, of that higher agent who sets 
everything in motion. They are known to him, secret to us; the minds of men 
cannot reach them. 348 
Turning to Discourses 1.56, Machiavelli writes that the truth of signs is not to be doubted 
since they have been observed before all grave events in both ancient and modem times. 
He gives four modem examples. Savonarola foretold the invasion of King Charles.349 The 
invasion was also forecast by the sound of fighting in the air above Arezzo. Lightning that 
hit the highest part of the cathedral presaged the death of Lorenzo de' Medici the Elder. 350 
The Palazzo was hit by lightening as a sign of Piero Soderini' s imminent ruin. Lest we 
are tempted to think Machiavelli is dissembling, he himself, after the last sign, had a 
348 Maxims and Reflections, series C, maxim 211. 
349 Although here in 1.56.1, he appears to flatly accept "how much had been foretold by 
Friar Girolamo Savonarola," in 1.11.5, he says he will not "judge whether it is true or not" 
that Savonarola spoke with God. About twenty years before finishing the Discourses, 
Machiavelli wrote to a friend describing two sermons by Savonarola which he himself 
attended on March 2 and 3, 1498. At the end of his letter, Machiavelli notes that once 
Savonarola no longer feared his Florentine adversaries, he turned from his claim that God . 
had told him someone in Florence was seeking to make himself tyrant to vilifying the 
pope, adding: "Thus, in my judgment, he acts in accordance with the times and colors his 
lies accordingly" (Letter of March 9, 1498, Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 10). 
350 Machiavelli also takes this event as a sign in FH 8.36. 
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testament drawn up on November 22, 1511.351 Machiavelli's final example is an ancient 
one from Livy: a plebeian heard a greater than human voice warning, in Machiavelli's 
words, "that the French were coming to Rome." While Machiavelli argues that signs 
occur, he grants that their cause should be "discoursed of and interpreted by a man who 
has knowledg~ of things natural and supernatural, which we do not have." Like 
Guicciardini, he accepts that the human mind cannot reach to God. 352 For Machiavelli, 
even one who has knowledge of the natural and supernatural is still reduced to 
interpretation. In that regard, he tentatively puts forward the view of "some philosopher" 
that signs may be warnings from "intelligences" in the air. 
Although Machiavelli shows himself to be rather indifferent to metaphysics, the 
question remains of what he regards as "natural" and what he regards as "supernatural." 
The risk of imposing modem views on these terms may be limited by trying to draw an 
understanding of them from what Machiavelli himself says about the natural and 
supernatural elsewhere in his writings. In Florentine Histories, he gives a longer account 
of the storm mentioned as a sign in Discourses 1.56. While attributing the cause of the 
storm to God, he nonetheless writes: "This whirlwind, driven by superior forces, whether 
they were natural or supernatural, broke on itself and fought within itself' (6.34). He ends 
the description of the storm by saying: 
Without doubt, God wanted to warn rather than punish Tuscany; for, if such a 
storm had entered into a city among many and crowded houses and inhabitants, as 
it did enter among few and scattered oaks and trees and houses, without doubt it 
would have made ruin and torment greater than that which the mind can 
351 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 127; also see Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos, pp. 17-
18. 
352 Also see his statement in Prince 11, quoted above on page 155. 
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conjecture. But God meant for then that this small example should be enough to 
refresh among men the memory of His power. (6.34) 
While clearly assuming God to be the first cause of the storm, Machiavelli again shows 
his uncertainty about whether the forces driving it were natural or supernatural; 
presumably natural forces would be just that, the forces of nature, while supernatural 
forces would involve some type of supernatural intermediaries. As we also saw in· the 
above maxim from Guicciardini, the natural and supernatural are closely connected when 
the latter acts through the former. In another chapter of Florentine Histories, Machiavelli 
attributes the Turkish sack of Otranto in the Kingdom of Naples to God's "particular 
care" for Florence, since, in one stroke, it removed the Italian powers threatening Tuscany 
from its vicinity (8.19-20 ). In this second example, God intervenes through a worldly 
cause: the Turkish sack ofOtranto (a claim which would seem to imply that even God 
sometimes has to chose the lesser evil). 
In the Art of War, Machiavelli sets forth a natural interpretation oflightning, 
eclipses and earthquakes by stating they all have "a natural cause" ( 6.207-8). He also says 
in Discourses 1.12 that what are said to be miracles actually have natural causes. 
"Natural," then, means the cause and effect of the natural elements. Yet, it seems that in 
his view both natural phenomena and worldly things may sometimes have a supernatural 
cause. While Machiavelli acknowledges the existence of signs, his little inquiry into their 
cause only further shows that his true concern is the room left in sublunar affairs to 
h d d . ' 353 uman pru ence an vzrtu. 
353 For this reason, Hornqvist terms Machiavelli's style "sublunar writing" (see in 
particular, Machiavelli and Empire, pp. 232-33). 
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Machiavelli sometimes speaks of fortuna as a power with a will of its own; other 
times, it is left ambiguous whether he is referring to a supernatural power or simply to 
chance. One of the strongest examples of fortuna as a willing being occurs in Discourses 
2.29, "Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its 
Plans." He begins the chapter by saying: "If how human affairs proceed is considered 
well, it will be seen that often things arise and accidents come about that the heavens [i 
cieli] have not altogether wished to be provided against." Following Livy's history, he 
describes the numerous errors made by the Romans that allowed the Gauls to take all of 
Rome, except the Capitol. Machiavelli then quotes Livy: "So much .does Fortune 
[fortuna] blind spirits where it does not wish its gathering strength checked." He adds that 
Livy's "conclusion" is "true," and as we can now see the chapter's title is based on this 
quotation. Livy's ''fortuna" finds her way directly into Machiavelli's text and thought. 
Although Machiavelli's heading indicates the discourse will be about "La Fortuna," the 
first sentences proceed to mention "the heavens" and "the power of heaven," showing that 
he equates fortuna and the heavens (and does not distinguish between "the heavens" and 
"heaven"). Further just as he incorporates the pagan fortuna into his thought, he 
transposes "the heavens" into Livy's history: "Because this place [Rome] is very notable 
for demonstrating the power of heaven over human affairs, Titus Livy demonstrates it 
extensively and in very efficacious words, saying that since heaven for some end wished 
the Romans to know its power, it first made the Fabii err." However, in Livy 5.36 where 
he mentions the error of the Fabii, what Livy writes is: "There the envoys took up arms, 
contrary to the law of nations, and the fates [fatis] began to bring down ruin on the city of 
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Rome. "354 What Livy attributes to the fates, Machiavelli interprets as the heavens. 
Machiavelli also expands on Livy's interpretation, concluding that "to make Rome 
greater and lead it to that greatness it came to, fortune [la fortuna] judged it was 
necessary to beat it [ necessario batter la] ... but still did not wish to ruin it altogether" 
(2.29.2). It is notable how closely this follows the wording of Prince 25 where 
Machiavelli notoriously writes ofjortuna, "it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, 
to beat her and strike her" (e necessario, volendola tenere sotto, batter/a e urtarla). In 
Discourses 2.29 the roles are reversed: fortune judges it "necessary to beat" Rome for the 
sake of the city's future greatness. 
While Machiavelli's understanding ofjortuna cannot be reduced to a purely 
figurative personification of chance, it is another metaphysical matter he is content to 
leave obscure-or rather that he believes is obscure to human reason; fortune, as he says, 
"proceeds by oblique and unknown ways" (D 2.29.3). He speaks of fortune as he speaks 
of God and the heavens: as powers that intervene in human affairs, but can only be 
interpreted through their effects, and even then often remain enigmatic. Further, he seems 
to use the three almost interchangeably depending on the context and rhetorical point. To 
reduce them to metaphors for chance is to read Machiavelli's oeuvre against itself and 
against the worldview of his time, with its mingling of Christian and pagan concepts. 
While his texts indicate that he believed in a supernatural power that intervenes in human 
affairs, he was evidently unconcerned with clear metaphysical distinctions. As a true 
354 The Rise of Rome, p. 320. 
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humanist, his concern is human things; the only metaphysical point he insists on rejecting 
is fatalism, that is, that fortuna, the heavens or God leave no room for free will. 
Machiavelli and the Republic of Wooden Clogs 
The letters exchanged between Machiavelli and Guicciardini in May of 1521 shed 
some interesting light on the question of Machiavelli's private beliefs. The Florentine 
government gave Machiavelli, age fifty-two, a commission to a meeting of Franciscan 
friars in Carpi (which Machiavelli and Guicciardini derisively refer to as the Republic of 
Wooden Clogs). The Wool Guild took advantage of Machiavelli's commission by asking 
him to obtain the assent of a certain friar to preach in the Duomo for Lent. 355 Since their 
exchange of letters shows so much familiarity, it is believed that Machiavelli visited 
Guicciardini in Modena on his way to Carpi. 356 
Guicciardini' s letter of May 17 initiates the exchange, Guicciardini pointing to the 
irony of the Wool Guild entrusting Machiavelli with the task of finding a preacher: 
It was certainly good judgment on the part of our reverend consuls of the Wool 
Guild to have entrusted you with the duty of selecting a preacher, not otherwise 
than if the task had been given to Pachierrotto, while he was alive, or to San Sano 
to find a beautiful wife for a friend. I believe you will serve them according to the 
expectations they have of you and is required by your honour, which would be 
stained if at this age you started to think about your soul, because, since you have 
always lived in a contrary belief, it would be attributed rather to senility than to 
goodness. 357 
355 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, pp. 186, 189; Najemy, "Introduction," p. 1. 
· 
356 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 189; Najemy, "Introduction," pp. 1-2. 
357 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 335. 
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As Pachierotto and San Sano were two w~ll-known Florentine pederasts, Guicciardini 
jokes that asking him to find one a preacher is like asking a pederast to find one a wife.358 
Guicciardini's jocose comments reveal the popular perception of Machiavelli: he was 
known as one who did not worry about his soul. As will be shown below, Machiavelli's 
corpus justifies this perception. 
· Machiavelli responded to Guicciardini the same day and in the same vein, picking 
up where Guicciardini's jokes left off. He begins by informing him that he "was sitting on 
the toilet" thinking about the type of preacher he would like to find for Florence when his 
letter arrived. He goes on to explain: "They would like a preacher who would show them 
the way to paradise, and I should like to find one who would teach them the way to go to 
the Devil .... For I believe that the following would be the true way to go to Paradise: 
learn the way to Hell in order to steer clear of it. "359 Machiavelli's comments playfully 
tum the Florentines' concern about the afterlife into an allegory about the art of state. As 
in many of his works, knowing the way to hell, or in other words, knowing how to 
commit the actions that lead to hell, is, for Machiavelli, a necessary quality for a ruler. 
His desire for a preacher who would teach the way to hell fits quite well with the teaching 
of The Prince: that governance sometimes requires acting against religion in order to 
maintain the state. In an epigram about Soderini, he asserts that only manly men are 
permitted into Hell: 
La notte che mori Pier Soderini, 
L' anima ando de l' inferno a la bocca; 
Grido Pluton: "Ch' inferno? anima sciocca, 
358
.Ibid., p. 536 n. 1. 
359 Ibid., p. 336. 
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Va su nel limbo fra gli altri bambini" 
The night that Piero Soderini died, 
His soul went to the mouth of hell. 
Pluto roared: "Why hell? Silly soul, 
Go up into limbo with the other boys!"360 
Machiavelli likely wrote this humorously rhyming epigram after Soderini was forced 
from office and the Medici returned to power. From the point of view presented in his 
letter to Guicciardini, we could say that Soderini failed to maintain the state because, in 
his childlike innocence, he did not know "the way to Hell" and thus did not deserve a 
place there. Further, since the ruin of the republic brought about a sort of personal hell for 
Machiavelli, including imprisonment and torture, it is not hard to see why he would 
emphasize knowing the way to hell in order to avoid it. Playful comments about hell also 
occur in his comedy Mandragola and his novella Belfagor. In Mandragola, Callimaco 
fortifies his determination to commit adultery by telling himself, "the worst that can 
happen to you is to die and go off to Hell. How many others have died! And how many 
excellent men have gone to Hell! Why should you be ashamed to go there, too."361 In 
Belfagor, life in the underworld is found to be preferable to marriage on earth. However, 
that Machiavelli's writings undermine fear for one's soul is not necessarily indicative of 
atheism; rather, as we see in Prince 8 and the Exhortation to Penitence, he assumes th~t 
God has a charitable understanding of human affairs and political necessities. 
360 Tutte le opere, p. 872; Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 1463 (translation modified). In 
"Machiavelli's City of God," Wright connects this letter and epigram, arguing that for 
Machiavelli rulers must be willing "to risk Hell for Heaven on Earth" (p. 305). 
361 The Mandrake 4.1, in The Comedies of Machiavelli. 
179 
! ' 
In the same letter, Machiavelli also responds to Guicciardini' s concern that "the 
air of Carpi might make you become a liar, because that has been its influence not only in 
the present age but also for centuries gone by." In response, Machiavelli writes: "for 
some time now I have never said what I believe or never believed what I said; and if 
indeed I do sometimes tell the truth, I hide it behind so many lies that it is hard to find."362 
We should be wary of taking this playful response to Guicciardini' s warning about the 
infamous air of Carpi out of context and turning it into some sort of general interpretive 
heuristic.363 At the same time, Guicciardini's comment clearly resonated with 
Machiavelli, spurring him to claim a greater proficiency in lying than the citizens of 
Carpi. Since he emphasizes that "it has been a while since I have become a doctor of this 
art," his comment could refer to his practice, evident in both The Prince and the 
Discourses, of stating an orthodox religious position just before leading the reader into an 
unorthodox one. It could also hint at his solution to the problem of his previous support of 
the republican government once he desired to stay involved in affairs of state under the 
Medici; in that regard, when considering what "truth" he needed to hide and what "lies" 
he used to hide it, one could think of his high praise of the Medici in The Prince as well 
as the Florentine Histories, a text he was working on at the time. 
Machiavelli's Exhortation to Penitence 
362 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 337. 
363 In 1891, Burd wrote that this sentence has been "strangely misinterpreted" as support 
for the idea that The Prince has a hidden meaning (JI principe, p. 39 n. 1). 
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In Florence it was customary for citizens of various social classes to join together 
in a lay confraternity and for members or guests to recite sermons. Since Machiavelli was 
known not to trouble about his soul, it may seem a little surprising that we have one such 
sermon written in his hand. However, according to his grandson Giuliano de' Ricci, 
Machiavelli belonged to a number of religious lay confraternities and was requested to 
write an exhortation to penitence. 364 While penance was a customary theme for Good 
Friday, it seems to me unlikely that Machiavelli wrote it for Holy Week since he omits 
altogether any mention of the Passion or crucifixion. 365 The handwriting indicates a late 
date, perhaps some time in the last two years of his life, that is, between 1525 and 
1527.366 Opinion on the sermon's intent has varied. Villari sees "a certain veiled irony" 
and Malagoli "feigned religious zeal. "367 Croce calls it "a frivolous joke. "368 Ridolfi, on 
the other hand, sees it as "the climax of the author's Christian thought. "369 
Writing a sermon would offer Machiavelli the opportunity to interpret religion 
according to virtue, and, in my view, the theology of his Exhortation is profound, and 
364 Capponi, An Unlikely Prince, p. 285; Viroli cites the letter but.questions its 
truthfulness; in his view the sermon is simply "a commissioned text" (Niccolo's Smile, p. 
258). Sumberg writes that Machiavelli "was no doubt a member" of a confraternity 
("Machiavelli's Sermon on Penance," p. 171), yet according to Ciliotta-Rubery, "he was 
not likely a member" ("A Question of Piety," p. 20); Najemy writes, "we know nothing" 
about the sermon's "context and purpose" ("Papirius and the Chickens," p. 663). Also see 
de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 59. 
365 In an essay on humanist lay preaching in Florence, Weissman discusses the various 
themes appropriate to each holy day ("Sacred Eloquence," pp. 256-57). Capponi suggests 
it was written during the Advent of 1526 (An Unlikely Prince, p. 285). 
366 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 328 n. 2; Germino, "Blasphemy and Leo Strauss 's 
Machiavelli," p. 149. 
367 Villari quoted in Germino, "Second Thoughts," p. 799 n. 1 O; Malagoli quoted in 
Whitfield, Discourses, p. 10. 
368 Quoted in Germino, "Second Thoughts," p. 799 n. 10. 
369 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 253 
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even majestic, precisely because it strips religion to its universal elements and accepts the 
human condition as it is. Machiavelli places the emphasis more on the relation between 
God and human beings and between human beings than on the institution and doctrine of 
the Roman church. The principal messages of his sermon are that one should have 
gratitude to God and charity for one's neighbours and that God is merciful so long as one 
repents of one's sins and does _not persist in evil. 
He begins by describing the origin and role of penitence: 
[God] could not with a more merciful remedy provide against human frailty than 
by admonishing the human race that not sin but persistence in sin could make him 
unforgiving; and therefore he opened to men the way of penitence so that, having 
lost the other way, they could by it rise to heaven.370 · 
Although humans have lost the way of living free from sin, sin need not bar one's way to 
heaven. Machiavelli emphasizes that God knows "how easy it was for man to rush into 
sin," but that he is "all merciful." Thus in Machiavelli's view what is unforgivable to God 
is "not sin but persistence in sin." This two-sided argument-that human life occasions 
sin but that only persistence in sin is unforgivable-recurs in many of his writings.371 
Sins, Machiavelli writes in the Exhortation, "can be divided into two groups: one 
is to be ungrateful to God, the second is to be unfriendly to one's neighbour."372 As his 
audience would have recognized, Machiavelli takes as his model Jesus' first and second 
commandments: "love the Lord your 9-od with all your heart" and "love your neighbor as 
37° Chief Works, vol. 1, p. 171. 
371 For a collation seep. 69 above. 
372 Chief Works, vol. 1, pp. 171-72. 
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yourself' (Matt. 22.3r39).373 These two commandments define the orthodox definition of 
Christian caritas. However, since Machiavelli is here outlining the two types of sins, he 
expresses them negatively, classifying them as being "ungrateful to God" ("ingrate a 
Dio") and being "unfriendly to one's neighbour" ("inimico al prossimo").374 To show all 
we have to be grateful for, Machiavelli lists the gifts God has given to human beings. His 
list is rather pagan as it is made up exclusively of natural things that human beings share 
in common: the earth, dry land, oceans, animals, plants, fish, the sky, the sun, speech, 
sight, hands and reason. By saying that God gave us hands in order to "build temples 
[and] offer sacrifices in His honor," Machiavelli expresses those two ideas in a way that 
embraces religious practice in general. He also writes that the "marvelous workmanship" 
of the heavens brings upon us "a thirst and a longing to possess those other things that are 
hidden from us." Machiavelli evidently desires to convey piety in a universal manner, 
emphasizing the things of nature, marvel at the heavens, temples and sacrifices. His focus 
on the common element in religious experience may explain his silence on two central 
tenets of Christianity-the passion and resurrection. The omission of the first is 
particularly striking since Christ's passion is a central feature in the exhortations written 
by other Florentine humanists. 375 In this sermon we see Machiavelli interpreting religion 
according to what he believes is most essential to it. 
373 Also in Luke 10.27, Mark 12.30-31. The first commandment comes from Deuteronomy 
6.5. 
374 Tutte le opere, p. 778. This point is made by Norton, "Machiavelli's Road to 
Paradise," pp. 36-37, and Ciliotta-Rubery, "A Question of Piety," pp. 22-26. 
375 See Ciliotta-Rubery, "A Question of Piety," pp. 34-35, and her source Weissman, 
"Sacred Eloquence," p. 257. 
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After pointing out all we have to be grateful for, Machiavelli then points out all 
the ways we show ingratitude to God by perverting his gifts to evil ends. According to 
Machiavelli, ingratitude to God is also the cause of unfriendliness towards neighbours. 
Here Machiavelli teaches the traditional Christian virtue of "carita" (caritas in Latin), 
and, although he omits the passion in his sermon, he does mention Jesus, writing that 
carita "is that heavenly garment in which we must be clad if we are to be admitted to the 
celestial marriage feast of our Emperor Jesus Christ [imperadore nostro Cristo Jesu] in 
the heavenly kingdom." This is a clear allusion to Jesus' parable of the marriage feast in 
· Matthew 22. Machiavelli also conflates Jesus and God when he writes that "God" (lddio) 
forgave "Saint Peter for the offense of having denied him not once but three times." 
When Machiavelli describes the carita that allows one into the celestial marriage 
feast he closely follows Paul's famous description of caritas in I Corinthians 13.4-7. 
Machiavelli then describes what carita means for this life; one who has Christian love 
aids one's neighbour, endures his faults, consoles him in tribulation, teaches the ignorant, 
advises those who err, helps the good and punishes the evil. For Machiavelli, caritas is 
then not only a "divine virtue" but also a civic virtue. In his account, caritas meets the 
needs of this world and the next. 
Some scholars have been pointed out that Machiavelli's description of penance 
departs from the ecclesiastical practice of his time in that he fails to mention the role of 
priests in hearing confession, offering absolution and prescribing satisfaction. 376 His 
audience, however, could expect this since an anti-ecclesiastical bias had been common in 
376 See in particular Sumberg, "Machiavelli's Sermon on Penance," p. 172, and Ciliotta-
Rubery, "A Question of Piety," p. 32. 
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lay confraternities since the quattrocento.377-Lay confraternities instead emphasized 
public confession to the confraternity as well as the practice of self-flagellation. The 
remedy Machiavelli recommends is to "sincerely resort to penitence"; self-flagellation he 
interprets symbolically: to give alms and to honour and do good to one's neighbour. 
Machiavelli points out that there can be no greater transgression than the "adultery 
and murder" committed by King David, and yet, due to David's great penance, he was 
forgiven by God. Thus, although Machiavelli's sermon mentions "the everlasting fire" 
and "the Devil," he assures the audience that God's mercy will embrace anyone who 
repents and practices caritas. This point resonates with what I earlier called Machiavelli's 
economy of moral transgression: his insistence that due to human frailty it is not sin that 
is unforgivable to God but persistence in sin. 
Machiavelli's Soul 
In the last year of his life Machiavelli wrote to Vettori, "I love my native city 
fpatria] more than my own soul." According to Strauss this statement "presupposes a 
comprehensive reflection regarding the status of the fatherland on the one hand and of the 
soul on the other."378 Regarding Machiavelli's reflection on his patria, Strauss does not 
question his patriotism but argues that he strategically uses it as a cover for teaching 
evil.379 Regarding Machiavelli's reflection on the soul, Strauss argues he was an atheist, 
writing, for example, that Machiavelli sees religion as "untrue," that he "blasphemies" 
377 Weissman, "Sacred Eloquence," pp. 265-66. 
378 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 10. 
379 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 285. 
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and that he replaces God by Fortuna.380 Restoring Machiavelli's comment about his 
fatherland and his soul to its context provides an example of the distortion that can arise 
by treating Machiavelli as a thinker engaged with "all thinking men regardless of time 
and place," rather than as a thinker embedded in a certain historical discourse (though this 
is surely not to deny that Machiavelli also wrote for posterity, nor that he often addressed 
universal human concems).381 
We should first note that the words "my own soul" is a textual emendation; the 
extant version, copied by Machiavelli's grandson Giuliano Ricci, reads: "I love my patria 
more than"-and the rest of the sentence is blotted out. Since the saying "amare la.patria 
piu dell 'anima" was common in Florence, editors have taken for granted the conjecture of 
"my soul." However, in 1989, Giorgio Inglese observed that the letters "st" appear to be 
faintly visible beneath the blotted out words, leading him to speculate that Machiavelli's 
sentence may have ended with "Cristo. "382 If Machiavelli had added emphasis to the 
common saying by writing "Christ" instead of "soul," it would further explain why Ricci 
felt it necessary to censor his grandfather's letter. 
The original letter was written by Machiavelli to Vettori on April 16, 1527. 
Without the emendation, the whole passage reads: 
I love Messer Francesco Guicciardini, I love my native city more than ... ; and I 
tell you as a result of the experience I have had over sixty years that I do not 
believe there were ever more difficult problems than these, where peace is 
necessary and war cannot be renounced. 383 
380 Ibid., pp. 226, 51, 209; also seep. 12. 
381 Ibid., p. 11. 
382 Viroli, Machiavelli's God, pp. 35-36; Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 562 n. 5; 
Capponi, An Unlikely Prince, p. 290. 
383 Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 416. 
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The context is Guicciardini's decision to send the papal and French forces under his 
command to defend Florence in case the large imperial army allied with emperor Charles 
V attacks Tuscany as it descends south. 384 Thus Machiavelli's comment was inspired by a 
burst of patriotism, gratitude and relief. Whether he wrote "soul" or "Christ," how far can 
we go in taking this outburst to indicate an atheistic indifference to the soul? Looking at 
the statement in its context, there is much to militate against such an interpretation: it was 
written to a friend at a time when the safety of Tuscany (including Machiavelli's own 
family) was at risk; it was a common saying in Florence and it was understood in 
Florentine civic Christianity as the proper Christian attitude. The expression itself goes 
back at least as far as Gino Capponi's Ricordi of 1420.385 Therein, this respected 
Florentine soldier and statesman writes: "Appoint as the Ten of Balia men of wisdom and. 
temper, more interested in the welfare of the Commune than in their own good or in their 
soul. "386 The latter seems to be merely a poetic way of pointing out that politics should be 
separated from religion, for he then shows on the very same page his concern for the soul: 
"A divided and disunited Church is good for our city and for our freedom but contrary to 
the good of the soul." On the other hand, he also argues that religion should be separated 
from politics: "If possible, see that the Church is interested only in spiritual matters." In 
Guicciardini' s Dialogue on the Government of Florence, one of the interlocutors brings 
up Capponi's Ricardi: "your great-uncle Gino wrote in those last memoirs of his, that it 
384 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. 241; Machiavelli and His Friends, pp. 411-12. 
385 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 289 n. 19. 
386 Quoted in Sereno, "The Ricardi of Gino Di Neri Capponi," p. 1121. Sereno includes 
the two page Ricordi as an appendix to his essay. 
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was necessary to appoint as members of the Ten of War people who loved their country 
more than their soul. "387 For Guicciardini, the saying points out the contradiction between 
"the precepts of Christian law" and "the reason and practice of states" (la ragione e l 'uso 
degli stati).388 Of the same spirit is Cosimo de' Medici's saying that "states were not held 
with paternosters in hand" (FH 7 .6). And Machiavelli, after describing how a new prince 
must make everything new in a city or province taken by him, makes a similar confession 
in the Discourses: "These modes are very cruel, and enemies to every way of life, not 
only Christian but human" (1.26.1). While the latter is an important acknowledgement that 
political necessity often conflicts with not only Christian values but also with human 
values, Machiavelli's general tendency is to interpret religion in light of the needs of the 
fatherland. For example, when he uses Capponi' s expression in Florentine Histories he 
shows that it does not conflict with religion. Discussing Florence's war with Pope 
Gregory, which lasted from 1375 to 1378, Machiavelli writes that the eight citizens who 
were appointed to conduct the war "were called Saints even though they had little regard 
for censures, had despoiled the churches of their goods, and compelled the clergy to 
celebrate the offices-so much more did those citizens then esteem their fatherland than 
their souls [tanto quelli cittadini stimavano allora piu la patria che l'anima]."389 Despite 
going to war against the Church for the good of their fatherland, the Eight were, as 
Machiavelli points out, called "Saints." Further, with the qualifier "then," Machiavelli 
387 Bk. 2, p. 158. 
388 Ibid., p. 158-59. According to Viroli, this was the first use of the expression reason of 
state (Machiavelli, p. 50). 
389 FH 3.7. For a history of what Machiavelli so briefly summarizes, see Peterson, "The 
War of the Eight Saints," especially pp. 178, 200-201. 
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makes a disparaging contrast with his own times, suggesting that citizens now worry 
more about their own good than the good of their fatherland. When Poggio Bracciolini 
(1380-1459) speaks about the War of the Eight Saints in his Historia Florentina, he 
writes: "the fear of religion is to be set aside when liberty is at stake, and that the censures 
of unfaithful men are not to be feared."390 When his son Iacopo Bracciolini (1442-1478) 
translated his father's history into Italian, he explained that the Florentines put "the 
charity of the fatherland" above "the fear ofreligion," which "was right to do inasmuch as 
they were good citizens and good Christians."391 While an interpretation of Christianity 
that is faithful to the letter of the New Testament may dictate that one choose between 
one's soul and one's patria, many Florentines did not see a contradiction between being a 
good Christian and pursuing the good of their fatherland. While Capponi' s saying points 
to the need to separate religion and politics, doing so for the sake of the fatherland was 
also interpreted as a properly Christian attitude. In the latter case, the saying seems to 
simply emphasize with rhetorical exaggeration that one should put the common good 
above one's own good and that in political life it is an admirable and necessary thing to 
do even when it means engendering some risk to one's soul, whether this is taken in a 
worldy sense as risking a stain on one's honour or in the sense of needing to overcome 
the fear ofreligion. In the expression's affirmation of the patria, there is, however, no 
sense of agonizing over the literal perdition of one's eternal soul. 
390 Quoted in Peterson, "The War of the Eight Saints," p. 195. 




Coming to the fate of Machiavelli's soul, the authenticity of the two stories about 
his death has been questioned; despite this uncertainty, together they make a fitting 
capstone for his approach to religion. 392 On the one J;iand, it is said that in his last words to · 
his friends he joked about having a vision of the afterlife in a dream, saying he would 
prefer to go to hell to discuss affairs of state with noble ancient writers than to keep 
company with the few blessed poor in the kingdom of heaven. On the other hand, a letter 
allegedly written by his thirteen-year-old son, Piero, records that after his friends said 
their final farewell, Machiavelli confessed his sins to a friar. 393 
Machiavelli's Civic Religion 
As we have seen, Machiavelli questions several Christian dogmas and interprets 
Christianity in accord with worldly virtue. Nonetheless, it seems (unless we read iroriy 
into almost everything he says about religion) that he does believe in God. If that is the 
case, then Machiavelli shares in the fundamental theistic assumption of his age: belief in a 
God that cares about human things. Similarly, the weight of evidence suggests that he 
392 Capponi, who gives credence to both stories, makes the same point (An Unlikely 
Prince, p. 296). 
393 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, pp. 249-50. The first extant account of the story occurs in 
Binet's On the· Health of Origen (1629) (the relevant passage can be found in Connell, 
ed., The Prince, p. 164). Ridolfi argues that since two of Machiavelli's contemporaries-
Paolo Giovio and Giovan Busini-refer to the story of the dream there is no reason to 
doubt its authenticity (p. 330 n. 24). He also argues that the letter is authentic (p. 330 n. 
25) but in a later essay comes to argue that it is an eighteenth century forgery (Geerken, 
"Machiavelli Studies since 1969," p. 355). Viroli, on the other hand, goes so far as to 
identify the friar that Machiavelli allegedly confessed to as Andrea Alamanni 
(Machiavelli's God, p. 41 ). Regarding the story of the dream, Viroli aptly points out that 
it "fits him perfectly well" (Machiavelli, p. 27), and Connell makes the same point 
(Connell, ed., The Prince, p. 163). 
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takes for granted the existence of the supernatural, though--depending on the context, 
rhetorical need or whim-he attributes this greater-than-human causation to fortuna, the 
heavens or God. The question of his relation to Christianity seems more ambiguous. In 
his preface to the Discourses, he points out that "heaven, sun, elements, men" do not 
change, and in his Exhortation to Penitence he emphasizes what is common to religion: 
gratitude for God's gifts to humankind, marvel at the heavens, the building of temples, 
the offering of sacrifices. Thus in his view the relation between humans and the 
supernatural does not change. On the other hand, he points out that the interpretation of 
that relation does change. Religions, as he puts it, "come from men" (D 2.5.1). When he 
states that sects are replaced every 1666 to 3000 years, he shows no concern that this will 
also mean the elimination of "the Christian sect" (D 2.5.1). His statement that religions 
come from men need not be a denial of the existence of God, though it does seem to be a 
denial of revelation. Such a denial is also implicit in his argument that religions are 
founded by "wise men" who "have recourse to God" (D 1.11.3). Similarly, he argues that 
apparent miracles are in fact based on natural phenomena (D 1.12.1). A religion, in his 
view, is simply a set of extraordinary laws and certain foundational practices. In that 
sense, he clearly accepts that the religious order of his time is Christianity; it is, as he 
acknowledges, "the truth and the true way" (D 2.2.2). But he is a Christian who interprets 
religion in such a way as to close the gap between the city of God and the earthly city. As 
he tells Pope Leo X in his Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence: "I 
believe the greatest good to be done and the most pleasing to God is that which one does 
191 
I, 
to one's native city. "394 Although the human mind cannot reach to God (P 11 ), 
Machiavelli takes it for granted that religion should be interpreted in accord with what is 
taught by nature and necessity; in other words, religion should be interpreted "according 
to virtue" and supporting "the exaltation and defense of the fatherland" (D 2.2.2 ). 
By considering the civic-minded interpretations of Christianity in Renaissance 
Italy and in Florence in particular, it becomes apparentthat the interpretation of 
Christianity need not be confined to the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. Some 
orthodox Christians did, however, fight against this civic interpretation; for example, the 
Paduan Sperone Speroni (1500-88) argues that the "civil religion" of the men who live in 
republics is contrary to the true Christian religion. 395 Thus we see that Christianity in this 
period stretched between two poles: a Christianity of humility and resignation that is 
often in conflict with the needs of this world and a civic Christianity that is better adapted 
to affairs of state. Since Machiavelli interprets religion according to his understanding.of 
political necessity, he provides one of the most radical expressions of civic Christianity. 
In particular, his interpretation of Christianity does away with the principal problem 
presented by orthodox Christianity: God, in Machiavelli's view, forgives evil done for the 
good of the state so long as it is not persisted in (P 8, Exhortation to Penitence). It seems 
Machiavelli could not believe that God's will conflicts with the requirements of political 
life, as if the human condition were a divine comedy where God metes out punishment 
for actions that serve the good of one's fatherland. He takes humanist studies to its logical 
end: human things and the teaching of virtue are his greatest concerns .. When the religious 
394 Chief Works, vol. 1, pp. 113-14. 
395 Quoted in Viroli, Machiavelli's God, p. 232. 
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education of a period conflicts with political life, then religion has become idle and 




Machiavelli and the Ancients 
In Prince 15, Machiavelli proclaims that an idealistic approach to affairs of state is 
ruinous, arguing that rulers must act according to "what is done" rather than "how one 
should live." In the vivid words of Meinecke this argument was "a sword plunged into the 
flank of the body politic of Western humanity, causing it to shriek and rear up."396 While 
Machiavelli himself recognizes the novelty of his teaching, he also claims it is an 
exposition of what the ancients taught esoterically: 
it is necessary for a prince to know well how to use the beast and the man. This 
role was taught covertly to princes by ancient writers, who wrote that Achilles, 
and many other ancient princes, were given to Chiron the centaur to be raised, so 
that he would look after them with his discipline. To have as teacher a half-beast, 
half-man means nothing other than that a prince needs to know how to use both 
natures; and the one without the other is not lasting. (P 18) 
Machiavelli's argument that a prince must know how to act in the manner of a beast 
presents a rupture with both orthodox Christian thought and Christian humanist thought, 
but it also reveals his awareness that even ancient writers did not openly divulge this 
teaching. 
This chapter argues that Isaiah Berlin' essay The Originality of Machiavelli 
simplifies both pagan morality and Machiavelli's morality on a point of fundamental 
importance, namely, his argument that they derive their concept of the virtues solely from 
political ends. I make this case through a critique of Berlin's essay and brief analyses of 
Thucydides, Cicero, Sallust and Livy. The penultimate section of the chapter examines 
396 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p. 49. 
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the classical argument that the practice of the virtues first requires security; this, I claim, 
is the pagan precedent on which Machiavelli bases his argument that a ruler may act 
against moral virtue in order to avoid ruin. The final section situates Machiavelli in the 
context of Italian humanism, showing that he was a humanist who argued for pushing the 
imitation of antiquity into the inhumane aspects of ancient politics-the knowledge 
symbolized by Chiron. 
Berlin's essay The Originality of Machiavelli (1972) offers a challenge to Croce's 
influential interpretation. According to Berlin, Croce's argument that Machiavelli 
divorced morality and politics disregards the fact that "there is an equally time-honoured 
ethics, that of the Greek polis, of which Aristotle provided the clearest exposition."397 
The heart of this alternative ethics is as follows: "Since men are beings made by nature to 
live in communities, their communal purposes are the ultimate values from which the rest 
are derived."398 According to Berlin's explanation of this pagan morality, the virtues of 
the ancient city-states were derived solely from the communal purpose of making their 
city great. He contrasts this type of morality with "non Aristotelian" moralities such as 
Stoicism, Christianity and Kantianism where good and evil are determined by a criterion 
independent of the polis. 399 Aristotle and Machiavelli, on the other hand, are said to share 
an understanding of "good and evil" that is "social through and through.''4oo Mark 
Hulliung summarizes Berlin's view of pagan morality succinctly: "Whatever favors the 
397 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, p. 178. 
398 Ibid., p. 178; also see pp. 179, 189. 
399 Ibid., pp. 177-78. 
400 Ibid., p. 178. 
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interests of the community is good in pagan morality."401 When Aristotle in the Politics 
discusses different opinions regarding the best way of life for a city, he does acknowledge 
the dominance of such a morality among "the many." Speaking of those who hold such a 
view, he writes: "among themselves they seek just rule, but they care nothing about 
justice towards others. "402 However, in Aristotle's own view practice and reason show 
that "the best way of life both separately for each individual and in common for cities is 
that accompanied by virtue."403 The particular virtues he mentions in Politics 7.1 are 
courage, moderation, justice and prudence. Thus Aristotle determines the virtues based on 
what is best according to experience and reason. Cassirer makes the same point about 
classical rationalism more broadly: 
The ethical systems developed by Greek thinkers, Socrates and Democritus, Plato 
and Aristotle, Stoics and Epicureans, have a common feature. They are all 
expressions of one and the same fundamental intellectualism of Greek thought. It 
is by rational thought that we are to find the standards of moral conduct, and it is 
reason, and reason alone, that can give them their authority.404 
Although Berlin identifies pagan morality with that of the city (in particular Athens, 
Sparta and Rome), even the morality of the ancient polis had to contend with the claims 
of justice and rational morality. Croce's interpretation of Machiavelli acknowledges that 
fact: "debates like those on just and unjust law, on natural and conventional law, on force 
and justice, etc., show how the contrast was sometimes felt and how the correlative 
401 Citizen Machiavelli, p. 250. 
402 Politics 7.2, 1324b35. For a similar point from Aristotle's Rhetoric see the section 
below entitled "Morality and Security." 
403 Politics 7.1, 1323b40. 
404 The Myth of the State, p. 81. 
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problem appeared in outline."405 Machiavelli too, as his statement about Chiron shows, 
was aware of that contrast. Berlin's description of pagan morality, on the other hand, 
makes it sound more like Thrasymachus' view of justice in the Republic. Therein he 
claims that "justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger" (338c). If 
we imagine the community as a tyrant asserting that whatever serves its communal 
interests is just, then we have a pagan morality close to the one Berlin describes. 
However, even if Greek city-states did tend to seek their own advantage as their 
communal purpose, other concepts such as justice and the unwritten laws could come in 
conflict with self-interest. We see this conflict between advantage and justice in 
Thucydides' History when Pericles admits that Athens' empire is "a tyranny" and adds 
"to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go unsafe" (2.63.2). While Pericles argues 
against relinquishing any of their subjects, he acknowledges that it was perhaps wrong to 
subject them. Such a dual position-the assertion of self-interest while tacitly 
acknowledging the injustice of it-is also apparent in the speech of the Athenian 
ambassadors to Melos (as it is presented by Thucydides). Since I will discuss their 
position below, for now it suffices to say that they openly base their claim to rule the 
Melians on their strength, not justice. Yet, in making such a claim, they implicitly admit 
that their act of subjecting the Melians is unjust. 
Based on the various positions sketched above, we can differentiate at lest three . 
views of justice in classical Greek thought. The view that identifies a city's own 
advantage with justice can be equated with the position of Thrasymachus. In that view 
405 Politics and Morals, p. 58. 
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justice is relative since it is identified with whatever one has the strength to impose. 
Nonetheless, even this cynical view appeals to the name of justice. In the second view, 
justice is recognized as an objective good, but it is granted only within the polis, and it is 
extended between poleis only when both are compelled to grant it to the other due to their 
equal power. This is the position of the Athenian ambassadors to Melos as well as the one 
Aristotle identifies with "the many." The third position, as stated by Aristotle himself, 
uses reason and experience to defend the virtues of courage, moderation, justice and 
· prudence as the best mode of conduct for both individuals and cities (Politics 7.1). 
Berlin's characterization of pagan morality is closest to the first position since both 
recognize no objective moral standard external to the polis. 
Turning to Berlin's interpretation of Machiavelli, he argues that the latter's 
writings impress upon the reader the necessity of choosing between two incompatible 
moralities: pagan and Christian. For those who accept the validity of Machiavelli's 
political analysis but also hold an objective morality, Berlin argues that his writings 
induce "acute moral discomfort. ,,4°6 The latter argument is essentially no different from 
Croce's. Where Berlin differs from Croce is in his argument that Machiavelli.himself 
"merely takes for granted the superiority of Roman antiqua virtus. "407 Machiavelli's 
choice, he argues, is not based on "the very nature of things," nor the argument that 
"necessity knows no law," but simply on his valorization of political life.408 According to 
406 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, pp. 196-97. 
407 Ibid., p. 204 
408 Ibid., pp. 189, 191, 204. 
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Berlin, anyone who chooses such a political morality will experience no moral agony in 
political life.409 
The third and final part of Berlin's essay offers a new interpretation of the 
originality of Machiavelli and the reason posterity has found him so shocking. Berlin 
argues that Machiavelli, by confronting the reader with a choice between two 
incompatible moralities, unknowingly undermined a fundamental assumption of Western 
thought: that there exists one ultimately valid solution to the question of how human 
beings ought to live.410 Thus what makes Machiavelli's writings original and shocking is 
that they inadvertently uncovered "the uncomfortable truth" of pluralism. 411 
Berlin's argument that this rupture first comes to the surface in Machiavelli's 
writings rests on his argument that Machiavelli simply took for granted the superiority of 
pagan morality, that it was a simple "choice.''412 On the other hand, if Machiavelli's 
preference for Roman grandeur were based on a reasoned argument, then, rather than 
revealing two incompatible moralities, it would establish one of them as the true way. 
Since Berlin fails to give any philosophical weight to Machiavelli's arguments, 
Machiavelli appears to him to be blind to the conflict between morality and politics. 
However, as I argued in chapter 4, Machiavelli's political judgements are not made in the 
absence of reasoned argumentation but rather based on the ancient and authoritative 
409 Ibid., pp. 180, 184, 190, 192, 196. 
410 Ibid., pp. 196, 203. 
411 Ibid., p. 205. 
412 Ibid., pp. 189, 192, 196, 198, 201, 202, 204. 
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standards of nature and necessity. 413 Further, as I tried to show in chapter 5, Florentines 
who were involved with politics tended to deal with Christianity in one of two ways: 
either to separate politics and religion (symbolized by the saying that one should love 
one's patria more than one's soul) or to reconcile Christianity with the needs of the state. 
Machiavelli in his writings can be seen to use both strategies. Further, he esteems the 
moral virtues but gives priority to necessity when the two come into conflict: a ruler 
should "not depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into evil, when 
forced by necessity" (P 18). Thus in my view Berlin's argument about what constitutes 
Machiavelli's originality is the least interesting part of ~is interpretation. 
Berlin attributes the evident lack of moral agony in Machiavelli's writings to the 
pagan monism that he projects onto him, but that lack is more adequately explained by 
Machiavelli's advocacy of a "manly" acceptance of the necessity of acting against moral 
virtue.414 The simple but profound point that makes his writings disturbing is that he 
highlights the conflicts that occur between moral values and political life and offers a 
morally difficult yet reasoned solution to that problem: moral virtues should be followed 
except when doing so will lead to ruin. For anyone who would like to see morality as the 
best guide to all spheres of human life that is a challenging conclusion, but what makes 
Machiavelli's writings even more shocking is that he also accepts acting against the moral 
virtues for the sake of expansion. 
413 Coby offer~ a similar critique of Berlin's position: "Necessity settles the issue and 
justifies the choice," Machiavelli's Romans, p. 230. 
414 For textual examples seep. 69 above. 
200 
To better compare Machiavelli's writings to ancient thought, the next four 
sections will focus on the relation between politics and morality in the writings of 
Thucydides, Cicero, Sallust and Livy, respectively, and briefly consider Machiavelli in 
relation to each of them. 
Thucydides and the Greek Polis 
The Greek understanding of the conflict between advantage and morality may be 
examined by turning to Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. It is a work 
which Machiavelli himself shows knowledge of in Discourses 2.2, 2.10 and 3.16. The 
speeches that occur throughout Thucydides' history show that justice (dike) is one of the 
principal Greek values. Focusing on a few of its instructive occurrences will outline the 
Greek understanding of justice as it pertains to relations between states. 
Before war broke out between Sparta and Athens, Corinthian ambassadors visited 
Sparta, their ally, to warn against Athenian aggression and to persuade them "to show 
their determination not to submit to injustice [adikeo]" (1.71).415 In response to the 
Corinthians' accusation, the Athenians invoked the treaty between their two leagues, 
telling the Spartans: "we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to 
have our differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement" (1.78). In Sparta's 
private deliberations on the matter, Archidamus, the King of Sparta, argues against war: 
"they are prepared to submit matters to arbitration, for one should not proceed against a 
party who offers arbitration as one would against a wrongdoer" (1.85). The concepts seen 
415 English translations are from The Landmark Thucydides, except where noted. The 
Greek text is from Thucydides, Historiae. 
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in these discussions-"treaty" (sponde), "oaths" (horkos), "arbitration" (dike) and 
"wrongdoer" (adikeo)-all pertain to the concept of justice (dike) and serve to constrain 
naked self-interest. Although Thucydides' History shows that claims of justice and 
accusations of injustice often mask self-interest, it is nonetheless clear that the different 
parties accept justice as the common standard for action, at least in principle. In addition 
to justice, we also see that the unwritten laws and fear of the gods are moral beliefs that 
serve to restrain narrow self-interest. 416 
Before Thucydides lays out the complaints that led to the breaking of the treaty, 
he begins with his own judgement on the cause of the war: "The real cause, however, I 
consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the 
power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable" (1.23). 
As we saw above, the stated causes of the war revolved around claims of justice and 
allegations of injustice, but in Thucydides' estimation the real cause had to do with power 
or, more precisely, fear of the other's power. Sparta was compelled to break the treaty 
because Athens was growing so powerful that the Spartans and their allies feared they 
might soon find their life and liberty in the hands of Athens. Despite being compelled by 
fear, the Spartans still sent to the oracle of Delphi to inquire if they should go to war; they 
received from the god the answer that victory would be theirs (1.118). 
One of the most noted discussions about justice and power is the dialogue 
between the Athenian ambassadors and the rulers of Melos. Thucydides' Athenian 
ambassadors are particularly frank, admitting "we have come here in the interest 
416 For the first see 2.37.3, and also 3.59.1, 3.84.3; for the second see 2.53.4. 
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[opheleia] of our empire," that is, to make the Melians a "tributary ally" (5.91, 5.rn). As 
the stronger power they insist on leaving justice out of the negotiations: "we both know 
that decisions about justice ( dikaios) are made in human discussions only when both sides 
are under equal compulsion; but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and 
the weak must accept that" (5.89).417 By appealing to strength rather than justice, the 
Athenians tacitly admit that their demand for the Melians to submit is unjust. The 
Melians, being weaker, are reduced to pointing out the common usefulness of justice: 
As we think, at any rate, it is expedient-we speak as we are obliged, since you 
enjoin us to let right [ dikaios] alone and talk only of interest [ sumphero]-that 
you should not destroy what is our common protection, namely, the privilege of 
being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair [ta eikota] and right [dikaios]. 
(5.90) 
Thucydides' own sympathy for this view is clear since earlier in the History he professes 
in his own voice the value of preserving the common laws of piety and justice, noting that 
one may need to call on their aid oneself in a time of danger (3.84). 
The Melians also place hope in the justice of the gods: "we trust that the gods may 
grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust" (5.ro4). 
And they further warn the Athenians that the Spartans will not betray their Melian colony 
as that would show the Spartans to be faithless to their friends (5 .ro6). The Athenians 
reply that interest lies in safety, while doing what is just and noble brings danger (5.ro7). 
With this comment they again acknowledge the injustice of their demand but correctly 
calculate that Sparta will not bring danger upon itself to stop injustice to their Melian 
colony. But are not the Athenians' words also an indictment of themselves, for there is no 
417 On Justice, Power, and Human Nature, p. 103. Here I use Woodruff's more literal 
translation. 
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justice and nobility in their treatment of the Melians. With the latter unwilling to submit 
and the Athenians set upon their immediate interest, the Athenians besiege them. After 
the Melians surrender, the Athenians "put to death all the grown men whom they took, 
and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred 
colonists and settled the place themselves" (5.116). Even the gods seem indifferent to the 
Melians' unjust fate, though retribution does perhaps come to the Athenians-too late for 
the former-in the form of their eventual defeat. 
In the History, we see three basic criteria at work to determine if an act is just or 
unjust. To break a treaty or oath is urijust (2.74). To willfully injure someone without 
reason is unjust (4.40). To punish one who has done injustice is just (5.89). According to 
these judgements, justice simply means not doing wrong and punishing those who do 
wrong. Such an understanding of justice is evident in the prayer of the Spartan king 
Archidamus before he besieges the city of Plataea: "Graciously accord that those who 
were the first to offend [ adikia] may be punished for it, and that vengeance [timoria] may 
be attained by those who would righteously [nomimos] inflict it" (2.74). Here we see that 
the one who is first to off end ( adikia) is unjust ( adikos ). This simple criterion of wrong is 
also seen in the earliest Greek texts: the Theogony and the Iliad. In the former, Kronos 
agrees to redress the evil [kake] of his father, saying: "Mother, I would undertake this task 
and accomplish it-I am not afraid of our unspeakable father. After all, he began it by his 
ugly [ aeikes] behaviour" (Theogony 169-172, emphasis added). In the Iliad, Menelaus 
supplicates Zeus before engaging in combat with Paris, pointing out that Paris was the 
first to do wrong: "Zeus, King, give me revenge, he wronged [kakos] me first!" (3.409). 
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While this distinction between the just and unjust is clear in principle, in practice 
disputants rarely agree over who was the first to do wrong, and a cycle of vengeance may 
then lead to a string of wrongs, clouding the whole matter. In the Peloponnesian War, the 
Spartans technically broke the treaty, but in their own minds felt it was the Athenians who 
were guilty (r.n8). 
Machiavelli himself accepts imperialism as both natural and necessary (P 3, D 
r.6.4). His acceptance of it is also clearly stated in On How to Treat the Populace of 
Valdichiana: "The world has always been inhabited in the same way by men who have 
the same passions: There have always been those who rule and those who serve."418 Since 
Machfavelli does not denigrate justice but simply does not bother to question the justice 
or injustice of imperialism, his position is similar to that of the Athenian ambassadors to 
Melos. They too believe it is in accord with nature: "Of the gods we believe, and of men 
we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is 
not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it 
existing before us, and shall leave .it to exist forever after us" (5.105). Machiavelli's 
acceptance of imperialism does not mean he was blind to its barbarism. In The Ass, he 
remarks that ambition "destroys our states; and the greater wonder is that all recognize . 
this transgression [error], but not one flees from it."419 And in his poem "On Ambition" 
(written around 1509) he graphically presents war's terrible consequences: 
A man is weeping for his father dead and a woman for her husband; 
Another man, beaten naked, you see driven in sadness from his own dwelling. 
418 Essential Writings, p. 36L 
419 Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 762, lines 46-48. 
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Foul with blood are the ditches and streams, 
Full of heads, of legs, of arms, 
And other members gashed and severed. 420 
But since Machiavelli accepts that ambition always has and always will lead to war, the 
only solution he offers in the poem is to join man's natural ambition with a ferocious 
heart (un cor feroce), an armed virtue (una virtute armata), a stem education (fiera 
educazion), as well as a sound judgment and intellect (ii iudicio e l'intelletto sano).421 In 
. short, his only solution to the problem of imperialism is to rely on one's own military 
virtue. However, when it comes to the question of the best mode of expanding, 
Machiavelli argues against the method used by Athens. In Discourses 2.4, he explains 
that their mode of expansion is "useless" since it acquires "subjects" rather than 
"partners." Holding subjects through "violence" is "difficult and laborious," and Athens 
came to ruin since it acquired an empire too difficult to keep (Discourses 2.4). Thus it is 
prudence rather than justice that makes Machiavelli criticize the Athenian mode of 
holding dominion. Nonetheless, his argument provides a realist check on imperial 
ambition. 
Cicero 
Cicero was largely responsible for introducing, and justifying, Greek philosophy 
to a Roman audience. His philosophical writings span 55 BCE to 44 BCE. On Duties (De 
officiis) was his last work, written the year Caesar was assassinated and a year before he 
met his own death at the hands of the Triumvirate's henchmen. During the Middle Ages 
420 Ibid., p. 738, lines 133-35, 148-150. 
421 Tutte le opere, pp. 851-52, lines 92, 117, 164. 
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and Renaissance, it was the most widely read classical Latin prose work, and Cicero, 
through the influence of Petrarch, attained a venerated status among Florentine 
humanists.422 His On Duties is divided into three books. The first explains duties based on 
what is honourable (honestum ); the second discusses the duties in relation to what is 
beneficial (utile); the third argues that everything honourable is beneficial and that 
nothing dishonourable can be beneficial.423 Cicero thus upholds the Stoic doctrine of the 
identity of the honourable and the beneficial, arguing they can never be in conflict. 
In the context of elucidating the honourable in relation to the virtue of justice, 
Cicero codifies the "laws of war" (iura belli).424 Basing himself on the example of their 
"forefathers," he prescribes that "once victory has been secured, those who were not cruel 
or savage in warfare should be spared" (1.35). He emblazons this point by naming all the 
Italian peoples to whom their ancestors gave citizenship after they defeated them. 
Another principle he lays down is that once a city or people is conquered the peace should 
involve no treachery. Their forefathers respec_ted that point so greatly, he says, that the 
very man who conquered a city became its patron (1.35). 
Cicero also discusses the importance of faith (jides) as a fundamental part of 
justice (1.23). He shows its importance by the fact that their ancestors built a shrine to 
Faith next to the temple of Jupiter, the greatest of the gods (3.rn4). He also includes faith 
among the "laws of war," arguing "it often happens that faith given to an enemy must be 
422 Colish, "Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince," pp. 79-83. 
423 All translations from On Duties are from the Cambridge edition. Latin is from the 
Loeb Edition. An alternative translation, used in the latter, is "morally right" for honestum 
and "expedient" for utile. 
424 On Cicero's definition of just war also see pages 102-103 above. 
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kept" (J.107). As he explains, faith must be kept with just and legitimate enemies, though 
it need not be kept with those who are an enemy to all, such as pirates (3.10r8). 
In his apologia for the Roman· empire, Cicero claims it was maintained through 
beneficence and justice and that Roman magistrates and generals sought praise through 
"the fair and faithful defence" of Rome's provinces and allies (2.26).425 He grants that 
Rome had already begun to depart from her just treatment of others before Sulla took 
power in Rome but writes that after his rule Rome completely abandoned justice since, 
having suffered so much injustice at home, nothing seemed unjust toward allies (2.27). 
In sum, the moral standards which Cicero attributes to Rome's forefathers are the 
fetial laws or rights of war; mercy, friendship and faithfulness towards the defeated; 
faithfulness toward legitimate enemies, and fairness and faithfulness towards allies. These 
values serve to restrain collective selfishness and show a concern for a more common 
good that includes allies and even enemies. Rather than comparing Cicero and 
Machiavelli on each of these points, we can go to the heart of the matter by comparing 
their central arguments. While Cicero defends the Stoic identification of the honourable 
and the beneficial, Machiavelli explodes it, arguing that there are in fact many cases 
where what is honourable conflicts with what is useful. Although Cicero's whole book 
argues against that view, he grants that in particular circumstances what is normally 
dishonourable is not so. The example he gives is killing: something which is normally a 
crime, but which is beneficial and honourable when the person killed is a tyrant (3.19 ). 
425 
"aequitate et fide defendissent." 
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Cicero thus allows of exceptions in particular circumstances but rejects the argument that 
anything dishonourable can be useful (3.18). 
The difference between their views is exemplified by the differences between two 
otherwise very similar passages in On Duties and The Prince. Cicero writes: 
There are two types of conflict: the one proceeds by debate, the other by force. 
Since the former is the proper concern of a man, but the latter of beasts, one 
should only resort to the latter if one may not employ the former. (1.34)426 
Machiavelli follows Cicero so closely it seems he must have had the text at hand: 
Thus, you must know that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other 
with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but since the first is 
often not enough, one must have recourse to the second. (P 18)427 
Machiavelli accepts Cicero's point that the use of force is beastly, but rather than 
prescribing force as a last resort Machiavelli emphasis that a ruler must often use it. The 
difference between their views becomes sharper in the next two similar passages. First 
Cicero: 
There are two ways in which injustice may be done, either through force or 
through deceit [fraude]; and deceit seems to belong to a little fox [vulpeculae], 
force [vis] to a lion. Both of them seem most alien to a human being; but deceit 
deserves a greater hatred. And out of all injustice, nothing deserves punishment 
more than that of men who, just at the time when they are most betraying trust, act 
in such a way that they might appear to be good men. (1.41)428 
Machiavelli: 
426 
"Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, 
cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti 
non licet superiore." 
427 
"Dovete adunque sapere come sono dua generazione di combatere, l 'uno con le legge, 
l'altro con la forza: quell primo e proprio dello uomo, quell Secondo delle bestie." 
428 
"Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, 
vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius 
autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam eorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut 
viri boni esse videantur." 
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Thus, since a prince is compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, 
he should pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from 
snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So one needs to be a fox to 
recognize snares and a lion to frighten wolves. Those who stay simply with the 
lion do not understand this. (P 18)429 
Cicero accepts that rulers must resort to the way of beasts when others are not willing to 
settle a dispute through discussion, but Machiavelli puts the powerful lion and the 
.deceitful fox on equal ground. Considering the two passages side by side, Machiavelli's 
point speaks directly to Cicero: "Those who stay simply with the lion do not understand 
this." He further contradicts Cicero by insisting not only that a ruler must know how to 
use deceit but also must know how to dissemble when he does so. Thus what for Cicero is 
the injustice most deserving of punishment, is for Machiavelli a quality necessary in order 
to be a good prince. While Machiavelli knew Cicero well, we see that he rejects his 
Stoicism. 
Sallust 
Sallust sided with Caesar during the civil war and, after the latter's assassination 
in 44 BCE, turned to writing. In Sallust's view, the moral decline and civil strife so 
evident in his time had begun to set in once Rome defeated its chief rival Carthage (in 
146 BCE) (C 10-11). His three histories describe the discord of the late Roman republic: 
Catiline's Conspiracy, The Jugurthine War and his unfinished, and now fragmentary, 
429 
"Sendo adunque uno principe necessitato sapere bene usare la bestia, debbe di quelle 
pigliare la golpe e il lione, perche el lione non si difende da' lacci, la golpe non si difende 
da' lupi. Bisogna adunque essere golpe a conoscere e' lacci, e lione a sbigottire e' lupi: 
coloro che stanno semplicemente in sul lione non se ne intendano." 
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Histories. His popularity during the Renaissance may be gauged by Machiavelli's passing 
comment: "Everyone has read the conspiracy of Catiline written by Sallust" (D 3.6.I9). 
Machiavelli also mentions The Jugurthine War in Discourses 2.8.1. He accepts Sallust's 
argument that fear of a foreign enemy helps preserves unity. 430 In Machiavelli's own 
words: "if it [a republic] does not have an enemy outside, it will find one at home, as it 
appears necessarily happens to all great cities" (D 2.I9.I). Another of Sallust's ideas 
shared by many Italian republicans is that virtue flourishes more in a republic than in a 
monarchy; as he explains, "kings are always more suspicious of good men than wicked 
men and they fear the virtue they do not have" ( C 7 .I-3). Machiavelli promotes the same 
idea; for example, he has a conspirator against the duke of Milan say: "republics nourish 
virtuous men, princes eliminate them" (FH 7.33).431 
How does Sallust portray the Roman view of the relation between expediency and 
honour? He believed that in his own time honour had succumbed to ambition and avarice. 
How far they had fallen is shown by the example of their ancestors: "they were fearless in 
war, and, when peace arrived, they were fair [aequitas]" (C 9.3). As proof of the latter, he 
adds: "in peacetime they exercised political power more often with kindness [beneficium] 
than with fear and, when they received an injury, they preferred forgiveness to 
prosecution" (C 9.5). Further, "[i]n their offerings to the gods, they were lavish; at home 
they were sparring; with friends they were trustworthy [fide/is]" ( C 9.2 ). Thus according 
to Sallust the old Romans were fair, kind, forgiving, pious and trustworthy. We get 
430 See C IO.I, J 41.2, H I.I2. 
431 Also see D 2.2.1, AW 2.293. 
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another glimpse of the old republic in a speech by Cato the Younger. In a senate meeting 
· in 63 BCE, he is reported to have said: 
Do not believe that our ancestors made a small Republic great with military 
weapons. If that were the case, we would now be in possession of the most 
beautiful of all states: we have more allies and citizens than they did, more 
military weapons and horses. No, other things made them great, things which we 
do not have at all: disciplined energy at home, a just empire abroad, a mind free in 
deliberation, limited neither by guilt nor craving. ( C 52.19-21) 
Thus in Cato's view it is not force that makes an empire great but certain moral qualities. 
Earlier in the work, Sallust expresses a similar view in his own voice, writing that it was 
work and justice ("labore atque iustitia") that increased the Roman republic ( C 10.1). 
On the other hand, a letter from Sallust's last work, the Histories, offers a view of 
Rome's imperialism from the perspective of its enemy in the Third Mithridatic War (75-
65 BCE).432 In the letter, King Mithridates requests an alliance with King Arsaces in 
order to drive Rome from the east. He warns the Parthian king that Rome will not stop its 
expansion to the east if he is defeated, and he describes how the Romans used treachery 
to divide and conquer the east one power at a time. He explodes the claim that Rome 
attained its empire justly, writing: · 
don't you know that. .. since their beginning they have possessed nothing except 
what they stole: their homes, their wives, their fields, their empire? Once they 
were immigrants without a country or parents; they have been established as a 
plague upon the whole world; nothing human or divine prevents them from 
robbing and exterminating allies and friends, people far away and nearby, the · 
impoverished and the powerful. (4.17) 
432 On the question of whether Sallust b·ased his letter on a letter of Mithridates, McGing 
writes: "There is no direct external evidence for or against the existence of a real letter" 
(The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, p. 155). 
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Their reason for making war is, he continues, "a profound craving for power and wealth" 
(4.5). And, according to him, the Romans have attained their empire "by daring and 
deception [fallundo ], and by sowing war upon war" (4.20 ). Since the Histories comes 
down to us in fragments, the text provides no further context for determining Sallust's 
intent in relation to the letter. Nonetheless, it is clear that the letter lays out an uncensored 
and unflattering critique of Roman imperialism. This perspective offers a much different 
account than the one Sallust attributes to his Roman ancestors in Catiline's Conspiracy. 
According to the Roman apologia therein, Rome attained its empire by defending itself 
from unjust neighbours and then by defending its allies ( C 6). The truth likely contains 
aspects of both Rome's apologia and her enemy's rhetoric. In the Discourses 2.4.1, 
Machiavelli offers another interpretation of Rome's rise to power. As he criticizes Athens 
for making its allies subjects, so he praises Rome for making its allies partners. Not only 
are subjects hard to keep, but Rome was able to use the "labors and blood" of their 
partners to conquer provinces outside Italy. Then, when Rome had used them to acquire 
empire outside Italy, their Italian partners "found themselves in a stroke encircled by 
Roman subjects and crushed by a very big city, such as Rome was."433 Thus according to 
Machiavelli Rome acquired its empire through "deception." In short, he does not cite any 
of the conventional justifications for Roman imperialism (self-defense, defending their 
allies, spreading Roman laws, justice and peace) but argues their imperiuin was solidified 
through the intentional deception of their allies (creating the illusion of an equal 
433 See also D 2.13.2. 
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partnership while actually using them for the sake of their own imperium), a strategy he 
counsels. 
Livy 
Livy's history-covering the founding of Rome down to 9 BCE-totaled 142 
books. Livy wrote the first book around 27 BCE and continued to add books until his 
death around 17 CE.434 Ab urbe condita (From the Founding of the City) became the 
definitive history of Rome in its own time, though often read in an abridged form. 435 
Interest in Livy's history waned during the Middle Ages and much of it was lost. In the 
fourteenth century, Petrarch helped preserve what remained by compiling the extant 
manuscripts: books 1-10 and 21-40. Later, in 1527, books 41-45 were also recovered.436 
In part thanks to Petrarch, Livy again became popular. Petrarch himself used Livy for his 
epic poem Africa; Leonardo Bruni explicitly modeled himself on Livy in his History of 
the Florentine People; Flavio Biondo likewise styled his history of the aftermath of the 
fall of the Roman Empire on Livy, and Machiavelli wrote a major commentary on Livy 
(making it fall into 142 chapters as a further tribute to Livy's work).437 Machiavelli, in his 
preface to the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, explains: "I have judged it 
necessary to write on all those books of Titus Livy that have not been intercepted by the 
malignity of the times whatever I shall judge necessary for their greater understanding." 
434 Luce, "Introduction," pp. ix-x; Ogilvie, "Introduction," pp. 12, 14-15. 
435 Ogilvie, "Introduction," p. 15. 
436 Kleinhenz, Medieval Italy, vol. 2, p. 645. 
437 Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 38 n. 1; Black, "Humanism," p. 257. 
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Like the works of Cicero and Sallust, Livy's history shows that the Romans held 
many moral beliefs which limit self-interest. Livy himself writes in the preface to the first 
book that his aim in turning to their ancestors is to discover the moral values which had 
made Rome great before tbe present moral collapse had set in: "Here are the questions to 
which I would have every reader give his close attention-what life and morals [mores] 
were like; through what men and by what policies, in peace and in war, empire was 
established and enlarged." Some of the first values Livy discovers in the old Romans are 
the importance of justice, treaties and oaths. In book 1, he records that the oldest known 
treaty was between Rome's third king and the Albans and that all treaties are still made 
according to the procedure then used. The end of the treaty's oath shows how seriously 
the ancients took their oaths: 
"From these terms, as they have been publicly rehearsed from beginning to end, 
without fraud [do lo malo ], from these tablets, or this wax, and as they have been 
this day clearly understood, the Roman People will not be the first to depart. If it 
shall first depart from them, by general consent, with malice aforethought [do lo 
malo ], then on that day do thou, great Diespiter, so smite the Roman People as I 
shall here to-day smite this pig: and so much the harder smite them as thy power 
and thy strength are greater." (1.24)438 
As seen here, both sides declare that they make the treaty without fraudulent intentions 
(do lo malo) and that if they do contrive fraud they wish divine retribution upon 
themselves. A few pages on, when Livy relates how a Roman King defeated a 
neighbouring city using fraud and trickery (fraude ac do lo), he adds that it was an un-
438 English translations from books 1-2 are from Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Translations 




Roman strategy (1.53). From these examples, we see that treaties, oaths and faith are 
common goods that limit expediency. 
According to Livy's history, Ancus, the fourth Roman king, instituted religious 
ceremonies for demanding redress. Ancus, he writes, borrowed the laws from the ancient 
tribe of the Aequi, and they are, Livy adds, the same rituals still used by the Roman fetial 
priests (1.32). Cicero's condensed outline of just war in On Duties is based on these same 
fetial laws. First, an envoy is sent to the border of the people from whom restitution is 
sought. The formula recited is: 
"Hear, Jupiter; hear, ye boundaries of'-naming ~hatever nation they belong 
to;-"let righteousness hear! I am the public herald of the Roman People; I come 
duly and religiously [iuste pieque] commissioned; let my words be credited." 
Then he recites his demands, after which he takes Jupiter to witness: "If I demand 
unduly and against religion [ iniuste impieque] that these men and these things be 
surrendered to me, then let me never enjoy my native land." (1.32) 
The envoy enters the land repeating the formula and allows 33 days for restitution; if it is 
not forthcoming the envoy declares: 
"Hear, Jupiter, and thou, Janus Quirinus, and hear all heavenly gods, and ye, gods 
of earth, and ye of the lower world; I call you to witness that this people"-
naming whatever people it is-"is unjust [iniustum], and does not make just 
reparation. But of these matters we will take counsel of the elders in our country, 
how we may obtain our right [ius]." (1.32) 
Having followed this procedure the Romans would then declare a pure and pious war 
(puro pioque due/lo) (1.32). Scholars have argued that this formula dates to the second 
century BCE, not the time of the kings as Livy writes,439 but, even if that is the case, it is 
noteworthy how strictly the Romans formalized war and framed it around the concepts of 
reparation and justice. Although the Romans could still interpret the matter of reparation 
439 Luce, ed., The Rise of Rome, p. 345 n. 40. 
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in their own favour (and back it with the threat of force), their formal demand allows the 
enemy, at least in theory, to judge whether or not the demand is just and pious and, if not, 
to retain the envoy. 
Another Roman concept constricting expediency is "the law of nations" (iure 
gentium ). Early in the first book, Livy writes that violence done to envoys violates the 
law of nations (1.14). In the second book, when foreign envoys are caught conspiring 
against the republic with some young Romans, Livy tells us, "The traitors were thrown 
into prison forthwith. As for the envoys, it was uncertain for a little while what would be 
done with them, but,. notwithstanding they appeared to have deserved no less than to be 
treated as enemies, the law of nations nevertheless prevailed" (2.4). Showing how much 
they honoured the law of nations, the Romans decided to punish only the Roman 
conspirators (who included the sons of Brutus), despite the envoys' guilt. 
As we saw in Livy's preface, one of the concerns of his history is to highlight the 
moral virtues of the old Romans. Machiavelli in his writings promotes both the humane 
Roman virtues and some of the severe ones. The "humane modes" which he wished to 
promote are succinctly expressed by Fabrizio in the Art of War: "To honor and reward the 
virtues, not to despise poverty, to esteem the modes and orders of military discipline, to 
constrain the citizens to love one another, to live without sects, to esteem the private less 
than the public, and other similar things that could easily accompany our times" (1.29, 
1.33). In addition to those humane values, Machiavelli was also interested in promoting 
the salutary effect of Roman severity. One of the most important lessons he draws from 
Livy's history is the way the Romans dealt with the allies who rebelled against them. In 
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book 8, Livy writes that after Camillus defeated the Latins he told the Senate: "you have 
the power to create a permanent peace for yourselves by exercising either cruelty or 
forgiveness" (8.13). The Senate decided to treat each Latin city based on its deserts, either 
granting it citizenship or punishing it harshly. In On How to Treat the Populace of 
Valdichiana after Their Rebellion, Machiavelli argues that the Florentines should have 
followed Camillus' advice in their treatment of Arezzo and the towns of the Valdichiana 
after their rebellion from Florentine rule. 440 Like the Romans, they should have avoided 
"any middle way," either benefiting them to win their loyalty or punishing them in such a 
way that they cannot rebel again. Thus Machiavelli agrees with Florence's decision to 
reconquer the deserving towns with benefits, but he argues that in its punishment of 
Arezzo it should have followed the Roman example of either destroying the city and 
bringing its inhabitants to Rome or of sending many new inhabitants to hold it down. In 
Machiavelli's view, the punishments Florence chose for Arezzo ruled out their loyalty 
while failing to remove their ability to rebel at the next opportunity. This example of 
Florence's failure to live up to Rome's severity is so important to Machiavelli that he 
repeats the argument in Discourses 2.23. 
Another important example for Machiavelli is the way in which the Romans dealt 
with a tumult that occurred in Ardea: they executed the heads of the tumult as a way to 
reunite the city (see Livy 4.rn ). Commenting on their decision, Machiavelli says that 
killing the heads of a tumult is the most certain way to unite a divided city, again 
unfavorably contrasting Florence's more lenient policies with that of Rome (D 3.27.2). 
440 In Essential Writings, pp. 359-64. 
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While Machiavelli takes from Livy the example of killing the heads of tumults and either 
benefitting those under one's power or eliminating their ability to harm you, he passes 
over the occasions on which the Romans followed the most inhumane ancient practice of 
massacring the men and enslaving the women of a defeated city. To take two such 
examples from Livy, he writes that after the city of Pometia surrendered: "Their chief 
men were beheaded, and the rest of the colonists were sold as slaves. The town was razed; 
its land was sold" (2.17). In a similar manner, the Romans, after defeating the Tarquinii, 
massacred the populace and sent 358 nobles to Rome to be flogged and beheaded (7.19). 
Machiavelli's argument that his contemporaries should imitate the Roman example of 
destroying a city and relocating its rebellious subjects as well as his argument that the 
ringleaders of tumults should be killed were meant to spur his contemporaries to 
overcome their humane feelings for the sake of order; however, Machiavelli was himself 
enough a product of a Christian and Stoic education in humanitas, so as not to think of 
going so far as advocating that modems should also imitate the completely inhumane 
example of eliminating or enslaving a populace. 
Morality and Security 
One point of the previous section was to emphasize that ancient thought was well 
aware of the conflict between morality and utility. This section will now focus on the 
relationship between morality and security in particular. The idea that morality may be 
contravened when it comes to defending the security of the state is sanctioned by two 
Roman texts on rhetoric written in the late first century BCE: De inventione and the 
219 
r. 
Rhetorica ad Herennium.441 They became the two most influential texts on rhetoric 
during the Middle Ages and Renaissance.442 Their discussions of morality and politics 
occur in the context of their elucidation of deliberative oratory, the type of speech dealing 
with political persuasion. De inventione is Cicero's earliest work, written around 91-86 
BCE (making him between fifteen and twenty years old).443 The Rhetorica ad Herennium 
was attributed to Cicero during the Middle Ages, but by the fifteenth century his 
authorship had come to be contested. It is now granted that the author is unknown, though 
the text itself dates to around 86-82 BCE.444 The work appears in the record Machiavelli's 
father kept of all the books he borrowed, wherein he attributes it to Cicero.445 
According to the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the aim of political action is utilitas 
(advantage or utility), and it has two parts: security (tutam) and honour (honestum). 
Under the heading of honour fall the four virtues of wisdom, justice, courage and 
temperance (3.2.3). The text grants there are cases where one may urge that a virtue be 
disregarded but adds that the speaker should show he is not abandoning virtue altogether; 
rather, he should say that the present situation is not a time for being strict about virtue or 
that what others have said is a virtue is not a virtue in this case (for example, what they 
have said is justice is in fact cowardice) (3.3.6). 
441 There has recently been an outpouring of literature placing Machiavelli's writing in 
the context of classical rhetoric. See, for example, Victoria Kahn, Machiavellian 
Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton (1994); Virginia Cox, "Machiavelli 
and the Rhetorica ad Herennium: Deliberative Rhetoric in The Prince" (1997); Maurizio 
Viroli, Machiavelli, "Chapter 3: The Power of Words" (1998); Maurizio Viroli, 
Machiavelli's God, "Chapter Two: The Power of Words" (2010). 
442 Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 85; Machiavelli's God, p. 132 n. 150. 
443 De inventione, p. xii. 
444 Rhetorica ad Herennium, p. ix. For the dating see page xxvi. 
445 Viroli, Machiavelli, pp. 76, 199 n. 9. 
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The text advises that if a course of action aims at both security and honour, then 
both should be mentioned, but if it aims at only one, then only the one should be 
mentioned (3.4.8). The writer then summarizes the types of arguments that can be used if 
one wishes to put security first and likewise if one wishes to put honour first: 
the speaker who advocates security will use the following topics: Nothing is more 
useful than safety; no one can make use of his virtues if he has not based his plans 
upon safety; not even the gods help those who thoughtlessly commit themselves to 
danger; nothing ought to be deemed honourable which does not produce safety. 
One who prefers the considerations of honour to security will use the following 
topics: Virtue ought never to be renounced; either pain, if that is feared, or death, 
if that is dreaded, is more tolerable than disgrace and infamy; one must consider 
the shame which will ensue-indeed neither immortality nor a life everlasting is 
achieved, nor is it proved that, once this peril is avoided, another will not be 
encountered; virtue finds it noble to go even beyond death; fortune, too, habitually 
favours the brave; not he who is safe in the present, but he who lives honourably, 
lives safely-whereas he who lives shamefully cannot be secure for ever. (3.5.9) 
While the first four arguments all give priority to security, the second, third and fourth 
rest their argument for it on an appeal to virtue, religion and honour, respectively. The 
fourth argument reverses the Stoic position that only what is honourable can be useful; 
rather, for a speaker in favour of security, only things that produce safety can be deemed 
honourable. Machiavelli utilizes a similar argument in The Prince: "So let a prince win 
and maintain his state: the means will always be judged honorable, and will be praised by 
everyone" (ch. 18). Machiavelli states this as a descriptive observation, but he is also 
asserting, in line with the classical argument, that acts which are conducive to winning or 
maintaining a state will be deemed honourable. He takes for granted the view that 
security is the sine qua non and even identifies it with honour. When the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium comes to list the arguments that put honour above security, two of them 
explicitly acknowledge what is at stake: preferring death to dishonour. While that 
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argument may have its validity in the case of an individual, the problem with it arises, as 
we will see in both Cicero and Livy, when preferring death to dishonour entails the harm 
and death of those one should be protecting. 
Cicero's De inventione also sheds light on the moral framework of ancient 
thought, and the text's arguments were passed on to the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
through its popularity as a work on oratory. Wh_en Cicero comes to the topic of 
deliberative oratory, he begins by disagreeing with Aristotle that its essential end is 
advantage: "I prefer both honour and advantage [utilitas]" (2.51.156). His allusion is to 
Aristotle's argument in the Rhetoric that the end of deliberative speech is the expedient. 
Aristotle backs this conclusion up in his Rhetoric by writing: "the deliberative orator, 
although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending 
what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful; but often he is quite indifferent 
about showing that the enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no 
harm, is not an act of injustice" (1.3). Cicero disagrees with Aristotle's rather pessimistic 
observation about the end to which deliberative oratory is put, giving it a broader 
foundation based on three ends: the honourable, the advantageous and things that are 
both. The honourable, he writes, consists of four virtues: wisdom, justice, courage and 
temperance (2.52-53.15r159). As examples of things that are both honourable and 
advantageous, he mentions glory, rank, influence and friendship (2.55.166). The 
advantageous are things such as fields, harbours, money, a fleet, sailors, soldiers, allies-
the means by which states preserve their safety and liberty (2.56.168). 
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When it comes to considerations of honour and advantage, Cicero points out that 
there are two types of necessity: simple necessity and qualified necessity. Simple 
necessity refers to necessity in the strict sense (for example, all mo~als must die). 
Qualified necessity refers to acts that are necessary if one desires a certain end, but where 
there is in fact the possibility of acting in another way (for example, it is necessary to eat, 
but one "may prefer to die of starvation"). Cicero divides cases of qualified ne.cessity into 
three types: those that seek honour, those that seek security and those that seek living 
without inconvenience. He prioritizes them as follows: 
The greatest necessity is that of doing what is honourable; next to that is the 
necessity of security and third and last the necessity of convenience; this can 
never stand comparison with the other two. It is often necessary to weigh these, 
one against the other, so that, although honour is superior to security, it may be a 
question which it is preferable to follow. In this matter it seems possible to give a 
fixed and universal rule. For one should take thought for security in a case in 
which though honour is lost for the moment while consulting security, it may be 
recovered in the future by courage or diligence. If this is not possible, one should 
take thought for honour. So in a case of this sort, too, when we seem to consult 
our security, we shall be able to say with truth that we are concerned about 
honour, since without security we can never attain to honour. (2.58.173-74) 
If one will lose one's honour without being able to recover it, then it is better to die an 
honourable death than to lose both security and honour; however, if one can save the state 
and recover the lost honour, then the latter is sacrificed only temporarily for the sake of 
both. Cicero's final argument is similar to the one in the Rhetorica ad Herennium that "no 
one can make use of his virtues ifhe has not based his plans upon safety" (3.5.9). 
According.to this line of thought, the practice of the virtues and the attainment of honour 
depend upon the precondition of security. Cicero follows the argument that one may act 
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against what is honourable for the sake of security, if its preservation will thereby allow 
the recovery of honour in the future. 
The same argument occurs in Livy's history of Rome. As Livy records in book 9, 
the Samnite army managed to trap the Roman army in the Caudine pass. The Samnite 
general told the envoy sent by the Roman army that if they surrendered they would let 
them go under the yoke, unarmed _and with a single garment each. When the soldiers 
heard this, one of the foremost men argued that although it would be more glorious to die 
fighting, without them there would be no one left to protect Rome. Thus he convinces the 
army to surrender, saying: "You ~ill say that surrender is shameful and ignominious. But 
our love of the fatherland is so great that we will save it, if need be, by our ignominy as 
much as by our death" (9.4).446 The Roman soldiers would rather die than suffer such 
ignominy-but they have a greater necessity than their own honour to ·think of. 
One of the most quoted passages from Machiavelli's Discourses is a gloss on this 
text from Livy. The point Machiavelli draws from this Roman example is that "where one 
deliberates entirely on the safety of his fatherland, there ought not to enter any 
consideration of either just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or ignominious; 
indeed every other concern put aside, one ought to follow entirely the policy that saves its 
life and maintains its liberty" (3.41). It is in this context that we can understand the view 
that it is proper to love one's country more than one's soul. For Machiavelli, the security 
446 Livy, Rome and Italy, p. 220 (translation modified). "'At foeda atque ignominiosa 
deditio est.' sed ea caritas patriae est ut tam ignominia earn quam morte nostra, si opus 
sit, servemus." We see a similar argument in book 23.14 where Livy writes that as the 
final resort of a state close to despair, honour yields to utility ("ad ultimum prope 
desperatae rei publicae auxilium, cum honesta utilibus cedunt"). 
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and liberty of the fatherland are the two most necessary goods, and they are not to be 
gambled with for the sake of honour. Machiavelli of course valorizes honour, but when 
there is a conflict between safety and moral scruples, he argues that one should preserve 
the material good of the state, even at the cost of ignominy. If the state preserves its 
liberty, it maintains the basis to "to cancel the ignominy" (3.41). As we saw, this 
argument is foung in both Cicero's De inventione and Livy's history, and a number of 
similar arguments are found in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. It is not only MaGhiavelli 
who accepts this line of reasoning from the ancients. Similar arguments are deployed in 
the Florentine pratiche.447 In a debate of 1498, the humanist Bernardo Rucellai stated: 
"Faced with a choice between honour and security, one must prefer security, because 
once one has ensured one's preservation, honour can be recaptured."44~ On May 22, 1501, 
Antonio Malegonnelle remarked that "a state should always adopt that policy which 
ensures its safety; this policy will always be considered a wise and honourable one. ''449 In 
the latter formulation, we again see that the maintenance of safety can itself be considered 
a matter of honour (or what twentieth century realists would call a moral duty). Returning 
to Machiavelli's formulation of the argument it presupposes that when it is not entirely a 
matter of the safety of the state, then one ought to enter into consideration of just or 
unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or ignominious. However, in the latter case it 
447 In addition to the two following examples another is quoted on pp. 29-30 above. 
448 
"che havendo ad eleggiere ·la dignita o la sicurta, che piu presto sia da eleggiere la 
sicurta, perche ogni volta che altri si e conservato la dignita puo tomare" ( Consulte e 
pratiche, 1498-1505, vol. 1, ed. Fachard, p. 39. Cited in Cox, "Machiavelli and the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium," p. 1135 n. 76). 
449 
''una Republica debbe sempre pigliare il partito che la salvi, et questo sempre e 
iudicato partito savio et honorevole" (Consultee pratiche, 1498-1505, vol. 2, ed. Fachard, 
p. 657. Cited in Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium," p. 1135 n. 75. 
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seems to be Machiavelli's view that both alternatives should be open for prudent 
consideration. 
These arguments have a long pedigree and are hard to argue against in cases 
where life and liberty are ~ly at risk. However, in less dire cases the Stoic position of 
Cicero's On Duties is the rule. Leonardo Bruni states it clearly in his Panegyric to the 
City of Florence: "this city has always taken pains to give each one his due and in all 
things to put honor before expediency in all its dealings. Indeed, it has been the case that 
Florence considers nothing useful that is not at the same time honorable."450 Machiavelli 
makes the exception to that rule-something dishonourable can be useful in the extreme 
case of avoiding ruin--one of the foci of his thought. However, he also extends the 
argument's applicability by using "ruin" in a loose sense, that is, not only in cases that 
truly apply to the life and liberty of the state. Whereas for Cicero what is necessary 
merely for the sake of convenience does not permit acting against honour, for Machiavelli 
what is necessary for convenience or well-being contributes to a city's greatness and thus 
to its security. By focusing on the exception and extending its bounds does Machiavelli 
forge a new political vision altogether? Do his quantitative changes to a conventional 
argument add up to a qualitative difference? In my view, as argued throughout, 
Machiavelli does not aim to overthrow Stoic morality or Christian morality altogether; 
rather, he ~ims to show that in affairs of state they need to be interpreted in a more 
flexible and militant way. That is already a radical step, and, as the next section will 
45° Kohl and Witt, eds., The Earthly Republic, p. 162. 
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show, another aspect of that radical step is criticizing humanism for stopping short of 
imitating the inhumane side of ancient politics. 
Machiavelli and the Imitation of the Ancients 
In order to determine to what extent Machiavelli was a humanist and to what 
extent he was a critic of humanism, we must first clarify what we mean by humanism. In 
this regard, the first thing to note is that the word "humanism" is of late origin: it-or 
rather Humanismus-first came into use in Germany in the nineteenth century.451 
Scholars nonetheless continue to use it as a convenient shorthand for the movement 
associated with what Renaissance writers themselves called the studia humanitatis. In 
Italy, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, a professor of the studia humanitatis came 
to be called a humanista, a title modeled on the medieval professorships of legista, 
jurista, cononista and artista.452 By the sixteenth century, humanista (and its vernacular 
equivalent in other languages) had come to signify not only professors but also teachers, 
students and representatives of the studia humanitatis. 453 If the word human is ta did not 
come into use until the second half of the fifteenth. century, then it is of course 
anachronistic to use it for Petrarch and his early successors; nonetheless, scholars 
commonly use both humanist and humanism as convenient terms to mark the new 
movement associated with the studia humanitatis. 
451 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, p. 22. 
452 Kristeller, ibid., p. 22. 
453 Kristeller, ibid., pp. 22, 99; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic 
and Humanist Strains, p. 121. 
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Since the expression itself goes back to ancient Rome, we must first turn to the 
source to get a sense of its meaning. The earliest extant uses of the expression occur in 
three of Cicero's legal defenses: Pro Murena ( 63 BCE), Pro Archia ( 62 BCE) and Pro 
Caelio (56 BCE).454 Since the expression means the "studies of humanitas" (humanitatis 
being the genitive of humanitas), we should begin with a brief consideration of the 
meaning of humanitas. The origin of the word and concept is often attributed to Panaetius 
of Rhodes ( c. 185-109) and the Scipionic Circle. However, the scarcity of writings from 
that generation .and the following mean there is no extant evidence on which to base such 
an attribution.455 The earliest extant example of humanitas occurs in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, an anonymous rhetorical treatise probably written between 86 and 82 
BCE. 456 The following example from that text gives a good sense of the word's meaning: 
"it is characteristic of a brave man to regard rivals for victory as enemies, but when they 
have been vanquished to consider them as fellow men, in order that his bravery may avail 
to put an end to the war, and his humanity [humanitas] to advance peace" (4.16.23). Here 
humanitas means considering men, even defeated enemies, as fellow men, in other words, 
having sympathy for human beings as human beings. The first time Cicero used the word 
454 Von Martels, "The Kaleidoscope of the Past," p. 93. Von Martels points out that in 
Cicero's writings it occurs in only three places: Pro Archia 1.2, Pro Caelio 10.24 and Pro 
Murena 29.61 (p. 95 n. 22). 
455 On the lack of evidence see Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, pp. 302-304. In Human Rights 
in Ancient Rome, Bauman points out several obstacles to such an attribution (pp. 25-26), 
though he then seems to accept it nonetheless (seep. 27). 
456 See Bauman Human Rights in Ancient Rome, where he also points out the places 
humanitas is used: 2.16.24, 2.7.26, 2.31.50, 4.8.12, 4.16.23 (pp. 25-26). On dating see 
Caplan, Rhetorica ad Herennium, xxvi. 
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was in a defense he delivered on behalf of P. Quinctius in 81 BCE.457 Cicero ends his 
appeal to the judge by saying: "My client begged his adversary to show compassion - if 
not for the man himself, at least for humanity [humanitas]" (Quinct. 97). Again we see 
the same basic meaning of humanitas: to have compassion for a human being as a human 
being. Later, in Of Duties, Cicero speaks of"the common body of humanity" (communi 
tamquam humanitatis corpore) (3.32).458 In this example, humanitas simply means 
humankind, but Cicero's metaphor again reinforces the idea of the fellowship of 
humankind. Thus the word can be used to refer to both humankind and the idea that 
humans should have compassion for other humans on the basis of their shared human 
nature. As Von Martels suggests, the best English translation of humanitas may simply be 
"humanity."459 Like the Latin word, the English word has both connotations: it can refer 
to humankind (as when we speak of "crimes against humanity") as well as to humane 
feelings (as when we say "he. lacks humanity"). 
With that understanding of humanitas in mind we can return to the meaning of the 
"studiis humanitatis" or "studies of humanitas." Cicero's Pro Archia (62 BCE) is a good 
place to begin since it influenced the early humanists. The reason they admired it is 
obvious: Pro Archia is not only a defense of the poet Archias-on the legal question of 
whether or not he was a Roman citizen-but also of the value of literature and poets in 
general. At the outset of the oration Cicero asks leave of the jury and audience to make 
what he admits is a somewhat strange digression: 
457 Bauman, Human Rights, p. 25. 
458 Miller's translation. 
459 Von Martels, "Kaleidoscope," p. 96. 
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I would ask you to allow me, speaking as I am on behalf of a distinguished poet 
and a consummate scholar, before a cultivated audience, an enlightened jury, and 
the praetor whom we see occupying the tribunal, to enlarge upon the studies of 
humanity and letters [de studiis humanitatis ac litterarum], and to employ what is 
perhaps a novel and unconventional line of defence. (2.3)460 
In defense of such studies Cicero argues that they enhanced the virtue of some of Rome's 
greatest men, such as Scipio the Younger. Another of his arguments is that "no mental 
employment is so humanizing [humanissimam] and freeing [liberalissimam]" (7.16).461 
The latter argument makes the direct link between the studies of humanity and letters 
(studiis humanitatis ac litterarum) and their humanizing effect (humanissimam). Cicero 
ends his oration by appealing to the very virtue that is a result of such studies; that is, he 
asks the jury to relieve Archias with their "humanity" (humanitas) (12.31). 
A brief look at a few of Cicero's other writings will show that although he was 
intent on promoting the virtue of humanitas, he was careful to emphasize that it should 
not undermine the older Roman virtue of severitas (a word which can range in meaning 
from "discipline" to "severity"). In his oration Pro Murena, Cicero defends Murena 
against a charge of electoral malpractice brought forward by Cato the Younger. Since 
Catiline was openly threatening Rome with the use of armed force at the time, Cato's 
prosecution of the newly elected consul showed more concern for moral rectitude than the 
460 I have replaced Watts' translation of "de studiis humanitatis ac litterarum" as 
"enlightened and cultivated pursuits" with von Martels' more literal translation (ibid., p. 
95). 
461 Translation modified. Watts' original translation is "so broadening to the sympathies 
and so enlightening to the understanding." C. D. Yonge translates it as "a most reasonable 
and liberal employment of the mind" (Orations, p. 115). In Pro Archia 1.2, Yonge 
translates humanitas as "civilizing and humanizing" (ibid., p. 109), helping to justify my 
use of "humanizing." Another sense of liberalissima is "befitting a freeman" (Lewis and 
Short, Latin Dictionary, p. 1058). 
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safety of Rome. Cicero thus spends part of his defense ridiculing Cato's too strict 
adherence to the Stoic ideals that have inspired him to prosecute Murena at such an 
inopportune time. Cicero justifies introducing a discussion of Greek moral philosophy 
into the court room by flattering the learning of those who are present and by noting that 
both he and Cato share a common interest in it: "Seeing, too, that I do not address an 
ignorant crowd or some gathering of rustics, I shall be a little more venturesome in 
discussing the humanistic studies [studiis humanitatis] which are so familiar and 
agreeable to us both" (Pro Murena 61).462 He then goes on to contrast the 
uncompromising Stoic ethics followed by Cato with the more moderate ethics of Plato 
and Aristotle, which he says he follows. Cicero points out that Scipio the Younger had a 
Stoic teacher, Panaetius, but that his teachings made Scipio more gentle, not more harsh. 
Cicero's point then is to mock only the too rigid interpretation of Stoicism followed by 
Cato and the way it has made him morally dogmatic and politically impractical. One of 
Cicero's rebuttals to a strict interpretation of Stoic doctrine makes clear his own view of 
the purpose to which the studiis humanitatis should be turned. To the Stoic doctrine-
"Do not be moved by pity!"-Cicero's responds: "Certainly not, if you are going to relax 
discipline [severitas]; but there is some merit in sympathy [humanitas]" (Pro Murena 65). 
Here we see that in Cicero's view the studiis humanitatis should introduce humanitas into 
one's character-though without undermining severitas. Cicero's concern to advocate the 
virtue of humanitas without undermining Roman severitas is also evident in one of his 
letters: "A vidius has such a well-balanced character that it combines the most rigid 
462 I have replaced MacDonald's "liberal" with "humanistic." 
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severitas with the highest degree of humanitas. "463 Of Duties offers a third example. of 
Cicero promoting humane virtues while maintaining the importance of severitas: "We 
must, however, recommend gentleness and forgiveness on the understanding that we may 
exercise severity [ severitas] for the sake of the republic; for without that the city cannot 
be governed" (1.88). When I return to Machiavelli, Cicero's goal of balancing these two 
qualities will be contrasted with his emphasis on pursuing one extreme or the other. 
The rebirth of the studia humanitatis could be said to begin with Petrarch's 
discovery of Pro Archia in Liege in 13 3 3. He made his own copy from the manuscript 
and marked the passage, discussed above, where Cicero mentions the "studiis humanitatis 
ac litterarum." By 13 70, Coluccio Salutati also had a copy of Pro Archia, and he 
frequently cited it in his letters.464 Thus Pro Archia became a particularly important text 
since it directly mentions the studiis humanitatis and since its eulogy of such studies 
resonated with the first two great humanists. 
There is no record of Petrarch himself using the expression studia humanitatis; 
rather he still uses another ancient Roman e~pression: "the liberal arts" or "liberal 
studies."465 The earliest known reference to studia humanitatis occurs in a letter Salutati 
wrote in 1369; nonetheless, the generation which succeeded Petrarch saw him as the 
founder of their new leaming.466 In a letter Salutati wrote in 1406 he agrees with Poggio 
Bracciolini that it was Petrarch who "called back into the light" an understanding of 
463 Quoted in Bauman, Human Rights in Ancient Rome, p. 22, from Familiar Letters 
12.27. 
464 Reeve, "Classical Scholarship," pp. 21-22. 
465 Petrarch, On His Own Ignorance, paragraph 13 and paragraph 38. 
466 Peterson, "The Communication of the Dead," p. 61. 
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humane letters. 467 Likewise, Leonardo Bruni praises Petrarch in his second Dialogue 
(written around 1405) as the one who "restored humanistic studies [studia humanitatis], 
which had been extinguished, and opened the way for us to be able to leam.''468 Petrarch 
set out the direction for this new learning in On His Own Ignorance and That of Many 
Others. Therein he argues that although Aristotle brilliantly defines virtue, his writings 
fail to make one love virtue; rather, it is the eloquent exhortations of the Latin authors, 
especially Cicero and Seneca, that impel one's mind to virtue.469 Petrarch's apologia for 
his study of Latin authors was simultaneously a critique of scholasticism and its blind 
idolization of Aristotle. Later humanists such Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, Francesco 
Barbaro and Erasmus also openly attacked their rival leaming-scholasticism. 
After Petrarch's death in 1374, Florence became the leading center of humanism, 
largely due to the intellectual leadership of its renowned chancellor Coluccio Salutati 
(1331-1406).470 The characteristic trait of the humanists was the desire to study and 
imitate the ancients. Their main authorities were the Bible, the Church Fathers, the Latin 
classics and, to a lesser degree, the Greek classics. 471 The central topics pursued by 
humanists tended to be grammar, rhetoric, history, poetics and moral philosophy. Around 
1402, Pier Paolo Vergerio, who had studied in Florence with Salutati, wrote On Good 
Manners, an educational treatise which became influential in defining a humanist 
467 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, p. 111. 
468 Bruni,. The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni, pp. 82-83; Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, p. 
89. 
469 Petrarch, On His Own Ignorance, paragraphs 107-109. 
470 Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers, p. 6; Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, p. 
288. 
471 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, pp. 22, 69-70; Von Martels, 
"Kaleidoscope," p. 91 ~ 
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education. In it he gives the first place to the study of history, second place to moral 
philosophy and the third place to rhetoric.472 
Although the humanists were themselves all Christians, some hostile 
conservatives charged that their study of pagan literature was dangerous and impious.473 
To support the humanist cause, Leonardo Bruni, in 1400, translated St. Basil's To the 
Younger Generation on Mqking Good Use of Greek Literature from Greek to Latin. As 
Bruni makes clear in his preface, he translated the essay to show that St Basil, an 
authoritative fourth-century church father, believed that the study of pagan philosophy 
and literature aids one's understanding of the Bible.474 In 1406, Salutati offered an 
argument similar to Basil's, writing: "The studia humanitatis and the studia divinitatis are 
so interconnected that true and complete knowledge of the one cannot be had without the 
other.''475 After Salutati's death in 1406, his Florentine heirs in the first half of the century 
were largely concerned with secular themes, though still within a Christian framework. 476 
Leonardo Bruni's praise of humanistic studies in his 1428 Oration for the Funeral of 
Nanni Strozzi shows its emphasis on the human being as well as Florence's role in 
. . 
propagating it: "humanistic studies [ studia humanitatis] themselves, which are the best 
and most distinguished branches of learning and the most appropriate to humankind, 
472 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, p. 90; Kohl and Witt, The Earthly Republic, pp. 14-15; 
Holmes, The Florentine Enlightenment, pp. 15-16·. 
473 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, p. 69; Holmes, The Florentine 
Enlightenment, pp. 31-34; Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers, pp. 8-12. 
474 Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers, p. 11; Reeve, "Classical scholarship," p. 
34. 
475 Quoted in Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers, p. 12. Also quoted by Von 
Martels in "The Kaleidoscope of the Past," p. 100. 
476 Kohl and Witt, Earthly Republic, pp. 8-9; Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, pp. 401-
402, 429. 
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being essential to private as well as to public life, were embellished by our literary 
. erudition and came, with the support of our city, to spread throughout Italy."477 In the 
second half of the fifteenth century, the studia humanitatis came to influence Italian 
culture even more broadly. Not only had the study and imitation of the ancients become 
fashionable, but the fruits of humanist education, research, translation and critical 
methods began to influence other fields of learning such as law, medicine, mathematics, 
theology and philosophy.478 Scholars of the studia humanitatis generally found vocations 
as teachers at secondary schools and universities, as secretaries of princes and republics, 
as scribes or as wealthy amateurs. 479 
Machiavelli, born in 1469, was raised in this ethos. Although his father, Bernardo, 
was of modest means, he loved books and provided his son with a basic education in 
humanistic studies. Niccolo began his study of Latin grammar at age seven, and at eleven 
he began to study arithmetic. Justin was the first history that children read, and Bernardo 
borrowed a copy when Machiavelli was twelve. At the same age, he began doing Latin 
compositions under a new school teacher. Five year later, Bernardo sent his loose copy of 
Livy's Decades to the binders, and it was Machiavelli who went to pick up the bound 
volume.480 When Machiavelli was elected secretary of the second chancery in 1498, it 
was his humanist education which qualified him for the position. His humanist interests 
477 Bruni, The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni, p. 126. 
478 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist Strains, p. 
124; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, pp. 29-30, 91-92; Kohl and Witt, 
The Earthly Republic, p. 19. . 
479 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist Strains, p. 
122; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, pp. 23, 93; Black, "Humanism," 
Pfo· 251, 253. 
0 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, pp. 2-4. 
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remain evident throughout his life, first as secretary and then as a writer. On his legation 
to France in 1500, he brought along Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War. 481 On a 
legation to Cesare Borgia in the fall of 1502, he asked a friend to send him a copy of 
Plutarch's Lives.482 In 1503, he applied his knowledge of Livy to recent Florentine affairs 
in his short discourse "On How to Treat the Populace of Valdichiana after Their 
Rebellion.''483 When he left for Germany on a mission to Emperor Maximilian in the 
winter of 1507, he brought along Tacitus' Germania.484 In his letter to Vettori describing 
his life since losing his position as secretary, he says that in the morning he wanders 
outdoors reading about love in Dante, Petrarch, Tibullus or Ovid and then in the evening 
enters the courts of ancient men to ask them questions. In The Prince's dedicatory letter, 
his reference to his continuous reading of the ancients establishes his humanist 
credentials. 485 And both The Prince and the Discourses show his reading of the ancients 
to be broad and deep. Like other humanists he tends to privilege the ancients of his native 
soil, though he also borrows from the more historically-minded Greek writers such as 
Xenophon, Thucydides, Polybius and Plutarch. 
While Machiavelli's position as Florentine secretary as well as his interest in 
studying and imitating the ancients make him an exemplary humanist, his writings 
challenge certain humanist ideals. Ironically, this challenge to humanism comes from his 
argument for a more thorough imitation of the ancients. As we saw above, some 
481 Ibid., p. 35. 
482 Ibid., pp. 57-58, 270 n. 18. 
483 Ibid., pp. 52, 269 n. 25. 
484 Ibid., p. 103. 
485 On this point see Black, "Humanism," p. 252. 
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Christians criticized the studia humanitatis for being too pagan. For Machiavelli, on the 
other hand, Christian education is still preventing a more thorough and beneficial 
imitation of the ancients. In his view, humanists themselves have held back from 
imitating the ancients where it would be most useful. The spirit of his times, as well as his 
critique of it, is clearly conveyed in the preface to the first book of the Discourses: 
Considering thus how much honor is awarded to antiquity, and how many times-
letting pass infinite other examples-a fragment of an ancient statue has been 
bought at a high price because someone wants to have it near oneself, to honor his 
house with it, and to be able to have it imitated by those who delight in that art, 
and how the latter then strive with all industry to represent it in all their works; 
. and seeing, on the other hand, that the most virtuous works the histories show us, 
which have been done by ancient kingdoms and republics, by kings, captains, 
citizens, legislators, and others who have labored for their fatherland, are rather 
admired than imitated-indeed they are so much shunned by everyone in every 
least thing that no sign of that ancient virtue remains with us-I can do no other 
than marvel and grieve. 
As we saw, Vergerio' s influential treatise on education awarded the most important place 
to.the study of history, and, as Machiavelli acknowledges in the preface, ancient histories 
are widely read and admired; the problem in his eyes is that "the infinite number who 
read them take pleasure in hearing the variety of accidents contained in them without 
thinking of imitating them." He grieves that modems shy away from imitating the 
ancients in their political judgements, but he lays only part of the blame for this on 
Christianity: "This arises, I believe, not so much from the weakness into which the 
present religion has led the world, or from the evil that an ambitious idleness has done to 
many Christian provinces and cities, as from not having a true knowledge of histories, 
through not getting from reading them that sense nor tasting that flavor that they have in 
themselves." While in his view Christianity has made the world weak, his Discourses on 
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Livy is meant to show the truths that can be learned from ancient history and that should 
still be imitated. For Machiavelli, this does not mean the rejection of Christianity but that 
it must be interpreted according to virtue rather than idleness (D 2.2.2 ). As he mourns in 
the preface, whereas knowledge of classical art, jurisprudence and medicine has been 
systematized for imitation, ancient judgements in affairs of state remain "rather admired 
than imitated." In teaching how affairs of state can likewise be imitated he claims to be 
taking "a path as yet untrodden by anyone."486 His friend the historian Jacopo Nardi 
supports this claim to originality in his lstorie della Citta di Firenze when he describes 
the Discourses as: "a work that certainly deals with a new subject, and of a kind that has 
never been attempted. "487 Machiavelli, by systematizing for the benefit of modem affairs 
what the ancients discovered through choice, fate and necessity, sets out to teach "new 
modes and orders." Likewise, in the Art of War, he systematizes what can be learned from 
the ancients about ordering armies. To support his argument for the feasibility of pushing 
the imitation of the ancients into political things,·he concludes the Art of War by writing: 
"this province seems born to resuscitate dead things, as has been seen in poetry, painting, 
and sculpture" (7.247). His writings are in large part a polemic against the education of 
his times mounted through a systematization of ancient knowledge and modem 
experience. 
Turning briefly to Machiavelli's milieu will show what he means when he says 
that although modems read and admire ancient histories, they fail to get their taste. 
486 On this interpretation of Machiavelli's untrodden path see Gilbert, Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini, pp. 158-59. 
487 Bk. 7, quoted in Chabod, Machiavelli and the Renaissance, p. 10. 
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Humanists adopted from Greek and Roman writers the belief that the past is a valuable 
guide to the present, and Machiavelli was of course familiar with the way ancient 
examples were brought up in political discussions. Felix Gilbert--describing Florentine 
consultative meetings (or pratiche ), some of which Machiavelli himself minuted-writes: 
"Speakers in the pratiche referred frequently to the lessons which could be drawn from 
events in Florentine history, but their favorite source was the.history of Rome." Gi~bert 
provides the example of a discussion about whether or not to interrogate Savonarola 
about his associates after he was arrested. A speaker arguing against such an interrogation 
pointed out that Caesar, after he defeated Pompey, refused to read Pompey's letters; 
another speaker countered that if Caesar had read the letters, he may have prevented his 
assassination. 488 Since the Florentines evidently were willing to learn from and imitate 
ancient examples, Machiavelli's particular grievance must be that they were not willing to 
follow ancient examples when they conflicted with their modem education. In the preface 
to the Discourses, he specifies that all those who read ancient histories think that 
imitating them "is not only difficult but impossible" (imitazione non solo difficile ma 
impossibile ). The resistance to imitating the inhumane side of Roman examples is 
apparent in a pratica which occurred on January 28, 1506, on the problem of Arezzo. The 
city had rebelled from Florentine·rule in June of 1502 and was reacquired the following 
month. Machiavelli's short oration On How to Treat the Populace of Valdichiana after 
Their Rebellion criticizes the middle path taken by Florence in its punishment of Arezzo. 
In 1506, the question of how to hold the city was still under discussion. In the pratica of 
488 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 39. 
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January 28, two speakers put forward arguments very similar to those which Machiavelli 
proposes in his oration; that is, they argl;led that the middle way (el mezo) is not useful 
and that what is needed is either to extinguish the Artines, to benefit them or to send in 
new inhabitants.489 Their argument was, however, soundly defeated by the moderate 
position of Giovanbattista Ridolfi and Piero Guicciardini (the father of Francesco 
Guicciardini). Speaking against the idea of sending new inhabitants to colonize a 
conquered town, Piero wrote it off as "a Roman thing" (cos a de' Romani); further, he 
argued that winning the Aretines with benefits would not be possible. In a collection of 
his son's aphorisms compiled twenty-four years later, we see that Francesco Guicciardini 
shared his father's distrust of Roman examples: "How wrong it is to cite the Romans at 
every turn .... In the case of a city with different qualities, the comparison is as much out 
of order as it would be to expect a jackass to race like a horse. ,,490 
In Discourse 3.27, Machiavelli provides an example of how the Florentines in 
their treatment of Pistoia failed to imitate the Romans, explicitly referring back to the aim 
of the Discourses as stated in the preface to the first book: "These are among the errors I 
told of at the beginning that the princes of our times make who have to judge great things, 
for they ought to wish to hear how those who have had to judge such cases in antiquity 
governed themselves." Machiavelli's ancient example is based on an event in Livy 4.10: 
after the city of Ardea became divided by armed conflict, the Romans reunited it by 
killing the leaders of the tumult. Leaming from that example, Machiavelli delineates-three 
489 On this pratica and for the following quotation see Homqvist, Machiavelli and 
Empire, pp. 106-107, and Consulte epratiche 1505-1512, pp. 76-77. 
490 Maxims and Reflections, series C, maxim 110, p. 69. 
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ways to deal with such tumults. The best way is to follow the judgement of the Romans 
and to execute the heads of the tumult. The second way is to remove the heads from the 
city; the third and "most useless" way is to oblige them not to use violence against one 
another (3.27.1). Machiavelli then points out that after armed conflict broke out in Pistoia 
(a city under Florentine control) in 1501, the Florentines followed the third mode. It was 
only when that measure led to further tumults that the Florentines were constrained to 
imprison some of the leaders and to remove others from the city. Machiavelli concedes 
that the later method was effective in ending the tumults, but he argues that the best 
solution would have been to imitate the Romans from the start. To support this argument 
he simply claims that such executions "have in them something of the great and the 
generous" (ii grande ed ii generosa) (3.27.2). In Machiavelli's view humaneness, when 
misapplied, leads to suffering, whereas severity can have a beneficial outcome. He 
acknowledges that the resistance to imitating the Romans arises because their actions are 
considered too inhumane: modem rulers think that imitating t~e ancients is "in part 
inhuman, in part impossible" (parte inumani, parte impossibili). However, in 
Machiavelli's view, this is due to their "weak.education" (educazione), "slight knowledge 
of things" and because they suffer from "certain modem opinions ... altogether distant 
from the true" (3.27.2). 
It is clear that for Machiavelli modem educazione is in conflict with the truth 
contained in ancient history. In both 3.27 and the preface of book 1, he complains that his 
contemporaries believe it is impossible to imitate the ancients in the realm of politics. In 
both places, he also claims it is the failure to understand the lessons of the ancients that 
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make modems weak. As his example of killing the heads of a tumult indicates it is the 
avoidance of severe or inhumane acts-especially the taking of life-that modem 
education makes rulers shy away from. Machiavelli uses educazione throughout the 
Discourses to refer to the sources of one's values and character. At the root of educazione 
is hearing "good or bad said of a thing" (3.46.1). In 2.2.2, he refers to Christian ideals as a 
form of education. He also speaks of nations, cities and families having different 
educations (D 3.43.1, 3.46.1). Religion, nation, city and family all educate one about what 
is good and what is bad. Religion is at the root of educazione, though it cannot be reduced 
to religion alone. In the preface of the Discourses, Machiavelli sets up a striking contrast: 
he calls Christianity "the present religion" as if to acknowledge its historicity; he then 
states that, since antiquity, the heaven, the sun, the elements and human beings have not 
changed. In other words, although religions change, human conditions do not. If 
something was true in antiquity, it is still true now. Religion must be accommodated to 
human conditions. Modem education makes leaders see Roman modes as inhuman and 
impossible. Because modem rulers fail to understand the human condition-"their slight 
knowledge of things" (3.27.2)-they fail to see that the Romans understood the truth 
about affairs of state. When Machiavelli argues for the imitation of their more severe 
practices, his humanistic studies challenge modem educazione. 
The heart of the issue seems to be inhuman severity and Machiavelli's principal 
example killing. As we saw, he argues that executions "have in them something of the 
great and the generous" (3.27.2). What he means by this is elucidated in an earlier chapter 
where he also speaks about the effect of executions. After listing several executions that 
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occurred in the Roman republic he writes: "Because they were excessive and notable, 
such things made men draw back toward the mark whenever one of them arose; and when 
they began to be more rare, they also began to give more space to men to corrupt 
themselves and to behave with greater danger and more tumult" (3.1.3). In Machiavelli's 
view, the severe enforcement of justice keeps people good. His argument is framed to 
make one weigh the benefit of severity against the cost of mercy. He challenges_ the 
educazione of his readers and even taunts them with the extreme statement that "one 
should not wish ten years at most to pass from one to another of such executions" (3.1.3). 
While the end Machiavelli has in view is the conventional one of "religion and justice" 
(3.1.1), the means he recommends is severity. Machiavelli's taste for the extreme is also 
evident in Discourses 1.27.2 where he argues that if Giovampagolo had killed the pope 
and his cardinals the act's "greatness would have surpassed all infamy." In his view, men 
fail to achieve such acts because "when malice has greatness in itself or is generous in 
some part, they do not kno_w how to enter into it" (D 1.27.2). Machiavelli's argument for 
severity challenges the modem opinions of our time as much as the modem opinions of 
his time. In part he was likely challenging the weakness he saw in his time with a 
rhetorical extreme he did not fully intend-presumably he applied his theory about 
avoiding the middle way in order to avoid mediocrity as a rhetorical strategy in his own 
writings. At the same time, it is clear he favoured a more thorough imitation of the 
Romans, one which contemporary opinion considered to be too inhumane. Guicciardini 
points to Machiavelli's extremism in his commentary on the Discourses when he writes 




491 However, as Machiavelli says in Prince 6, if one has a distant target one 
must aim above it in order "to achieve their plan." 
Despite Machiavelli's emphasis on severe measures, he is not averse to the virtue. 
of humanity (umanita). What he opposes is taking a middle way between humanity and 
severity. This is another principle he learns from the Romans: "they always fled from the 
middle way and turned to extremes" (D 2.23.2). For Machiavelli, humanity is only a 
weakness when it leads to ineffective. action. In Discourses 3.20.1, he notes that a great 
example of humanity can sometimes accomplish more than force. However, for 
Machiavelli it is a matter of acting on one extreme or the other. In Discourses 3.21, he 
compares the humanity of Scipio to the cruelty of Hannibal. The comparison of these two 
great generals was a common humanist topos, already seen in Petrarch's On Famous Men 
when he praises the virtue of Scipio over the fury of Hannibal. 492 When Machiavelli 
compares the humanity of Scipio to the cruelty of Hannibal, he argues that since both 
were successful commanders "the mode in which a captain proceeds is not very 
important" (3.21.4). He acknowledges that Hannibal's mode was "detestable" and 
Scipio's "praiseworthy" but nonetheless endorses both based on their equal effectiveness .. 
He also rules out the possibility of taking a "middle way," justifying his preference for the 
extreme by arguing that to the former "our nature does not consent" (3.21.3). In the 
following chapter, he compares the severity (severita) of Manlius and the humanity 
(umanita) of Valerius. He judges that in a republic it is better to imitate Manlius' severity 
since it preserves the common good without creating partisans, whereas for a prince it is 
491 Considerations of the Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli, p. 412. 
492 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, p .. 93. 
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better to imitate Valerius' humanity since it gives rise to love and obedience (3.22.4-5). 
Jacopo Nardi, one of Machiavelli's acquaintances from the Orti Oricellari, also discusses 
Manlius and Valerius in his Vita di Antonio Giacomini. He praises Giacomini, a 
Florentine military commander, for being both feared and loved by combining the 
qualities of Manlius and Valerius. 493 Machiavelli, on the other hand, does not even 
consider the possibility of such a combination; for him, it is a matter of one extreme or 
the other. Despite his argument in the Discourses, in the Florentine Histories Machiavelli 
shows in passing that the combination of severity and humanity can make a ruler popular. 
We see this in the case of the Duke of Athens, though once he acquired the lordship of 
Florence, "the severity and humanity [ severita e umanita] he had feigned were converted 
into arrogance and cruelty" (FH 2.36). In general, however, Machiavelli rejects the 
conventional wisdom of the middle way in favor of the extreme. His position is a polemic 
not only against Aristotle but also against one of the pillars of Florentine foreign policy at 
his time.494 Even a hundred years earlier, Leonardo Bruni, in his Panegyric to the City of 
Florence, calls the middle way "a.proven principle for all things."495 
As Machiavelli points out in the Art of War, another effect of Christian education 
is that victors now show more humanity toward the conquered than in ancient times. 
Machiavelli has Fabrizio attribute the neglect of military training in their time to that 
change: 
493 Homqvist, "Perche non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine 
Militia of 1506," p. 182 n. 138. 
494 On the middle way in Florentine policy see Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 
34; Homqvist, Machiavelli and Empire, p. 99. 
495 Bruni, Panegyric to the City of Florence, p. 13 7. 
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today's mode of living, on account of the Christian religion, does not impose that 
necessity to defend oneself that there was in antiquity. For then, men conquered in 
war were either killed or remained in perpetual slavery, where they led their lives 
miserably. Their conquered towns were either dissolved or, their goods taken, the 
inhabitants were driven out and sent dispersed throughout the world. So those 
overcome in war suffered every last misery. Frightened by this fear, men kept 
military training alive and honored whoever was excellent in it. But today this 
fear is for the most part lost. Of the conquered, few of them are killed; no one is 
kept in prison for long, because they are freed with ease. Even though they have 
rebelled a thousand times, cities are not demolished and men are left with their 
goods, so that the greatest evil that is feared is a ransom. So men do not want to 
submit themselves to military orders and to struggle along beneath them so as to 
flee those dangers they little fear. (2.59-60) 
As in Discourses 2.2 where Machiavelli also discuses why the ancients loved freedom 
more than modems, he finds the main cause in the difference between pagan religion and 
Christian religion. In Discourses 2.2.2, the difference he focuses on is that pagan religion 
places the highest good in worldly glory, whereas Christianity places the highest good in 
going to paradise. In the Art of War he describes another effect of the difference: 
Christianity makes people more humane. Because they are more humane, less is at stake 
when a city loses its freedom. According to Fabrizio, it is the loss of fear for one's city, 
freedom and life that has led to the neglect of military virtue. Machiavelli clearly regrets 
the effect of this humanity: the loss of the fundamental importance given to military virtu. 
There is nothing, however, to suggest he regrets the loss of the cause: the practice of 
killing and enslaving the conquered. As much as Machiavelli struggles against the 
educazione of his times, he is still a product of it, and his call for an imitation of the 
ancients is at least in part tempered by the role of humanitas in that educazione. 
The humanizing effect of Christian education was also of interest to later writers. 
Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), writes: 
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Let us envisage, on the other hand, the continual massacres of the kings 
and leaders of the Greeks and Romans, and on the other, the destruction of 
peoples and towns by Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, the very leaders who ravaged 
Asia, and we shall see that we owe to Christianity both a certain political right in 
government and a certain right of nations in war, for which human nature can 
never be sufficiently grateful. 
This right of nations, among ourselves, has the result that victory leaves to 
the vanquished these great things: life, liberty, laws, goods, and always religion 
(book 24, chapter 3).496 
Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu attributes the more humane treatment of the vanquished 
to Christianity. For Montesquieu, this is because Christianity "orders men to love one 
another" and because the gospel recommends "gentleness" (la douceur).497 Whereas for 
Machiavelli the main point is that Christian humaneness has removed the fear of being 
conquered and thus led to the loss of military virtue, for Montesquieu the main point is 
the gratitude we owe to Christianity for the humanity it has instilled in Christians. 
When we come to Clausewitz in the early eighteenth century, we see him writing 
against contemporary "historians and theorists" who, in the name of humanity, argue for a 
type of warfare based on manoeuver rather than bloodshed. His succinct reply is: 
We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact 
that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but 
not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. 
Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our 
arms (book 4, chapter 11).498 
While for Montesquieu the humanity of Christian victors is a virtue, Clausewitz warns 
that feelings of humanity become a vice when they lead people to forget how to defend 
themselves. In Machiavelli's view, the Christian teaching that it is better to suffer than to 
496 On this passage in relation to Machiavelli see Beiner, Civil Religion, p. 32 n. 10. 
497 Bk. 24, chs. 1 and 3. 
498 Also see Waltz's comments on this passage in Man, the State and War, p. 221. 
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be strong had already achieved that in his time: "This mode of life thus seems to have 
rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men" (2.2.2 ). In both Machiavelli 
and Clausewitz we see the warning that feelings of humanity may lead to the loss of 
military virtue. If an education that places too much emphasis on humanity can 
inadvertently lead to barbarity, then humanism must remain prudent. But comparing 
Machiavelli's attempt to inspire military virtues by turning to extremes and Cicero's ideal 
of balancing humanity (humanitas) and discipline (severitas), it seems that Cicero offers a 
more solid ground for avoiding both the extreme of the ancient barbarity shunned by 
Montesquieu and the extreme of allowing your political community to be prey. 
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Machiavelli and the Quality of the Times 
To conclude I would like to draw together a few reflections on Machiavelli's 
character and then to draw out some significant differences between his time and ours. 
Machiavelli's judgements would likely clash with the spirit of any time as he was driven 
to question conventional pieties, to condemn corruption and to idolize rare virtue. The 
polemical quality evident in his writings is also confirmed by a contemporary of his who 
said he loved to play "advocatus diaboli.''499 Guicciardini, in a friendly letter to 
Machiavelli, points to his well-known character in a diplomatic fashion: "you have 
always been considered exceedingly extravagant in your opinions by most people, and the 
inventor of new and outlandish things. "500 Thus even in his own city and time, his 
reputation preceded him. Still, Machiavelli's biographers agree that his character also 
reflects the qualities of his native city; Ridolfi refers to him as "that quintessential 
Florentine" and Capponi maintains that Machiavelli had "all the traits typical of the 
Florentines of his day (and even of today): love of contradiction, provocation, and bella 
figura, with a pronounced jocular streak as seasoning. "501 
After Machiavelli lost his post as secretary of the second chancery and the Ten of 
War, he never again attained the high office he so desired. Instead, he turned to writing 
and, based on those writings, found many who--at different times and for different 
499 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 164. 
500 Guicciardini to Machiavelli, May 18, 1521, in Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 339. 
501 Ridolfi, Life of Machiavelli, p. ix; Capponi, An Unlikely Prince, p. xi. On how 
Machiavelli's character is typically Florentine also seeAn Unlikely Prince, pp. xii, 10-14, 




reasons-either dishonoured him or defended him. Ernst Cassirer, writing in 1945, warns 
that our understanding of Machiavelli now suffers from knowing him too well: we may 
read his private letters, study his career and have his collected works. His life, Cassirer 
ackno~ledges, bears witness to "an honest and upright man." However as a result 
fondness for his character may conceal the "flagrant contradiction between Machiavelli's 
political doctrine and his personal and moral character."502 For Cassirer, Machiavelli's 
character has no bearing on the content of his teachings. · 
The question remains, if Machiavelli was a good man, how could he counsel evil 
acts? As we have just seen, it seems Machiavelli himself was the sort of person who took 
pleasure in such contradictions, and perhaps what allowed him to speak so shockingly 
was his own confidence in his commitment to the common good. Nietzsche, in his 
reading of The Prince, notes all of the above: its Florentine character, its contrasts, its 
humour. The Prince, he writes, "lets us breathe the subtle dry air of Florence and cannot 
help presenting the most serious affairs in a boisterous allegrissimo: not perhaps without 
a malicious artist's sense of the contrast he is risking-thoughts protracted, difficult, hard, 
dangerous and the tempo of the gallop and the most wanton good humour. "503 And 
Strauss too confesses that when one understands that "some of the most outrageous 
statements of the Prince are not meant seriously but serve a merely pedagogic 
function ... one sees that they are amusing and meant to amuse."504 Perhaps they are right 
that for Machiavelli The Prince was not meant to be altogether foreign to laughter. 
502 The Myth of the State, pp. 127-28; also seep. 144. 
503 Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 28. 
504 Thoughts on Machiavelli, p. 82. 
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Nonetheless, in the preface to the Discourses, Machiavelli himself shows an awareness of 
the need to justify his writings, saying: "driven by that natural desire that has always been 
in me to work, without any respect, for those things I believe will bring common benefit 
to everyone, I have decided to take a path as yet untrodden by anyone, and if it brings me 
trouble and difficulty ffastidio e difficulta ], it could also bring me reward through those 
who consider humanely the end of these labors of mine~" This sentiment is echoed in 
another text he was likely working on at the same time: "Whenever I have had an 
opportunity of honouring my country, even if this involved me in trouble and danger 
[carico e pericolo ], I have done it willingly, for a man is under no greater obligation than 
to his country. ,,sos Machiavelli recognizes that only those who read his works humanely 
will praise him; from the others he expects trouble and difficulty. Should we not allow 
what we know of his character as well as his persistent claim to work for the good to 
influence how we hear his works? Indeed, it would be cynical and uncharitable to assume 
he was untruthful when he stated that his aim is to "bring common benefit to everyone." 
Such a claim would seem to raise his discourse above Florentine or Italian patriotism to a 
concern with humanity. 
In my view, the problem of mitigating Machiavelli's radicalism arises not from 
knowing his character too well but from glossing over what is difficult and dangerous in 
his writings. Indeed, both apologists and detractors alike may elide, bend and collate his 
writings to produce the Machiavelli they seek. To let Machiavelli speak for himself, I 
505 A Dialogue on Language, p. 17 5. Also see his letter of May 17, 1521: "never did I 
disappoint that republic whenever I was able to help her out-· if not with deeds, then with 
words; if not with words, then with signs" (Machiavelli and His Friends, p. 336). 
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have tried to listen to both his harsh judgements and his considered qualifications. While 
many of his blunt counsels and amoral analyses were, and still are, shocking, his writings, 
at the very least, have the merit of provoking thought. To delve further into the question 
of the value of his counsels, I will conclude by considering how his thought stands in 
relation to our times and in particular to twentieth-century realism. I will also briefly 
consider some ofNietzsche's thoughts on external politics since they help to demonstrate 
that there has been a significant turn away from Machiavelli's assumption that politics 
and patriotism are the highest ends for human beings. 
Machiavelli's Realism and Twentieth-Century Realism 
Any ruler who wishes to maintain the state's well-being and to uphold morality 
will likely, at least on occasion, discover a conflict between the two. Machiavelli belabors 
this conflict between necessity and morality not only because avoiding it leads to unclear 
thinking but also to actual danger. His disturbing argument that entering into evil is 
necessary when not doing so spells ruin became a staple of twentieth-century-realism, 
though couched in less strident terms. Reinhold Niebuhr, in his seminal work Moral Man 
and Immoral Society (1932), asks: "An individual may sacrifice his own interests, either 
without hope of reward or in the hope of an ultimate compensation. But how is an 
individual, who is responsible for the interests of his group, to justify the sacrifice of 
interests other than his own?"506 While Niebuhr censures the pursuit of unjust interests 
and points out that it may be prudent for a group to sacrifice immediate interests for 
506 For this citation and the following seep. 267. 
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higher mutual interests, he nonetheless concludes that "fewer risks can be taken with 
community interests than with individual interests." The main thesis of Niebuhr's book, 
evident in its title, is a point Machiavelli insists upon: the morality that applies between 
individuals cannot simply be transposed into the political realm. Kenneth Waltz, in Man, 
the State and War (1954), the precursor to his neorealist classic, reiterates the dilemma 
upon which Machiavelli focuses so much ene~gy: "leaders of the state may have to 
choose between behaving immorally in international politics in order to preserve the state, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, abandoning their moral obligation to ensure their 
state's survival in order to follow preferred ways of acting in international politics."507 
The shocking sting of Machiavelli's polemical words is absent in Waltz's balanced 
framing of the same problem: that in foreign affairs rulers may sometimes face a conflict 
between two different goods (acting morally and avoiding ruin), and in Waltz's framing 
avoiding ruin is itself considered a moral good. His implied argument that the state's 
survival is a more fundamental moral obligation than the good of observing commonly 
accepted moral rules rings with an almost commonsensical air. Hans Morgenthau, in 
Politics among Nations, the textbook of classical twentieth-century realism, gives the 
problem a pithy formulation: "The individual may say for himself, 'Fiatjustitia, pereat 
mundus (Let justice be done, even ifthe world perish),' but the state has no right to say so 
in the name of those who are in its care."508 From the realist point of view, it is 
uncontroversial, at least in outline, that if contravening morality is necessary to preserve 
507 Man, the State and War, p. 207. 
508 Politics among Nations, p. 12. Hegel makes a similar argument: ''fiat iustitia should 
not have pereat mundus as its consequence" (Philosophy of Right, sec. 130). 
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the state, and thus the well-being of one's fellow citizens, then such necessity takes 
precedence over the moral principles that operate under normal circumstances. 
Leo Strauss also grants that the independence and slirvival of a political 
community justifies acting against what is normally considered just; he is, however, more 
circumspect about promulgating the argument. In Natural Right and History (1950), he 
points out: "In extreme situations there may be conflicts between what the self-
preservation of society requires and the requirements of commutative and distributive 
justice."509 However for Strauss the difficulties that arise from this conflict should be 
"covered with the veil with which they are justly covered." Like Bernardo del Nero in 
Guicciardini's Dialogue on the Government of Florence, Strauss believes such things are 
not to be discussed publicly.510 Yet as del Nero is willing to discuss such matters among 
friends, Strauss is willing to hint at them in his writings (and also, though not in his own 
name, to elucidate them forcefully). 
Unless one is willing to say "let justice be done, even ifthe world perish," then 
one accepts at least the heart of Machiavelli's argument. Once could argue however, as 
Strauss does, that such a view should nonetheless be veiled. But Machiavelli, unlike 
Strauss, clearly felt that the extreme situation reveals a truth too important to veil. In his 
view Christian idleness held Italy in such a deep slumber that it had become the prey of 
others and only the urgency and clarity of the extreme situation could awaken it. 
Nonetheless, Strauss' concern with veiling necessary violations of justice is similar to 
Machiavelli's concern that princes veil with the appearance of virtue the unjust acts that 
509 This and the following citation are from Natural Right and History, p. 160. 
510 See Dialogue on the Government of Florence, bk. 2, p. 159. 
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are necessary to preserve the state (P 18). While their arguments arise from a similar 
concern, Machiavelli puts the stress on religion and Strauss on moraiity. Machiavelli's 
argument aims to preserve both the honour of the prince, despite the necessity of acting 
against moral virtue, and the status ofreligion (P 18; D 1.12.1). Strauss nonetheless argues 
that Machiavelli's "immoral" teaching "is bound to strengthen the forces of moral 
depravity.'.'511 Machiavelli himself does not seem to think that the argument from 
necessity will undermine public morality; for him the argument pertains to the art of state, 
not the civil way of life. His repeated emphasis on the importance of good laws shows 
that he presupposes the value of moral conduct in the domestic sphere (and also that it has 
to be enforced).512 In Machiavelli's view what undermines public morality is undermining 
religion.513 One of my principal reasons for writing on Machiavelli has been to discuss 
among friends these moral problems that arise so clearly in the extreme situation. My 
own view is that by acknowledging Machiavelli's core argument that rulers must 
sometimes act against moral virtue, the even more difficult question of determining when 
a course of action is a justifiable necessity and which ends excuse which means may be 
rationally and humanely considered. 
Morality and Risk 
Machiavelli's justification of the violation of morality is least controversial when 
he rests it on the argument that the safety of the fatherland overrides any ignominy (D 
511 Thoughts on Machiavelli, pp. 11-12. 
512 See P 12; D 1.2.3, 1.3.1-2, 1.10.4, 1.16.5, 1.42.1, 1.45.1-2, 1.55.2, 2 preface, 3.1.3, 3.1.5, 
3.31.4, 3.46.1. 
513 See P 12; D 1.n, 1.12, 1.55.2, 2 preface, 3.1.2; AW 1.129, 4.141-46, 6.125. 
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3.41.1). However, the occasions on which a political community faces the choice between 
committing an ignominious act and certain ruin are rare. As Michael Walzer points out, 
realists often use the language of "necessity" in order to mask what are in truth 
"probabilities and risks."514 But just as the argument from necessity masks what are 
actually risks and probabilities, the argument that moral norms should always be observed 
often ignores the risks and dangers that may come from doing so. In his own writings, 
Machiavelli repeatedly points out that what may seem to be the more moral policy may in 
fact carry great risk. The policy of temporizing rather than turning to force (or the threat 
of force) may, for example, seem to be a more moral policy, but Machiavelli argues that 
such a course can be fatal: "when one foresees [troubles] from afar, one can easily find a 
remedy for them but when you wait until they come close to you, the medicine is not in 
time because the disease has become incurable" (P 3). A modem example of the principle 
that it is more prudent to act early than to temporize was voiced by Winston Churchill in 
1946 in relation to the threat of Soviet expansionism: 
Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by mere waiting to see what 
happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is 
a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the 
greater our dangers will become.515 
The policy that prima facie seems to be more pacific or moral may in fact be the best 
policy; the point I wish to make here-in the spirit of Machiavelli-is simply that there is 
good reason to be skeptical of moral positions which fail to acknowledge the risks that 
come with them. 
514 Just and Unjust Wars, p. 8. 
515 Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 442. 
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Though Machiavelli uses the word "ruin" _in a broad sense, its most extreme case 
refers to a change of government (and all the consequences that come with it) by force, 
either from within the state or by a foreign power. While states in Italy at Machiavelli's 
time were more vulnerable to "ruin" than states in the West have been since the birth of 
the modem territorial state, the extreme situation remains something to be guarded 
against. Walzer discusses a modem _example in Just and Unjust Wars: from the defeat of 
France in the summer of 1940 until the summer of 1942, when Hitler's armies remained 
everywhere undefeated, Britain faced a "supreme emergency."516 Although Walzer 
accepts that the bombing of German cities was a "crime," he justifies Britain's decision to 
do so since it "was made at a time when victory was not in sight and the specter of defeat 
ever present."517 He argues that after the summer of 1942, the supreme emergency had 
passed and thus the continued bombing of cities was "without moral (and probably also 
without military) reason."518 According to this argument, in a supreme emergency, a 
criminal action may have a moral purpose-maintaining the very existence of the state. 
This reasoning is similar to the reasoning that Machiavelli advocates, though whereas 
Walzer gives a narrow scope to the criteria of a supreme emergency (a nation's or a 
people's very freedom or existence is threatened and their options are exhausted), 
Machiavelli grants a wide scope to the meaning of "ruin" and therefore when moral 
standards can be contravened to prevent it. 
516 This discussion can be found on pp. 251-63. 
517 Just and Unjust Wars, p. 258. 
518 Ibid., p. 261. 
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The problem is manifold: how to balance concern for the well-being of one's own, 
concern for the humane treatment of other peoples and concern for moral norms 
themselves? Since in a contest of goodwill and force, force will prevail, the more faith 
that is put in goodwill, the more risk is taken. Rulers may accept' some risk to their state's 
own interests in order to respect moral norms, but, at some indeterminate point, the risks 
may begin to jeopardize the very security of the state. The willingness to assume some 
risk places hope in the proposition that goodwill and respect for moral norms may 
favourably influence others,. behaviour. Seen in this light, respecting morality means 
accepting some degree of collective risk for the sake of a good that transcends one's own 
collective: a common and mutual respect for moral relations. 
Alexander Wendt explores how such cooperative relations may grow out of the 
competitive relations that states find themselves in.519 The states system, he argues, does 
not dictate competitive power politics since the type of relations states develop depend 
upon how they interact with each other. Based on those interactions, they may develop 
either competitive or cooperative relations; thus he argues that "power politics are 
socially constructed."520 To transform a competitive system into one based on cooperative 
interests, a state must gain the trust of others and show that it poses no threat to their 
security. "The fastest way to do this," he writes, "is to make unilateral initiatives and self-
519 See "Anarchy Is What States Make oflt: The Social Construction of Power Politics" 
(1992). 
520 Ibid., p. 395. 
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binding commitments."521 He acknowledges, however, that this involves risk: "by 
themselves such practices cannot transform a competitive security system, since if they 
are not reciprocated by alter, they will expose ego to a 'sucker' payoff and quickly wither 
on the vine. "522 In other words, if asymm~trical practices are not reciprocated, they may 
become dangerous to the initiator. 
Emmanuel Levinas-likely the twentieth century's most radical moral 
philosopher of "the other"-recognizes the relationship between morality and risk 
whenever he turns his thoughts to Israel. In "The State of Caesar and the State of David" 
(1971), he proposes that the task of "monotheistic politics" is finding a way between "the 
methods of the Caesars" and "incautious moralism."523 Similarly, in "Politics After!'·' 
(1979), he speaks of forging an alternative to both "Realpoliti'/C' and "incautious 
idealism. "524 
While the negation of moral freedom through the appeal to necessity should 
always be questioned, the escape into incautious idealism must also be avoided. Since it is 
prudent to consider the risks and probabilities of all options, a cautious moralism or a 
moral realism is needful, one which aims to avoid creating insecurity by tempting others 
to use force due to one's vulnerability but that also strives to avoid heightening insecurity 
by compelling others into power politics due to fear of one's strength. 
521 Ibid., p. 421. This recalls Machiavelli's point that a state could decrease the fear it 
causes its neighbours by ordering "a constitution and laws to prohibit it from expanding"· 
(D 1.6.4). Machiavelli goes on, however, to reject the feasibility of such a policy. 
522 
"Anarchy Is What States Make oflt," p. 422. 
523 Levinas Reader, p. 276. 
524 Ibid., p. 283. 
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The Dawn of the Age of Balance 
While Machiavelli advocates the ·goal of acquiring imperium, he was aware of the 
concept of balancing power. Describing the period before Charles VIII and his army 
overran Italy like an unstoppable flood, he writes: "Italy was in balance in a certain 
mode" (Italia era in uno certo modo bilanciata) (P 20). He also recognizes the prudence 
of balancing power in Prince 21. While his main point is that if a small state seeks the aid 
of a stronger one, the latter would be prudent to join arms with it for the ruin of a third 
state, he points out that if the power that sought aid "were wise" it would have preserved 
the other small power. While this counsel shows that he takes for granted the utility of 
expansion, he nonetheless recognizes that weaker states would be wise to ally against a 
stronger one. In general, however, Machiavelli's sights are set on acquisition as not only 
the norm but as a necessary goal. Acquisition is, he says in Prince 3, "very natural and 
ordinary" (P 3). In the Discourses, he writes that since states must "either rise or fall," 
necessity dictates that they be ordered to expand (1.6.4). Guicciardini presents a similar 
picture in his Dialogue on the Government of Florence (written in the early 1520s): "The 
preservation and expansion of the dominion depend on outside factors, that is, the 
behaviour of the other powers, who continually think of expansion and usurping the 
territory of others. "525 
The ancient and medieval view of imperium as a good was still generally accepted 
at Machiavelli's time. The principal moral question about acquisition was only whether it 
was just or unjust. States could expand in one of four main ways: a prince inheriting 
525 Dialogue on the Government of Florence, bk. 1, p. 58. 
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territory through marriage, a political community submitting to another for protection, 
purchasing a state from another power or the use of force. The general acceptance of 
acquisition as a good rested on the assumption that imperium is the surest means to secure 
the liberty of one's own state. As M. S. Anderson notes, the Italian states of the 
Renaissance were locked in an intense competition "for power, for territory, in the last 
analysis for survival. "526 Machiavelli's championing of expansion as a legitimate aim of 
states is extreme only in that he almost wholly disregards the question of justice. As we 
have seen, he argues in the Discourses that the only way to secure one's state against 
others is to enlarge one's.own: "it is impossible for a republic to succeed in staying quiet 
and enjoying its freedom and little borders. For if it will not molest others, it will be 
molested, and from being molested will arise the wish and the necessity to acquire" 
(2.19.1, also see 1.6.4). Thus affairs of state are a perpetual struggle for survival, liberty 
and imperium. 
Although Machiavelli argues that the Roman mode is the true mode of expanding, 
he recognizes a league of several republics as "the best mode after that of the Romans" (D 
2.4.2). Leagues, he says, have "two goods": the first is that they do not easily go to war 
(since it is difficult for them to consult and decide and because they have to share any 
new acquisitions); the second good is that they are strong enough to hold what they 
acquire (2.4.2). It is worth pausing to note that Machiavelli considers it a "good" for a 
state not to take on a war easily. He further argues that leagues have a natural limit in 
terms of size: "having arrived at a rank that seems to enable them to defend themselves 
526 The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, p. 3. 
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from everyone, they do not seek larger dominion, both because necessity does not 
constrain them to have more power and because they do not see any usefulness in 
acquisitions" (2.4.2 ). Here Machiavelli again points to the underlying reason that states · 
seek dominion: necessity constrains a state to have enough power to defend itself because 
only then does it live "securely" (2.4.2). Although he does not use the balance metaphor, 
he clearly recognizes how an alliance may be used to balance power for the sake of 
security. He ends his discussion of the different modes of expanding by conceding that if 
the Roman mode is too difficult to imitate, then the present Tuscans should imitate the 
league of the ancient Tuscans. 
While for Machiavelli a balancing league was only the second best mode, some 
writers at his time began to praise a policy of balance over aggrandizement. The image of 
scales and the concept of balance first made their appearance in Renaissance painting, 
medical theory and music theory, and then spread to political discourse in the mid to late 
quattrocento.527 The first uses of the balance concept are usually attributed to Bernardo 
Rucellai and Francesco Guicciardini.528 The idea is, however, attested earlier. In 1447, 
when the Visconti duke died without heir and the Milanese declared their state a republic, 
its dominion over its subject territories became vulnerable. Responding to this turn of 
events, Francesco Barbaro, Venice's leading humanist at the time, wrote a memorandum 
527 See Vagts, "The Balance of Power," p. 89ff. 
528 See for example Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 199. Gilbert writes that 
Rucellai's book "introduced the term 'balance of power' into political literature" 
("Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricelleri," p. 216). 
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advising that Venice put its security "more in the balance of things than in arms. "529 
Venice has a choice, he wrote, "either to enlarge our dominion or to augment common 
liberty and save the peace of Italy." He warned, as in fact happened, that if Venice used 
the weakening of Milan to enlarge its own dominion, then its cooperative relation with 
Florence would be ruined by "suspicion" and "wars. "530 Rather than pursue 
aggrandizement, Barbaro envisioned welcoming the new Ambrosian Republic into the 
republican alliance of Venice, Florence and Genoa. 
The political memoir of Marco Parenti shows that some Florentines responded to 
the situation with a similar vision; favourably reporting an idea discussed at the time, he 
lays out how a policy of "counterbalancing" ( contrapesando) could secure peace between 
a free Florence, Venice and Milan: 
since the space between Florence and Venice, and from Venice to Milan, and 
from Milan to Florence is quasi equidistant in the form of a triangle, in this way 
on every side, like a point, there would be a powerful city to keep the peace of 
Italy strong, the third one always counterbalancing the other two if they wished to 
clash.531 
This model of a tripartite balance acknowledges that any one part may still be tempted to 
aggrandize itself but that the other two parts would act as a deterrent, thus maintaining 
peace. The vision of a balance between friendly republics was, however, quickly 
shattered, as Venice extended its dominion westward, and Francesco Sforza overthrew 
the new Milanese republic, making himself duke. Lorenzo de' Medici responded to 
529 This quotation and the following may be found in Phillips, The Memoir of Marco 
Parenti, p. 232. I also here draw on Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, 
pp. 396-99. 
530 Quoted in Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, p. 398. 
531 Quoted in Phillips, The Memoir of Marco Parenti, p. 231. 
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Venice's expansionism by allying first with Milan and then with Naples, a policy for 
which, as we will see, he was greatly praised. 
Rucellai opens his history of the invasion of Charles VIII, De Bello ltalico, by 
arguing that Lorenzo de' Medici had preserved peace in Italy by pursuing the principle 
that "things must be kept in equal balance. "532 His portrait of Lorenzo as a wise ruler 
concerned with balancing the power of Venice became an enduring topos, especially after 
Guicciardini repeated it in his History of Italy. 533 In Guicciardini' s much-cited words, 
Lorenzo "carefully saw to it that the Italian situation should be maintained in a state of 
balance [in modo bilanciate], not leaning more toward one side than the other."534 
Although neither Rucellai nor Guicciardini use the expression "the balance of power," it 
came into common use soon after Guicciardini's work was published posthumously in 
1561.535 In the first English translation, which appeared in 1579, the translator begins his 
dedication to Queen Elizabeth: "God has put into your hands the balance of power and 
justice. "536 Giovanni Botero, in Reason of State ( 15 89), supports the idea that Lorenzo de' 
Medici maintained "Italy at peace for a long time by balancing the powers. "537 Likewise, 
Alberico Gentili in his De jure belli libri tres (1598): "This it is which was the constant 
care of Lorenzo de Medici, that wise man, friend of peace and father of peace, namely 
532 Quoted in Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 114-15. Gilbert argues that 
Rucellai's work was conceived in 1495 and completed by 1509 ("Bernardo Rucellai and 
the Orti Oricelleri," pp. 216, 225, 501 n. 50). 
533 Guicciardini finished his History by 1540, the year he died. It circulated in manuscript 
as early as 1546 but was not published until 1561 (Vagts, "The Balance of Power," p. 96). 
534 History of Italy, bk. 1, pp. 4-7. 
535 For other sixteenth century uses of the balance concept see Anderson, The Balance of 
Power, pp. 151-52. 
536 Quoted in Vagts, "The Balance of Power," p. 97. 
537 Quoted in Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 33. 
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that the balance of power should be maintained among the princes ofltaly."538 And 
Francis Bacon takes up the idea in his essay "Of Empire" (1612): 
there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one, which 
ever holdeth; which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their 
neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by 
approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were. 
And this is generally the work of standing counsels to foresee and to hinder it. 
During the triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the 
First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was·such a watch kept, 
that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would 
straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and 
would not in any wise take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that 
league (which Guicciardine saith was the security of Italy) made between 
Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius medices, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, 
the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the 
schoolmen to be received, that 'a war cannot be justly made but upon a precedent 
injury or provocation'. For there is no question but a just fear of an imminent 
danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war. 539 
According to the general rule described by Bacon, if a neighbor increases in power-
whether through territory, trade or moving forces to the border-a balance needs be 
reestablished. As he notes this may be done in two ways: by forming a confederation to 
balance the power or if need be through war. He notes with approval that kings prefer to 
go to war than to maintain peace when a neighbor grows in power and could later use it 
against them. He rebuts the scholastic position, represented by a quotation from Aquinas, 
that for war to be just the neighbour must first wrong one; in Bacon's view a neighbour's 
territorial growth or domination in trade may itself give rise to "a just fear of an imminent 
danger." Here one of the difficulties inherent in the concept of the balance of power 
comes to the surface: the concept, while meant to maintain peace, may justify war. 
538 Quoted in ibid., p. 32. 
539 Bacon, The Major Works, p. 377. This essay was first published in the second edition 
of the Essays (1612) and enlarged in the third edition (1625). 
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The idea of balancing power continued to gain ground in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. A treaty between France and Denmark in 1645 committed them to· 
maintaining "that old and healthy balance (ancient et salutaire equilibre) which has until 
now served as the foundation of peace and public tranquility. "540 The Treaty of 
Westphalia, which in 1648 marked the end of the Thirty Years' War, was implicitly based 
on the balance of power concept.541 By the· latter part of the seventeenth century, the 
principle achieved general acceptance in Europe. 542 The Anglo-Spanish Treaty of Utrecht 
( 1713) formally recognized the aim of securing peace through "a just Balance of 
Power."543 The crown prince Frederick of Prussia, in The Refutation of Machiavelli's 
Prince (1739-1740), emphasizes the important changes, including the idea of balance, that 
have occurred since Machiavelli lived: 
But what would Machiavelli himself say if he could see the new form of 
the European body politic: so many great princes figuring now in the world who 
didn't amount to anything then, the power of kings solidly established, the manner 
in which sovereigns negotiate-those privileged spies maintained reciprocally in 
all the courts, and the balance of Europe which establishes the alliance of some 
important princes in order to oppose the ambitious-wisely maintaining equality 
with no other goal than the tranquility of the world? 
All these things have produced such a general and universal change that 
they render most of Machiavelli's maxims inapplicable and useless to modem 
politics. 544 
However, as many have pointed out, and as Fredrick himself recognized, once he became 
king of Prussia he no longer found Machiavelli's maxims so inapplicable (and in fact 
540 Quoted in Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, p. 154. 
541 Holbom, A History of Modern Germany, p. 362; Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 
37; Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, p. 21. 
542 Sheehan, The Balance of Power, pp. 34-35; Butterfield, The Balance of Power, p. 139. 
543 Quoted in Wight, The Balance of Power, p. 153. Also see Anderson, The Rise of 
Modern Diplomacy, p. 164. 
544 Frederick of Prussia, The Refutation of Machiavelli's Prince, p. 76. 
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when he became king in 1740 he wrote to Voltaire, his collaborator on the book, asking 
him to prevent it from going public; it was however too late). 545 The above quote is of 
particular interest here insofar as it shows to what extent the balance concept had become 
part of the discourse and practice in European foreign affairs. 
On the one hand, after Machiavelli's time, the continuing role of the struggle over 
imperium cannot be denied: would-be hegemons, colonial expansion, expansion in the 
New World, the Second World War, the Cold War and so on. On the other hand, theory 
and practice in Europe underwent significant changes in the centuries that followed his 
time. First, the balance-of-power principle was aimed precisely at preventing the 
emergence of an imperial power. Secondly, whereas at Machiavelli's time the main way 
to increase power was still to expand in dominion over territory and men, through the 
ever-quickening march of technology, power could increasingly be developed internally 
through industry and armaments. Then too borders became more fixed and less fluid. 546 
Thus Machiavelli's advocacy of the imperialistic Roman mode lost his explicit 
justification for it: that the only two possibilities for a state are expanding or contracting 
(D 1.6.4). If there is an alternative that does not risk ruin-balancing power-then 
expansion is not necessary. What Machiavelli himself called "the true political way of 
life," that is, staying within one's boundaries, ordered only for. defense, becomes a 
feasible policy (D 1.6.4). Nonetheless, two different questions seem to get conflated here: 
firstly, which is the better way of life, being on the march for conquest or enjoying peace 
545 Ibid., p. 14; Meinecke, Machiavellism, p. 301. 




at home? And, secondly, which is the more secure way oflife, pursuing expansion or 
staying within one's boundaries? While Machiavelli tends to rest his argument for 
expansion on safety and liberty, his writings are also infused with the view that being on 
the march is the grander way of life. 
At Machiavelli's own time, some writers were beginning to argue for the idea of a 
·balancing league as opposed to expansionism. Likewise, most twentieth-century realists 
favour balance-of-power politics. According to Morgenthau, the aim of the balance of 
power is "the preservation of peace and security" as well as "the preservation of the 
independence of individual states."547 Waltz writes that balance-of-power politics is the 
only alternative to "power-politics" and "probable suicide."548 For Waltz, maintaining a 
balance is itself a normative end: "Where a balance of power does exist, it behooves the 
state that desires peace as well as safety to become neither too strong nor too weak. "549 
Implicit in the idea of balance as a moral norm is a rejection of the ancient and medieval 
acceptance of imperialism as a necessary or glorious end. 
The two other major alternatives to imperialist discourse and practice are just war 
theory and international law. However, if "men cannot secure themselves except with 
power" (D 1.1.4), then the latter two, to be secure, must rest on a balance of power. While 
the criteria of just war theory aim to constrain the unjust use of force, one of the major 
problems with the theory is, as Erasmus points out, that every prince thinks his own cause 
547 Politics among Nations, p. 213; also seep. 181. 
5~8 Man, the State and War, pp. 205, 222. 
549 Ibid., p. 222. 
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is just. 550 In regard to restraining the use of force through international agreements, 
Machiavelli was well aware of the major weakness therein: "among private men laws, 
writings and agreements make them keep their word; but among princes nothing but arms 
makes them keep it."551 Although I am arguing for balance-of-power politics as a counter 
to imperialist discourse and as the foundation of a moral realism, this principle also has its 
problems. For one, it is difficult to measure each state's power, its changes in power and 
the combined power of states in their various configurations. Second, as the theory gained 
acceptance in the seventeenth century, the concern for the ba\ance in Europe spread to 
colonial territories as well, thus becoming a justification for colonial expansion (and a 
similar concern fueled proxy wars during the Cold War).552 Third, while its aim is to 
maintain peace, the theory may be used to justify a preemptive war for the sake of 
maintaining a balance (as we saw, for example, in the quote from Bacon). Fourth, to be an 
effective deterrent, the states which desire peace must have enough power to balance 
those with aggressive aims. And, fifth, alliance partners cannot necessarily be relied upon 
to act in union. Although the balance-of-power principle is far from ideal, it does have a 
moderating quality, something which stands in stark contrast to the imperialist policy that 
Machiavelli still took to be the norm and ideal. 
Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Spiritedness 
550 The Education of a Christian Prince, ch. 11, p. 251. 
551 
"Words to be Spoken on the Law for Appropriating Money," in Chief Works, vol. 3, p. 
1442. 
552 On colonial expansion and the balance of power see Anderson, The Rise of Modern 
Diplomacy, pp. 170-72; Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 104. 
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In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama charts the change in 
spirit and values that occurred during the Enlightenment. His discussion helps to further 
clarify why some of Machiavelli's views are less relevant in our times than they were in 
his. One consequence of this change is that Machiavelli's concern with greatness is taken 
up by Nietzsche in a way that is more.pressing for our times. While Machiavelli is 
concerned with political greatness, Nietzsche is concerned with cultural greatness. 
Admittedly, Nietzsche's idolization of greatness is anti-egalitarian in spirit; despite being 
in that way untimely, his writings provide an incisive diagnosis of modernity. 
Fukuyama' s discussion of thymos (spiritedness) and megalothymia (a word he 
coins) explains why Machiavelli and Nietzsche have different conceptions of what 
constitutes greatness .. Fukuyama adopts the concept of thymos from Socrates' discussion 
of the soul in Plato's Republic. Therein, Socrates argues that the soul has three parts: a 
desiring part, a spirited part and a reasoning part.553 The virtue he associates with the 
spirited part is courage (andreia). Fukuyama coins megalothymia to signify an abundance 
of thymos and defines it as "the desire to be recognized as superior to other people. "554 He 
then considers how different thinkers have addressed the qualities of thymos and 
megalothymia and how their conceptions have helped to shape social values. Seen in this 
light, Fukuyama argues that the history of the West shows "the emergence, growth, and 
eventual decline of megalothymia. "555 He dates the beginning of the decline to the attack 
on princely and aristocratic pride initiated by Hobbes, Locke and their successors-
553 The End of History, pp. 163-64. 
554 Ibid., p. 182. 
555 Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
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thinkers who placed a higher moral weight on self-preservation and material well-being 
than on recognition of superiority. 556 
According to Fukuyama, the spirited quality which Plato calls thymos is the same 
quality that Machiavelli calls desire for glory and that Hobbes calls pride. 557 He argues 
that Hobbes, and succeeding liberal thinkers, turned the reasoning and desiring parts of 
human nature against pride and the desire for glory.558 Hobbes' concern with suppres.sing 
the thymotic part of the soul, and especially its expression in political life, is evident 
throughout his works. In De Cive (1642), he praises monarchy since "anyone who is 
prepared to live quietly is free of danger, whatever the character of the ruler. Only the 
ambitious suffer, the rest are protected from being wronged by the powerful."559 In 
Leviathan (1651), he explains that the work's title, his name for the sovereign power, 
alludes to the description of the biblical Leviathan in the last two verses of Job 41: "There 
is nothing on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. Hee 
seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride."560 As in De 
Cive, Hobbes sees it as a virtue of the sovereign power that it can hold down the proud 
and ambitious. In Behemoth (1668), he restricts the expression of fortitude to soldiers and 
the sovereign: "Fortitude is a royal virtue; and though it be necessary in such private men 
as shall be soldiers, yet, for other men, the less they dare, the better it is both for the 
556 Ibid., pp. 160, 184-85. As Fukuyama acknowledges, his reading is indebted to Strauss' 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 
557 Ibid., p. 162. 
558 Ibid., pp. 184-85. 
559 On the Citizen, p. 120. Also see Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 251. 
560 Quoted in Leviathan, ch. 29. For Fukuyama on this point see The End of History, p. 
157. 
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Commonwealth and for themselves."561 "Fortitude" he says in Leviathan, chapter 6, is 
"Magnanimity, in Danger of Death, or Wounds." Since_ fortitude is not a virtue for 
subjects, the courageous or thymotic part of the soul is to be repressed through fear of 
death and physical harm. The virtue of subjects is "to obey the laws" and "justly and 
moderately to enrich themselves" (Behemoth). 562 By advocating the oppression of the 
daring and ambitious men who would wish to oppress, Hobbes envisions a society of 
equal men, stripped of pride, fearful of violent death, living a life of moderate enrichment. 
As witnesses to the emergence of the Dutch and English bourgeoisie, Hobbes and Locke 
were responding to a change already occurring in their society. Locke's Second Treatise 
(1690) became the locus classicus for the justification of unlimited acquisition (5.46-50). 
Although separated by a chasm insofar as Hobbes champions absolute government and 
Locke limited government, both have no place for aristocratic megalothymia, instead 
valorizing just acquisition as a safer channel for thymos. 
As Fukuyama points out, the ideas propagated by Enlightenment thinkers have 
been so successful that in modem liberal democracies it is considered unacceptable to 
exhibit the desire to be recognized as superior to others. 563 Likewise, it is now considered 
unacceptable to pursue recognition in its greatest classical manifestations-conquest and 
empire. In the dominant discourse of our time, the reversal has been so thorough that 
conquest and imperialism are now considered immoral rather than glorious. The word 
"glory" itself rarely occurs at all in contemporary political discourse, and on the few 
561 Behemoth, dialogue 1, p. 44. Quoted in Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobb~s, p. 
120. 
562 Dialogue 1, p. 44. 
563 The End of History, p. 190. 
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occasions it does, it is usually reserved for those who died in a defensive war. Thus an 
epochal shift has occurred between Machiavelli's time and ours: Enlightenment thinkers 
were largdy successful in their devaluation of aristocratic values, and the honour 
attributed to political office at Machiavelli's time seems considerably lowered in modem 
parliamentary politics. Liberal institutions constrain megalothymia, yet still off er an outlet 
for thymos. 564 These changes are likely connected. When most borders are agreed upon 
and struggles over imperium, that is, both security and conquest, are not at the forefront 
of political life, there is less at stake in politics and high office is bound to fall in prestige. 
Political office becomes just one among many outlets for thymos. 
Liberal thinkers had good reason to tame the aristocratic desire to be recognized 
as superior: the proud man's contumely, the violence that comes from making good of 
vaunts, battles for prestige, the glorification of war. It is further a tribute to the 
Enlightenment critique of military glory that the unabashed assertion of greatness in the 
form of conquest and empire has tended to lose its lustre. The question is, what has been 
the cost of repressing the thymotic part of the soul in the name of self-preservation and 
material well-being? To answer this question, Fukuyama turns to Nietzsche-"the 
greatest and most articulate champion of thymos in modem times. "565 Following 
Fukuyama, I will now tum to Nietzsche's writings, not only because he is a champion of 
thymos but also because-as a sign of our times-he sees its greatest outlet in culture 
rather than politics. 
564 Ibid., pp. 187-88. 
565 Ibid., p. 188. 
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In an aphorism on "Conscript armies" in Human, All Too Human (1878), 
Nietzsche touches on several of the issues that concern Machiavelli: ambition, the Greeks, 
the Romans, patria, a civilian army. Nietzsche, however, takes a decisive stand against 
patriotism as mankind's highest end: 
as the Greeks once waded in Greek blood, so Europeans now do in European 
blood; and it is always the most highly cultivated, those who guarantee a good and 
abundant posterity, who are sacrificed in relatively the l;ugest numbers: for they 
stand in the van of the battle as the commanders and on account of their superior 
ambition expose themselves most to danger. - Now Uetzt], when quite different 
and higher missions than patria and honor demand to be done, crude Roman 
patriotism is either something dishonest or a sign of retardedness 
[ Zuriickgebliebenheit]. 566 
Nietzsche marks his discourse with a temporal "now" signifying that Europe has entered 
a new historical epoch. Although war persists and the ambitious are still willing.to risk 
their lives for honour, society's highest needs have changed. He sees Europe's wars as 
civil wars in which the lives of its most ambitious, cultivated men are wasted. Europe 
requires the talents of its best minds for a more important task than those of the patria; 
patriotic ends are regressive compared to these "higher missions." Nietzsche returns to 
this idea in another aphorism, from the same chapter, entitled "Grand politics and what 
they cost." Here he explains the greatest cost of war to be that "the most prominent talents 
are. continually sacrificed on the 'altar of the fatherland' or the national thirst for honour." 
Grand politics channel a nation's energy into war, leading to "spiritual impoverishment" 
and "a diminution of the capacity for undertakings demanding great concentration and 
application."567 The higher missions now needed are concerned with what Nietzsche calls 
566 Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, aphorism 442. 
567 Ibid., aphorism 481. 
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the spiritual. Like the Enlightenment philosophers, he no longer sees conquest as a thing 
of glory. But, further, the Enlightenment inadvertently opened a new spiritual abyss and 
overcoming that abyss is a higher mission than any patriotic one. 
According to Nietzsche, seeking and asserting power atrophies a nation's "spirit." 
Periods of political weakness, on the other hand, rejuvenate its spirit and culture. 568 
Nietzsche does, however, also see a value in war. He calls war the "hibernation time of 
culture," a hibernation from which mankind emerges more natural and barbarian. 569 He 
. expands on this line of thought in an aphorism entitled "War indispensible."570 The 
"barbarism" of war, he argues, revives the "new energy" necessary to maintain a vital 
culture. While he points out that a society may find "surrogates for war"-the Romans in 
animal-baiting, gladiatorial combats and persecuting Christians; Englishmen in perilous 
naval exploration and mountain climbing-they are, he suggests, a sign of its 
enfeeblement. Tacitus would agree with Nietzsche's assessment that such surrogates are a 
sign of degeneration: "What remained, except that they should also bare their bodies and 
take up boxing gloves and perform fights of that type instead of soldiering and weapons?" 
(Annals 14.20 ). In Shelley's Frankenstein, the letters of Wal ton, an English naval 
explorer, also support Nietzsche's point. Walton, having rejected the bourgeois ideals of 
comfort and accumulation, explains that he "preferred glory to every enticement that 
wealth placed in my path."571 While Walton still exhibits ambition for greatness, even at 
568 Ibid., aphorism 465. 
569 Ibid., aphorism 444. 
570 Ibid., aphorism 477. 
571 Frankenstein, p. 17. 
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the risk of death, it is channeled, as Nietzsche chidingly writes of the British, into 
exploration. 
While Nietzsche valorizes culture's highest achievements, he sees a dangerous 
dialectic in culture: the more "highly cultivated" it becomes the more "feeble" it 
becomes. 572 Thus a highly civilized culture that has "unlearned how to wage war" risks 
being deprived not only of its culture but of its very existence. Like Nietzsche, 
Machiavelli also insists that there is no surrogate for knowing how to wage war; he 
mocks what he considered to be bloodless battles and saw them as a source of Italy's 
weakness when confronted by foreign armies. 573 The difference between the two is the 
nature of their concern: Machiavelli's is practical, Nietzsche's spiritual. For Nietzsche, 
the significant point is that the energy released in war "will later under favourable 
circumstances tum the wheels in the workshop of the spirit." Nietzsche returns to the 
dialectic between barbarism and high culture in Beyond Good and Evil where he writes· 
that because the Germans are "closer to barbarism than the French" they create "stronger, 
more daring, more severe and more elevated things."574 However, even if it were true that 
the barbarism of war is in some way a catalyst for cultural vitality-a claim he perhaps 
bases on the particular experience of Athens in the fifth century BCE-to praise war on 
that ground is to make a gruesome cost-benefit analysis.575 Thus while aiming to 
572 These two quotations, and the following one, are still from Human, All Too Human, 
a~horism 4 77. 
5 3 AW 2.305-308, 7.236-38; FH 5.1, 5.33, 6.1. 
574 BGE, aphorism 256. 
575 Hegel's view is similar to that of Nietzsche: "just as the movement of the winds 
preserves the sea from stagnation which a lasting calm would produce-a stagnation 
276 
faithfully represent Nietzsche's thought, the main point I wish to emphasize here is that 
his writings show a tum from the privileging of patriotic ends to cultural and spiritual 
ones.· 
Nietzsche continues his critique of grand politics in Beyond Good and Evil (1886). 
As in Human, All Too Human, he argues against the "narrowness" of "patriotism" and for 
"good Europeanism."576 Without naming Bismarck or German unification, he expresses 
disdain for a statesman who would awe the masses with "some monstrosity of power and 
empire."577 He reproaches its "grand politics" since "that nation had hitherto had 
something better to do and think about and in the depths of its soul still retained a 
cautious disgust for the restlessness, emptiness and noisy wrangling of those nations 
which actually do practise politics." Nietzsche does not, however, overly concern himself 
with the regression of his patria since "when one nation become·s spiritually shallower 
there is a compensation for it: another becomes deeper." He picks up this same topic in 
Twilight of the Idols, adding: "The moment Germany rises as a great power, France gains 
a new importance as a cultural power. A great deal of current spiritual seriousness and 
passion has already emigrated to Paris."578 For Nietzsche, greatness has nothing to do 
with military power; rather, it must come from spiritual depths and address the cultural 
abyss at the centre of modernity. Both Machiavelli and Nietzsche are concerned with 
which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace would also produce among nations" 
(Philosophy of Right, sec. 324). 
576 Quotations from BGE aphorism 241; also see aphorism 254. For Machiavelli's praise 
of the "good European" in Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, see aphorism 475. 
577 This citation and the following are from BGE aphorism 241. 
578 This and the following quote are from "What the Germans Lack," aphorism 4 
(emphasis in the original). 
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what the former calls educazione and the latter Cultur, but whereas Machiavelli's concern 
with educazione bears primarily on how morality and religion affect the art of state, for 
Nietzsche the very foundations of morality and religion have fallen into question. Since 
the status of morality is less firmly grounded now than in the Renaissance, morality itself 
is in need of a grounding. 
Nietzsche shows ·his modernity not only by el~vating culture above politics but 
also through his regard for balance-of-power politics. In Human, All Too Human, he 
argues that balance is the foundation of justice. Since aiming at "preponderance" over 
neighbours leads to long drawn-out wars, he notes that 
the community prefers to bring its power of defence and attack up to precisely 
the point at which the power possessed by its dangerous neighbour stands and 
then to give him to understand that the scales are now evenly balanced: why, in 
that event, should they not be good friends with one another. Equilibrium is thus a 
very important conceJ?t for the oldest theory of law and morality; equilibrium is 
the basis of justice. 57 
Nietzsche attributes this concept of balance to Thucydides, a debt he acknowledges in 
another aphorism: "Justice (fairness) originates between parties of approximately equal 
power, as Thucydides correctly grasped (in the terrible colloquy between the Athenian 
and Melian ambassadors)."580 The first quotation, relying on the scale metaphor, indicates 
how a balance of power may provide peace and even friendship. While this is similar to 
the concept of balance that began to emerge in both theory and practice in quattrocento 
Italy, Nietzsche, by going back to Thucydides' Athenian ambassadors, also accepts the 
inverse: that where there is not a balance of power, power, not justice, will prevail. The 
579 Human, All Too Human, vol. 2, part 2, aphorism 22. 
580 Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, aphorism 92. 
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Athenian ambassadors themselves made the argument in order to justify the negative side 
of the principle. In the modem period, the balance-of-power principle gained currency as 
a means to provide stability and security, for where there is a balance of power there is 
more likely to be justice, if not friendship. 
Justice 
As we have seen, the argument that rulers, for the sake of security, may 
occasionally have to act against moral norms is uncontroversial for realists. Nonetheless, 
one of the things that remains troubling about Machiavelli is that in his writings the 
principle takes on such a broad application, even excusing immoral acts for the sake of 
expansion. In accord with the dominant spirit of his time, he takes for granted that 
imperium is one of the greatest goods, but he almost wholly neglects the question of 
whether imperium is acquired justly. Instead, he focuses on how to acquire prudently, that 
is, how to acquire in such a way that a city may maintain what it acquires. Thus his 
concern with justice arises only when it is prudent to be just. His writings fail not only to 
consider how to achieve justice among nations but even undermine the question, for in his 
view ambition, avarice and necessity lead to a never ending struggle for imperium. His 
response to this predicament was, like the Romans, to privilege the vita activa over the 
vita contemplativa. 
One must concede to Machiavelli the continuing significance of the struggle for 
imperium even after his time. It should also be granted to Machiavelli that the common 
good of a state rests on civic and military virtue. And, as is often pointed out, without 
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political order, all other human endeavors and values remain precarious. Thus the ethic of 
the vita activa and its commitment to the common good-the just common good, for 
justice is more wondrous than the evening and morning star-help to fortify political life. 
Yet at the same time one hears another need arising from the hollow din of postmodern 
metropolises: the ever-loudening echo of ~he challenge posed by Zarathustra's alpine cry 
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